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ABSTRACT 
 
The three studies in this dissertation explore the relationship between Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) and Corporate Financial Performance (CFP).  CSR consists of social, 
ethical, and environmental performance dimensions that have not traditionally appeared in 
mandated financial reports and largely reflect societal expectations for corporate behavior 
beyond legal and regulatory constraints.  CSR is reflected in both corporate actions (performance 
outcomes) and voluntary reporting (disclosure), and the two are not necessarily equivalent due to 
managerial discretion in disclosure.  Although the mechanisms remain unclear, the general 
consensus is that there is a positive relationship between CSR and CFP.  In considering the 
drivers and goals of CSR, two themes emerge and are used to inform these papers:  a stakeholder 
view of organizational relationships and the need to signal legitimacy in the face of changing 
social norms.  A stakeholder view asserts that a wide range of groups across society are 
important to the long-term success and health of the organization.  Legitimacy theory provides 
the explanation of why the stakeholder view is important to organizational success and can 
produce significant strategic advantages. 
The first study utilizes archival data in an exploration of how to model the relationship 
between Corporate Social Performance (CSP) and CFP.  Using independent evaluations of 
organizational CSP from KLD STATS, I explore the CSP-CFP relationship at four different 
levels (overall CSP, component CSP, directional component CSP, and issue-based component 
CSP).  I consider the effect of CSP on a range of outcome measures of CFP performance, at 
different levels of aggregated performance measures and linkage to stakeholder groups.  Finally, 
I explore the pattern of significant CSP components on individual CFP outcome measures to 
iv 
 
determine if there is evidence for changing associations based on relevant stakeholder groups, in 
answer to concerns raised by prior research (Wood and Jones 1995; Orlitzky, Schmidt, and 
Rynes 2003).  I find that (a) stock market measures are extremely insensitive to CSP; (b) the 
appropriate measurement level of CSP varies with the degree to which the CFP measure is 
aggregated and attributable to a more focused group of stakeholders; and (c) significant CSP 
aspects and associated CFP outcomes do vary in patterns and sensitivity. 
The second study examines the role voluntary social disclosure plays in economic 
performance through an attribute I term resilience.  Resilience influences stakeholder resource 
allocation decisions in the face of unexpected poor performance attributable to an exogenous 
shock and is associated with perceived organizational legitimacy.  To test this model, an 
experiment is conducted in which participants are asked to assess the perceived legitimacy of an 
organization based on information characteristics of voluntary CSR disclosure and then to make 
reallocation decisions in the face of poor performance caused by an industry crisis not involving 
the underlying organization.  I find that high quality disclosure (driven by reporting accuracy) is 
significantly associated with greater perceived legitimacy.  In turn, the legitimacy construct is 
significantly associated with resilience following an exogenous shock. 
The final study considers organizational choices in CSR disclosure to preserve credibility 
in the face of a crisis threatening the legitimacy of the institutional framework.  Using qualitative 
data surrounding the turbulent 2001 – 2002 period encompassing the Enron and WorldCom 
scandals and the fall of Andersen, I examine organizational voluntary disclosure decisions to 
ascertain how they sought to preserve their own informational credibility and legitimacy in the 
face of a threat that did not directly involve their actions.  I find that organizations responded 
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throughout this period by increasing signals of both transparency (greater CSR disclosure) and 
credibility (greater use of external sources of assurance of that disclosure).  I also find that third-
party assurance was not widely used, and remained at a steady, minimal percentage over time.  
Overwhelmingly, organizations turned to the implementation of an independent, external 
reporting framework (e.g., the Global Reporting Initiative’s widespread guidelines) that provided 
consistency and comparability in their reporting, made use of standardized measurements and 
definitions, and required specific items and measures. 
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CHAPTER ONE:  INTRODUCTION 
 
Introduction 
 
Increasingly, social and environmental performance dimensions are becoming a factor of 
organizational life.  Whether one believes with Friedman (1970) that a concern for anything 
other than stockholder profits represents a socialistic appropriation of wealth or with Freeman 
(Freeman 1984; Freeman, Harrison, and Wicks 2007) that globalization and technology have 
rendered the “stockholder centered” model obsolete, observation of the behavior of public 
companies demonstrates the astonishing number and diversity of firms claiming to be “green,” 
“sustainable,” or otherwise environmentally and socially responsible.  Prior research has debated 
the reasons for firms engaging in Corporate Social Performance (CSP) reporting,
1
 from both a 
theoretical and a practical standpoint.  Although the mechanisms remain unclear, and temporal 
relations are cloudy, the general consensus is that CSP is associated with an economic benefit 
and that the stakeholder model is an important factor in this relationship (Jones 1995; Porter and 
van der Linde 1995; Wood and Jones 1995: Cormier and Magnan 1999; Ruf et al. 2001; 
Margolis and Walsh 2003; Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes 2003; Barnett 2007; Margolis, 
Elfenbein, and Walsh 2007; Doh et al. 2010; Dhaliwal et al. 2011). 
The purpose of this stream of research is to explore the relationship between Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR) and organizational economic performance.  CSR is reflected both in 
corporate actions (social performance) and in reporting (social disclosure).  As CSR disclosure is 
                                                 
1
 CSP reflects actual performance outcomes; Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) reflects the organization’s 
stated policies and positions on these issues.  CSP (or CSR) is comprised of social, environmental, and governance 
elements. 
2 
 
largely voluntary, the lack of standardization and the degree of managerial discretion as to what 
is reported and how it is measured (and defined) can result in image management and non-
credible information (more of “spin” than signaling) and what is disclosed might not truly reflect 
performance (Merkl-Davies and Brennan 2007).  Both social disclosure and social performance 
might affect economic performance (Ullmann 1985), and the mechanisms among these three 
aspects of organizational behavior and outcomes are still not clearly understood.  To add to the 
complexity, CSR does not consist of a single factor, and the factors might not be weighted 
identically or reflect the interests of identical groups of stakeholders. 
Two themes emerge within the stream of CSR literature and are used to inform these 
papers.  A stakeholder view asserts that a wide range of groups across society are important to 
the long-term success and health of the organization, and addressing their needs and interests can 
produce significant strategic advantages (Hill and Jones 1992; Jones 1995; Freeman 1984; 
Freeman, Harrison, and Wicks 2007).  Legitimacy theory (Dowling and Pfeffer 1975) provides 
an explanation of why a stakeholder view of the firm is important to organizational success.  
Society controls the allocation of scarce resources (capital, labor, markets for goods, raw 
materials) and constrains organizational behavior via regulation to ensure that organizational 
processes and outcomes reflect and incorporate societal norms, values, and goals.  Legitimacy is 
a continuum, however, rather than an absolute state.  Basic legitimacy depends on organizational 
competence and compliance with institutional norms and expectations reflected in laws and 
regulation and upheld by industry and professional association conventions (Suchman 1995).  
Full legitimacy goes “above and beyond” these minimal requirements and reflects a broader, 
non-codified range of social and economic values, thus reflecting a longer-term relational 
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commitment, as opposed to an exclusively profit-centered, transactional emphasis.  Where an 
organization lies on the legitimacy continuum is dependent on how much of the “legitimacy gap” 
between basic and full legitimacy it chooses to close (Lindblom 2010). 
Mandatory disclosure establishes basic legitimacy.  Voluntary disclosure, however, 
moves the organization beyond basic legitimacy and towards full legitimacy.  The degree to 
which the legitimacy gap is closed is dependent on voluntary disclosure credibility and 
organizational trustworthiness.  CSR disclosure predominates as this information reflects the 
non-mandated, non-economic societal values and goals not incorporated into mandated financial 
reporting.  CSR disclosure will then logically influence resource allocation, based on the degree 
to which organizations have displayed greater respect for the informational needs of relevant 
stakeholder groups.  Although mandatory disclosures (i.e., the financial statements) are 
determined in terms of content and format, the discretionary, non-financial information desired 
by the full range of stakeholders might vary widely in content, measures, and format.  Some of 
this variance is due to the difficulty of establishing objective measures or developing new 
measurement methods; but much of this variance is also due to managerial discretion and might 
be attributed to organizational attempts at impression management (Arya and Mittendorf 2005: 
Cho, Roberts, and Patten 2010; Merkl-Davies and Brennan 2007).  Stakeholders are aware of 
this and tend to be skeptical of organizational intentions and behaviors in the light of recent 
widespread ethical scandals (Bazerman, Loewenstein, and Moore 2002; Bazerman et al. 2006; 
Moore et al. 2006).  Consequently, stakeholders assess organizational information in terms of 
both content and intent, discounting corporate disclosures due to credibility issues (Barnett 2007; 
Kothari, Li, and Short 2009). 
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The degree to which CSR disclosure and CSR performance correlate will determine the 
credibility of the information and its ability to affect economic performance.  Where there is a 
low correlation (i.e., image management), the information is deemed less credible and might 
result in weaker (or less persistent) judgments of legitimacy and the concomitant allocation of 
resources.  Consequently, organizational economic performance is partially dependent on social 
performance, the degree to which social performance is credibly reflected in social disclosure, 
and the degree to which various components of CSR reflect the interests of the organization’s 
key stakeholders.  CSR is not costless or easy to implement:  therefore, organizations must 
believe such activities to be demonstrably in their best interest to engage in CSR actions and 
disclosures.  A recent survey of top corporate officers for sustainability in major international 
organizations found that nearly half of the respondents thought that “sustainable practices would 
definitely improve profitability” for their companies, and one manager went so far as to state that 
for every dollar spent on sustainability, the company experienced a return of $1.50 to $2.00 
(KPMG 2011, 3).  CEOs also believe that CSR contributes to improved overall performance and 
that environmental, social, and governance factors need to be embedded within the core business 
model (Accenture 2010). 
The motivation behind these studies is the recent escalation in organizations involved in 
reporting CSR.  In an era of globalization, consumer activism, and economic uncertainty, 
organizations recognize that their success depends on a broader audience with wide-spread 
access to information via the Internet (KPMG 2005, 2008).  These stakeholders desire 
information in order to assess overall organizational performance and define this performance 
much more broadly than stockholders or analysts.  In response, organizations increasingly 
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engage in voluntary disclosures of CSR.  KPMG reported in 2005 that 64% of the Global 
Fortune 250 published CSR information in some format, and that number jumped to 83% in 
2008 (KPMG 2005, 2008).
2
  New definitions of performance include qualitative and 
“citizenship” issues such as quality, governance, employee relations, sustainability, and human 
rights.  Failure to address these concerns increases assessed risk and regulatory costs and 
decreases available resources.  In a series of surveys of multinational firms’ perceptions of their 
top risks, several items pertaining to CSR performance and resource allocation found their way 
into the top 10 (Ernst & Young 2009, 2010).  “Access to credit” and “increased regulation and 
compliance” were in the top two slots for 2008, 2009, and 2010 (Table 1), while “reputation 
risks” rose to 10th place in 2009 and, specifically as “Social acceptance risk and corporate social 
responsibility,” moved to 9th place in 2010.  These risks reflect the influence of multiple key 
stakeholder groups beyond shareholders alone. 
The Internet, market liberalization, globalization, and increased activism have resulted in 
a climate in which company performance (especially negative events) is quickly known around 
the world (Freeman, Harrison, and Wicks 2007).  Disasters are no longer local:  an oil spill in 
Australia can produce demands for increased environmental monitoring and safeguards at every 
company site, from North American to Africa (Deegan, Rankin, and Voght 2000) and can 
directly influence other, “innocent” members of the same industry (Blacconiere and Patten 
1994).  Well-organized and vocal stakeholder groups and the competitive, globalized economy 
                                                 
2
 Increasing European demand for CSR type disclosures (although this demand is not universal in terms of content, 
format or whether mandatory) also is a factor in the increase in reporting across the Global 250.  However, the 
changes in European disclosure requirements have been greatly driven by stakeholder activism and thus also reflect 
stakeholder engagement pressures. 
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have produced increased public pressure and, in response, increased organizational sustainability 
reporting to demonstrate legitimacy (Neu, Warsame, and Pedwell 1998). 
As a result, organizations face increasing pressures to disclose non-financial 
performance.  The pressure arises not only from stakeholder groups (and society in general), but 
also from competitors who, if they are able to demonstrate greater responsiveness to societal 
concerns and values, might attract stakeholder support and scarce resources away from poorer 
performing organizations.  Competitiveness and legitimacy have been found to be two of the 
driving forces behind organizational decisions to “go green” and engage in environmental 
reporting (Bansal and Roth 2000), but some organizations (e.g., Starbucks) are moving even 
further and acknowledging a responsibility to account for social, environmental, and governance 
performance.  By voluntarily signaling long-term commitment to sustainability and stakeholder 
values, these firms should be perceived as more trustworthy, enjoy greater stakeholder 
commitment, and therefore have greater access to resources and less likelihood of governmental 
regulation. 
Ullman’s (1985) model of the possible interactions among social disclosure, social 
performance, and economic performance provides a framework for these three studies (Figure 1).  
Beginning with an archival exploration of the structure of the relationship between CSP and 
corporate financial performance (CFP), I seek to determine the appropriate factors and 
measurement level of organizational CSR.  In the second study, I explore this relationship by 
proposing a psychological construct based on perceived legitimacy derived from information 
characteristics in voluntary disclosure (“resilience”).  Resilience operates to benefit the more 
legitimate organization by influencing stakeholder resource allocation decisions in the face of 
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unexpected poor performance.  Finally, in the third study, I consider voluntary reporting and 
external sources of credibility that are able to strengthen legitimacy following an exogenous 
shock from a loss of credibility in the surrounding institutional structure. 
 
Study One:  Exploring the Interface of Corporate Economic and Social Performance:  What 
Matters to Whom? 
 
Considerable effort has been expended in ascertaining what effect, if any, CSR 
performance and/or disclosure has on economic performance (Cochran and Wood 1984; 
Ullmann 1985; Berthelot, Cormier, and Magnan 2003; Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes 2003; 
Margolis, Elfenbein, and Walsh 2007).  The overall conclusion is that CSR has a positive effect 
on economic performance, but the mechanisms by which this occurs remain unclear (Cormier 
and Magnan 1999; Ruf et al. 2001; Margolis and Walsh 2003; Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes 
2003; Margolis, Elfenbein, and Walsh 2007; Doh et al. 2010; Dhaliwal et al. 2011).  The 
uncertainty in the relationship (and variance across prior studies) includes questions of how CSR 
variables should be measured and the appropriate financial outcome measures to be used.  
Consequently, the first study explores measurement issues between CSR and economic 
performance via the lens of stakeholder theory. 
Stakeholder theory asserts that organizations are dependent on a wide range of social 
groups for their success, and a myopic focus on a single group (i.e., shareholders) will result in, 
at best, lack of long-term competitive advantage and decreased performance (Freeman 1984; 
Freeman, Harrison, and Wicks 2007; Eccles, Ioannou, and Serafeim 2011).  One of the chief 
explanations for inconsistent results in analysis of the CSP-CFP link is that the CSP and CFP 
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variables usually chosen reflect the interests of differing stakeholder groups, weakening their 
relationship (Wood and Jones 1995; Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes 2003).  There have also been 
indications that (a) the measurement level of CSP (e.g., aggregated, overall performance vs. 
individual issues) might be a significant cause of weaker statistical relationships, (b) negative 
and positive information might be weighted differently, and (c) relevant CSP factors might vary 
across groups or CFP measures (Carroll 1979; Berman et al. 1999; Cormier, Gordon, and 
Magnan 2004). 
Using an independent assessment of CSP provided by KLD STATS and Compustat data 
for a variety of organizations across industries over three years, the study tests the relationships 
among different measurement levels of CSP and a range of CFP measures.  Using hierarchical 
regression, four different models are evaluated for their ability to explain variance and differing 
patterns of CSP factors across a range of CFP outcomes designed to reflect differing stakeholder 
groups.  The study contributes to the literature by exploring the still nebulous structure of the 
CSP-CFP relationship and the varying strength of this relationship across a broader range of CFP 
outcomes.  I find that the most appropriate measurement level for CSP factors varies with the 
measurement level (and degree of aggregated performance) for the CFP outcome measure.  For 
measures of stock price, overall CSP is only occasionally significant.  For measures of net cash 
flow, the most appropriate CSP measurement level is directional at the individual component 
level (environmental, human rights, diversity, employee relations, community relations, 
governance, and product quality).  For revenue, however, which is directly and clearly associated 
with a single stakeholder group (customers), the most sensitive CSP measurement level appears 
to be issue-based within components.  Additionally, I find that the strength (and extensiveness) 
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of the association varies considerably across CFP outcome measures, and these associations 
might be directly related to the stakeholder groups predominantly concerned with the given 
outcome. 
 
Study Two:  The Benefit of the Doubt:  Resilience in Stakeholder Assessments of Corporate 
Social Performance Disclosure 
 
The second study explores the interaction between CSP disclosure and economic 
performance, specifically in the face of unexpected poor performance following an industry 
crisis.  High quality voluntary CSR disclosures might close the legitimacy gap between 
institutional requirements and non-codified, often emergent societal norms and values by 
increasing perceived legitimacy, primarily through investor assessments of information 
credibility and organizational trustworthiness.  When an organization demonstrates concern for 
broader social values, and goes “above and beyond” in its actions and reporting, this signals a 
commitment to longer-term, mutually beneficial relationships with its stakeholders.  There is a 
strong link between this level of “full” legitimacy and “thick trust” (Vosselman and van der 
Meer-Kooistra 2009), with increases in voluntary disclosure quality leading to increased 
assessments of disclosure credibility.  The quality of voluntary disclosures is largely determined 
by the completeness and the accuracy of the information.  Higher quality disclosures will be 
more complete (including both positive and negative performance reports) and more accurate 
(containing more specific details and quantitative information) (Cormier and Magnan 1999; 
Merkl-Davies and Brennan 2007).  The combination of completeness and accuracy also 
contributes to stakeholder perceptions of organizational intent in disclosure along the continuum 
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of impression management to transparency (Merkl-Davies and Brennan 2007).  In turn, 
perceptions of intent and the extent of the disclosure will tend to produce assessments of 
organizational trustworthiness (Koonce and Mercer 2005).   
Greater perceived legitimacy resulting from the information characteristics used in 
voluntary reporting will produce a fund of what I term “resilience” among stakeholders.  
Resilience reduces volatility in the face of unexpected poor performance by absorbing a portion 
of transactional or relational risk.  As a result, organizations that enjoy a greater degree of 
resilience should suffer less of a decline in resources in the face of bad news.  The importance of 
this relationship in an era of rapid, global change, technology-driven speed of communication, 
and an uncertain economic environment is considerable.   
The model is first tested with ANCOVA using a 2 x 2 factorial design (accuracy x 
completeness) to assess information characteristics’ influence on non-professional investors’ 
perceptions of organizational legitimacy.  Mean scores for individual items within the resilience 
factor display the expected relationships across conditions, with the greatest scores in the high 
accuracy/high completeness cell and the lowest scores in the low accuracy/low completeness 
cell.  I find that high quality voluntary disclosure characteristics significantly explain variance in 
legitimacy, with accuracy driving the relationship.  To test the link between perceived legitimacy 
and subsequent resilience to unexpectedly poor performance, the factor score for the construct of 
resilience is regressed on the factor score for the construct of perceived legitimacy.    I find that 
perceived legitimacy significantly accounts for variance in the construct of resilience.  Factor 
scores across individual cells also suggest that reporting accuracy is associated with perceived 
legitimacy and reporting completeness is associated with resilience. 
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Study Three:  In Bad Company:  Voluntary Disclosure and Preserving Credibility During 
External Crisis 
 
The third and final study addresses the interaction between social disclosure and social 
performance through the lens of legitimacy theory.  Social performance can be equated with 
legitimacy (Dowling and Pfeffer 1975) and will range from “basic” legitimacy reflective of 
competence and compliance with legal and regulatory requirements to “full” legitimacy that also 
incorporates non-mandatory incorporation of societal expectations.  Basic legitimacy is reflected 
in mandatory disclosures, whereas the degree to which the organization covers the “legitimacy 
gap” between basic and full legitimacy (Lindblom 2010) is reflected in voluntary reporting.  
However, voluntary reporting can also serve another, vital function. 
If basic legitimacy reflects compliance with institutional regulations and requirements, 
then the credibility of mandatory reporting is supported by the legitimacy of the institutional 
framework.  When a critical piece of that framework suffers a credibility crisis, as occurred with 
public accounting firms during the Andersen/Enron disaster, then the credibility of the 
mandatory disclosures of reporting organizations also suffers, even when the reporting 
organization has been uninvolved in the events surrounding the credibility crisis.  In this case, I 
predict that organizations will attempt to strengthen their own legitimacy by demonstrating 
increased transparency and credibility in voluntary reporting, signaling both their respect for 
societal norms and their difference from the failed institutional entity.  In order for voluntary 
disclosure to be able to fulfill this function, however, it must be perceived as credible.   Because 
of skepticism regarding management’s discretionary choices in what and how they report, 
independent, external sources of credibility enhancement (such as a reporting framework or use 
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of a third-party assurer) are normally used (Merkl-Davies and Brennan 2007; Kothari, Li, and 
Short 2009; Simnett, Vanstraelen, and Chua 2009; O’Dwyer, Owen, and Unerman 2011; 
Pflugrath, Roebuck, and Simnett 2011). 
Using qualitative data, I examine organizational voluntary CSR disclosure choices among 
S&P 500 companies during the turbulent 1998 – 2005 period.  In so doing, I contribute to the 
literature by shedding light on how organizations use information disclosure to protect and repair 
perceptions of legitimacy and their strategies for enhancing the credibility of voluntary 
disclosures.  Non-parametric analysis reveals that the use of both CSR disclosure and a reporting 
framework increases steadily and significantly before, during, and after a credibility crisis, while 
the use of third-party assurance (and auditors, specifically, as a source of third-party assurance) 
remains steady but minimal.  In fact, I find that during a credibility crisis centered on the 
credibility/legitimacy of public accounting firms as a component of the institutional framework, 
the use of auditors is never more than 50% of overall third-party assurers and decreases during 
the crisis period.  I find that disclosure intensity also increases during this period, with 
transparency being important immediately prior to the crisis, but transparency with at least one 
means of credibility enhancement accelerating during and after a crisis. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The association between CSP and CFP is a complex one.  CSR performance and CSR 
reporting are each related to CFP, as well as to each other.  CSR performance contributes to CFP, 
but the strength of the relationship will vary across measures of economic outcome, as will the 
individual CSR components that display an association with a given CFP factor.  Additionally, 
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economic outcome measures based on stock market performance are highly insensitive to CSR 
as the associated stakeholder group (shareholders) is chiefly concerned with financial 
performance only.  Therefore, a single, aggregated measure of CSR is not appropriate and 
measures that have used a single measure, or a single component of overall CSR performance, 
might explain the mixed results from prior studies. 
The relationship between CSR and CFP is not necessarily a direct one.  CSR might 
positively affect CFP by its influence on intervening constructs.  Some of the intervening 
constructs mentioned in the literature include organizational learning, strategic match, reputation, 
operational efficiency and effectiveness, and innovation.  Organizational disclosures of CSR 
performance, and the degree to which they are perceived as credible and trustworthy measures of 
actual performance, also lead to stakeholder judgments of organizational legitimacy.  Perceived 
legitimacy then affects stakeholders’ subsequent resource allocation decisions. 
The relationship between CSR performance and CSR disclosure is also an important 
contributor to CFP.  CSR disclosure can reflect organizational intentions and values both through 
the amount of information voluntarily provided to stakeholders (transparency) and the degree to 
which that information is rendered credible by the support of external, independent sources.  As 
such, choices in the information characteristics of voluntary CSR disclosures can help an 
organization close the legitimacy gap between institutionally mandated “basic” legitimacy and 
the “full” legitimacy reflective of societal norms not enshrined in regulation.  More importantly, 
in cases where the legitimacy of the institutional framework itself is questioned due to ethical 
scandals, compromised independence, or perceptions of its failure to protect the public interest 
(Bazerman, Loewenstein, and Moore 2002; Bazerman et al. 2006; Moore et al. 2006; Nelson 
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2006), voluntary disclosure can bolster the affected mandatory disclosures of “innocent” 
reporting organizations, allowing them to preserve or repair threatened legitimacy. 
The stream of research represented in this dissertation seeks to shed light on this 
complex, interdependent relationship through three studies examining each of the three possible 
associations among CSR performance, CSR disclosure, and CFP.  The next three chapters each 
contain one of the studies.  Chapter five concludes the dissertation, summarizing and linking the 
findings from the three individual studies, and discussing the overall themes emerging from 
research into organizational choices in CSR reporting and behavior. 
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Based on Ullmann’s (1985) framework 
Figure 1:  Conceptual Framework of Research Stream 
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Tables 
 
Table 1:  Ernst & Young Surveyed Top Global Business Risks and Relationships to Stakeholder 
groups 
Ernst & Young Top 10 
Global Risk 
Representative Stakeholder Group(s) 
Rank 
in 
2008 
Rank 
in 
2009 
Rank 
in 
2010 
Access to credit 
 
Creditors, Suppliers 2 1 2 
Increased regulation and 
compliance 
 
Regulators, Government, Local 
Communities 
1 2 1 
Radical greening 
 
Consumers, Regulators 9 4 8 
Non-traditional entrants 
 
Competitors 16 5 7 
Managing talent 
 
Employees 11 7 4 
Executing alliances and 
transactions 
 
Suppliers, Partners, Customers 7 8 10 
Reputation risks 
 
All Stakeholders 22 10  
Social acceptance risk and 
corporate social 
responsibility  
(new in 2010) 
Customers, Local Communities, 
Regulators, Government, Society 
n/a n/a 9 
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CHAPTER TWO:  EXPLORING THE INTERFACE OF CORPORATE 
FINANCIAL AND SOCIAL PERFORMANCE:  WHAT MATTERS TO 
WHOM? 
 
Introduction 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between Corporate Social 
Performance (CSP) and Corporate Financial Performance (CFP).  CSP is used as a label for 
corporate social, ethical, and environmental programs, processes, and outputs which, with one 
exception, are not required to be reported within the firm’s financial statements or other 
mandated reports.  The exception, of course, consists of the major costs and liabilities associated 
with failure in these areas (e.g., fines, environmental clean-up costs, and lawsuits).  Although 
factors that comprise CSP might have significant impacts on overall firm performance (Litan and 
Wallison 2000), many are harder to assess with standardized, quantitative measures and might 
operate through implicit contracts and expectations (Cornell and Shapiro 1987).  Examples of 
organizational performance areas that are often affected significantly by CSP factors include 
employee commitment and training, product quality, responsiveness and flexibility to market 
changes, and innovation (Moore 1993; Porter and van der Linde 1995; Grow, Hamm, and Lee 
2005; Freeman, Harrison, and Wicks 2007; Boehe and Cruz 2010).  This study seeks to explore 
the relationship between components of CSP and CFP and to examine the appropriate level of 
measurement and range of outcome measures.  The key assumptions underlying this study are 
that (1) neither CFP nor CSP is adequately measured by a single variable and (2) relationships 
among variables will vary across stakeholder groups and contexts (Barnett 2007; Margolis et al. 
2007). 
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Much ink and effort has been spent in prior research to argue for or against the role CSP 
plays in contributing to CFP, but our understanding of how corporate economic performance is 
affected by the interaction of stakeholder relationships and non-economic performance remains 
limited.  Nevertheless, an understanding of these interactions is important.  Stakeholder theory 
provides a meaningful theoretical base for examining the relationship between CSP and CFP 
(Freeman 1984; McWilliams and Siegel 2001; Barnett 2007; Freeman, Harrison, and Wicks 
2007; Mackey, Mackey, and Barney 2007) by explaining why performance in non-economic 
areas important to key stakeholder groups will, in turn, influence economic performance via the 
resources controlled by those stakeholders (e.g., labor, capital, raw materials, market share, etc.).  
If an organization’s stakeholders have expectations regarding non-financial performance, and 
these expectations determine subsequent allocation of resources (or willingness to forego 
increased regulation or contracting costs), then management needs to monitor, plan for, and 
report on the actions, policies, and outcomes affecting the relevant non-financial areas.  
Stakeholders will have an impact on organizational performance as they set expectations, 
evaluate outcomes, and reward or punish the firm based on that evaluation (Wood and Jones 
1995; Grow, Hamm, and Lee 2005; Barnett 2007).  Although stakeholder theory is the most 
frequent theoretical lens used to make the business case for Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR)
3
, there seems to be a consistent mismatch between the stakeholder approach (requiring 
consideration of multiple stakeholder groups) and the outcome measures used (which tend to 
predominantly focus on the priorities of shareholders) (Wood and Jones 1995). 
                                                 
3
 It is important to differentiate between CSR, a measure of perceived responsibility, obligation, or philosophical 
orientation towards stakeholders, and CSP, a measure of actual performance, outcomes, or verifiable policies.  CSP 
also differs from the measurement of perceptions of an organization, which are usually captured in reputational 
scores. 
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In general, reviews of prior literature have found a preponderance of evidence for at least 
a weakly positive correlation between CFP and CSP (Ullmann 1985; Orlitzky, Schmidt, and 
Rynes 2003; Margolis, Elfenbein, and Walsh 2007; Eccles, Ioannou, and Serafeim 2011).  Study 
results, however, have been mixed and are often attributed to lack of theoretical underpinnings or 
methodological problems, including measurement levels, mismatch between CSP and CFP 
variables, and poor measures in general (Alexander and Buchholz 1978; Ullmann 1985; Wood 
and Jones 1995; McWilliams and Siegel 2000; Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes 2003).  Most prior 
research has concentrated on CFP as market-based performance measures or accounting 
measures at a relatively high level of aggregation (Margolis, Elfenbein, and Walsh 2007).  
However, aggregated measures (or those using only a limited subset of CSP components) might 
miss the relevant associations.  For example, if CSP performance is strongly associated with 
sales via the customer stakeholder group, the overall influence on CFP might not be apparent at 
the net income or return on equity levels of CFP measurement. 
A firm’s worth is reflected in both market and operational performance (Easton and 
Harris 1991), so both types of CFP measurement are required to give a complete view of 
organizational value.  The sensitivity of some CFP measures vary depending on the time frame 
or might be highly correlated with each other (McWiliams and Siegel 2000; Ruf et al. 2001).  
Failure to carefully match CSP and CFP measures with the same stakeholder group orientation 
has been an issue behind prior inconclusive findings (Ullmann 1985; Jones 1995; Wood and 
Jones 1995; Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes 2003).  This implies that different performance 
measures might be associated with different stakeholder groups and might vary across context 
(Carroll 1979; Cornell and Shapiro 1987; Miller and Bromiley 1990; Wood 1991; Hill and Jones 
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1992; Jones 1995; Wood and Jones 1995; Mitchell, Agle, and Wood 1997; Barnett 2007; 
Margolis, Elfenbein, and Walsh 2007).  Consequently, I use multiple CFP outcome measures to 
evaluate the influence of CFP factors on performance, and to capture the interests of related 
groups of stakeholders. 
In this study, I use an external assessment of CSP based on organizational outcomes, 
policies, and procedures, and a range of CFP measures for organizations in a variety of industries 
across three years.  I contribute to the literature by evaluating four different models, reflecting 
different measurement levels of CSP, for their ability to explain variance across CFP outcomes.  
Patterns of significance across CSP components as they differ among CFP outcomes are also 
examined for potential evidence linking specific outcomes to specific stakeholder groups.  I find 
the appropriate CSP measurement level, and the strength of the relationship, is related to the 
degree of aggregated performance in the CFP measure.  I find that revenue, which is the least 
aggregated measure and most predominantly associated with a single stakeholder group 
(customers), has the strongest CSP-CFP relationship and is best described by the model using 
issue-level CSP component measurement.  Measures of net cash flows, reflecting greater 
aggregated performance and two or more predominant stakeholder groups, are better described 
by a directional component model and have a weaker overall CSP-CFP relationship.  Change in 
stock price, although associated with one predominant stakeholder group, might operate at such a 
high level of aggregation that no association with CSP was found at any measurement level, or 
might reflect the dominance of financial outcome goals for the associated stakeholder group 
(shareholders).  I also find that issues are not treated homogeneously (some are dichotomous 
scales, some are measures of exposure, some are directional measures) and there are clear 
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differences in sensitivity to, and associations among, CSP components across CFP outcomes.  
These findings are important for researchers in helping to clarify measurement issues within the 
fields of CSR research and stakeholder theory.  The results are also important for managers in 
understanding how CSR policies, processes, and outcomes affect different groups of key 
stakeholders and CFP measures, and in clarifying why the effort to measure and voluntarily 
disclose CSP is worthwhile. 
The paper is organized into five sections.  Section two reviews relevant literature on 
stakeholder theory and the CSP-CFP link and develops the research hypotheses.  Section three 
describes the research design, datasets, and measures used.  Section four presents the results of 
testing the competing measurement models across the range of CFP outcome measures.  Section 
five concludes with a summary of key research findings and a discussion of the implications of 
these findings for future research. 
 
Literature Review and Research Questions 
 
Stakeholder Theory, Corporate Social Responsibility, and Social Performance 
 
Roberts and Mahoney (2004) group stakeholder research into three levels of analysis:  
managerial agency, organizational, and societal.  Agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976) 
focuses on principal-agent contracts and costs among owners, creditors, and managers, but fails 
to incorporate (often implicit) contracts with other key groups (Cornell and Shapiro 1987).  As a 
result, stakeholder theory at the managerial agency level of analysis tends to focus on 
maximizing profit for shareholders and might ignore long-term costs to the organization or 
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society at large (e.g., unionization, increased governmental regulation, cleanup of Super Fund 
sites, etc.) from short-sighted or irresponsible decisions (Blacconiere and Patten 1994; 
McWilliams and Siegel 2000; Patten 2002; Mackey, Mackey, and Barney 2007).  From a 
societal level of analysis, legitimacy theory (Dowling and Pfeffer 1975) posits that society 
allocates scarce resources to those organizations involved in activities that are economically 
viable, legal, and legitimate, with legitimacy defined as reflecting societal norms and values 
(Carroll 1979).  This implies that organizations are judged on more than simply maximizing 
economic performance and are dependent on the judgments of society as a whole.  Freeman’s 
(1984) introduction of stakeholder theory, with its specific conceptualization of key stakeholder 
groups affecting (or affected by) organizational performance links legitimacy theory and agency 
theory and functions most clearly at the organizational level of analysis. 
Stakeholder theory incorporates consideration of the values, interests, and goals of 
multiple stakeholder groups.  Stakeholder groups have claims on the firm, but because claims are 
more implicit than explicit, stakeholder groups recognize they are vulnerable to moral hazard 
(Cornell and Shapiro 1987), especially in terms of the completeness and accuracy of information 
provided by management.  The successful organization recognizes this and will signal its 
intention (via the voluntary provision of information on performance areas of interest) to align 
processes and outputs with the concerns and goals of stakeholder groups.  By moving beyond 
mandated performance and disclosure (agency theory) and incorporating the non-mandated 
values and expectations of non-shareholder groups (stakeholder theory), the organization is able 
to demonstrate its legitimacy (Lindblom 2010) and honor implicit contracts. 
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Under stakeholder theory, management is faced with multiple (often competing) 
stakeholder groups with differing levels of urgency, power, and importance (Mitchell, Agle, and 
Wood 1997).  Jones (1995) synthesized stakeholder concepts, economic theory, insights from 
behavior science, and ethics in developing instrumental stakeholder theory to explain 
organizational management of (and prioritization among) competing stakeholder interests.  In 
general, because costs are incurred to avoid opportunism, markets reward those able to contract 
efficiently by providing credible information to stakeholders.  Therefore, ceteris paribus, 
stakeholder assessments of organizational credibility, trustworthiness, and integrity reduce 
agency costs and produce a competitive advantage.
4
  How the organization responds to 
stakeholder groups, and which groups it regards as key, will therefore influence financial 
performance.  The theory specifically allows for organizational behavior and relevant CSP 
factors to vary across stakeholder groups, subcultures within those groups,
5
 and, presumably, 
situations (Mitchell, Agle, and Wood 1997; Barnett 2007; Margolis, Elfenbein, and Walsh 2007).  
Although the theoretical focus on stakeholder groups has produced a proliferation of claims for a 
wide range of groups,
6
 this study focuses on key stakeholder groups defined as those that have 
expectations of future benefit (or harm) from organizational actions or products (Donaldson and 
Preston 1995).
7
 
                                                 
4
 Interestingly, McWilliams and Siegel (2001) assert that firms employing CSR to manage stakeholder relationships 
have higher costs, but also enjoy higher revenues because they operate on a higher demand curve at every price than 
do non-CSR firms. 
5
 For example, an organization might have:  activist and non-activist customers; suppliers determined by competitive 
bid and those tightly linked into the supply chain via a strategic partnership; domestic employees and international 
employees, etc. 
6
 Up to and including the planet itself. 
7
 Stakeholder groups are identified by their interests in the organization, whether or not the organization has a 
corresponding interest in them.  This implies that some areas of CSR that organizations currently regard as 
unimportant (and consequently do not monitor or manage) might have unexpected influences on financial 
performance (Donaldson and Preston 1995; Margolis and Walsh 2003; Freeman, Harrison, and Wicks 2007). 
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Once we have accepted that other stakeholder groups beyond shareholders are important 
in determining organizational performance, addressing the expectations (and subsequent 
evaluations) of these stakeholders becomes necessary.  These expectations usually go beyond 
simple profit maximization to include questions of fairness, ethics, governance, environmental 
stewardship, and so on.  Stakeholder interests tend to be more complex and require tradeoffs 
among multiple performance goals.  Although Friedman famously equated any consideration of 
goals beyond shareholder profit maximization as “theft and appropriation,” he acknowledged 
that the organizational responsibility “to make as much money as possible” was contingent upon 
simultaneously “conforming to the basic rules of society, both those embodied in law and those 
embodied in ethical custom” (1970, 33). 
Management’s choice of the appropriate CSP components to incorporate into 
organizational policies and processes depends not only on their identification of key stakeholder 
groups, but also on perceived effectiveness of CSP and an understanding of the salient indirect 
links to CFP outcomes.  Management’s evaluation of components/associations can vary from a 
Friedman-like measurement of future cash flows and maximization of market value (Mackey, 
Mackey, and Barney 2007) to a wider duty to society and the public good (Margolis and Walsh 
2003).  Carroll’s (1979) four-factor model of corporate performance (economic, legal, ethical, 
and discretionary) specifically noted that relevant social issues will differ both within and across 
industries, implying that (a) the significant CSP components affecting CFP outcomes will also 
vary across industries and/or (b) the ability of individual managements to identify key 
stakeholder groups and related critical CSP factors also varies within groups.  Unfortunately, 
prior research in the CSP-CFP relationship has been plagued by methodology issues associated 
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with inconsistent findings (Alexander and Buchholz 1978; Ullmann 1985; Wood and Jones 
1995; McWilliams and Siegel 2000; Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes 2003) and that have largely 
not been examined beyond questions of the appropriate datasets to use for the operationalization 
of CSP construct(s). 
 
Measures of Corporate Social Performance 
 
The measures for CSP vary widely and have not been standardized.  Definitions of key 
terms and operationalization of the construct(s) might be inappropriately related, ambiguous, or 
inconsistent (Ullmann 1985; Wood and Jones 1995; Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes 2003).  For 
example, operationalizations frequently include reputational measures (often self-reported), 
quantitative outcomes, categorical counts of the existence of a program/policy (regardless of 
effectiveness), or qualitative textual analysis of corporate disclosures or news releases.  There are 
considerable differences between corporate reputation and corporate behavior, and studies that 
do not consider this difference in analyzing relationships to CFP might create spurious findings.  
Reputational and disclosure measures of CSR reflect internal actions and decisions.  This study 
focuses on the link among corporate actions or positions taken and the association with related 
economic outcomes, so CSP measures are limited to those representing outcomes, policies, and 
programs. 
Although the overall conclusion of recent research is that CSR has at least a slight 
positive association with CFP, the mechanism by which this occurs remains unclear (Cormier 
and Magnan 1999; Ruf et al. 2001; Margolis and Walsh 2003; Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes 
2003; Margolis, Elfenbein, and Walsh 2007; Doh et al. 2010; Dhaliwal et al. 2011; Eccles, 
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Ioannou, and Serafeim 2011).  A major cause of the uncertainty rests with inconsistency in the 
construction or measurement level of CSP variables.  Prior research has tended either to examine 
a single, limited aspect of CSP (e.g., environmental performance, human rights concerns, 
governance, etc.) or to use a single, aggregated measure to incorporate all aspects of CSP equally 
(Margolis, Elfenbein, and Walsh 2007).  The CSP-CFP link might be better established using 
individual measures for separate CSP components, and not all components assumed to be 
significant in determining CSP might actually be so (or might vary depending on the CFP 
measure used to measure CSP-influenced performance).  Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes (2003), 
for example, in a meta-analysis of prior research found that environmental performance 
measures had a weaker direct relationship with CFP than social performance, and Berman et al. 
(1999) have found evidence that some CSP components might have an indirect relationship to 
CFP by moderating the relationship between strategy and performance.  A high level of 
aggregation might hide significant variances in performance among individual components, and 
firms might consciously use this in order to bury poor performance in a key area with multiple 
reports of good performance in less important areas (Arya and Mittendorf 2005).  Stakeholders 
might also differentially weight aspects of CSP performance and consciously engage in trade-
offs in performance across CSP areas.  This leads to the first hypothesis: 
H1a:  CSP component measures will explain a greater amount of variance 
in CFP measures than an aggregated overall CSP measure. 
Negative and positive CSP might not be weighted equally:  stakeholders might 
overweight negative information or perceive positive information to be less credible (Patten 
2002; Margolis, Elfenbein, and Walsh 2007; Kothari, Li, and Short 2009; Linthicum 2010).  
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Prior capital markets research has demonstrated that directional (positive vs. negative) measures 
might be significantly more sensitive in establishing a statistical relation between CFP-oriented 
predictors and outcomes (Ball and Brown 1968), and the same effect might exist for CSP 
measures if stakeholders are more sensitive to reports of negative performance in key areas.
8
  As 
a result, models incorporating CSP components that have different weights for positive and 
negative performance or which might have only one significant directional score might be more 
sensitive to the CSP-CFP link when CFP outcomes are properly matched with stakeholder 
groups.  As a result, I derive my second hypothesis: 
H1b:  Directional CSP component measures will explain a greater amount 
of variance in CFP measures than aggregated CSP component 
measures. 
If greater disaggregation results in greater explanatory power and there are differences in 
how directional measures affect the underlying component, then there might be another 
measurement level to be assessed.  Research has largely focused on broad categories of CSP that 
are often based on reporting (or ratings agency) frameworks and that have very little variation 
among number of categories or issues within categories among competing frameworks.  I have 
also followed this approach, adopting the seven components utilized by KLD STATS:  
Community, Corporate Governance, Diversity, Employee Relations, Environment, Human 
Rights, and Product.
9
  Even this level of analysis, however, might be too aggregated.  
Stakeholders might focus on a specific issues or sub-categories within the CSP component scores 
                                                 
8
 This would conform to Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory explaining decision making under 
conditions of risk. 
9
 For a more complete discussion, please see the research design section. 
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(e.g., child labor under Human Rights, Superfund designation under Environment, or excessive 
executive compensation under Corporate Governance). Consequently, a factor analysis of items 
within the CSP components might indicate that each component actually reflects evaluations of 
performance for separate groups of items (reflecting underlying key issues), leading to the third 
hypothesis: 
H1c:  Issue-oriented CSP component measures, based on significant 
factors within each component, will explain a greater amount of 
variance in CFP measures than directional CSP component 
measures. 
 
Measures of Corporate Financial Performance 
 
Another methodological issue in the determination of the CSP-CFP relationship centers 
on the choice of the measure of CFP outcome and the degree to which the chosen measures 
predominantly reflect the interests and influence of a single stakeholder group (Wood and Jones 
1995).  Prior work has focused on accounting or market-based CFP outcome variables such as 
Return on Assets (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE), stock price, or earnings (Margolis and Walsh 
2001).  These outcome measures reflect the performance concerns of investors and shareholders 
who primarily concentrate on financial performance.  Thus, associations with measures of non-
financial performance (i.e., CSP factors) might not be significant.  To adequately capture the 
effect of CSP on CFP, it is necessary to choose a range of CFP measures that capture the 
interests of key stakeholder groups. 
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For example, in considering the appropriate CFP outcome to associate with a CSP issue 
(e.g., human rights concerns for child labor in overseas sweat shops), researchers should consider 
which stakeholders (1) set expectations (customers, activist groups), (2) experience the direct 
effect of company behavior (suppliers, employees), (3) evaluate company performance 
(customers, activist groups), and (4) take action in response to corporate behavior (customers, 
activist groups) (Wood and Jones 1995).  In other words, measures of whether child labor is 
involved in company manufacturing activity would probably not show a clear relationship to 
stock price, as the stakeholder group most clearly associated with stock price (shareholders) does 
not directly experience the effect of the company behavior.  The same measure of child labor 
linked with sales revenue, however, should show a much clearer picture as customers set 
expectations of behavior, evaluate performance, and act in response to that evaluation by making 
a decision whether to boycott the company’s product. 
The level of aggregated performance represented by the chosen CFP outcome measure is 
also important.  Measures based on stock market performance are often focused on short-term 
horizons, arbitrage opportunities due to momentary – and artificial – differences in value (Zhang 
2010), and economic performance indicators (e.g., analyst earnings forecasts).  Stock-marekt 
based measures might therefore be insensitive to the effect of CSP on intervening constructs such 
as learning, operational effectiveness, or strategy and their influence on longer-term economic 
performance.  Accounting-based measures, such as ROA, might operate at too aggregated a 
performance level – such that CSP linkages to specific, focused measures of CFP become 
insignificant when those focused measures are “rolled up” into overall performance ratios.  
Different CSP components (or the factor-based issues within those components) capture different 
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risks to which the organization is exposed (and the degree to which organizational behavior 
affects those risks), and the relationship between these CSP-determined risks and potential CFP 
measures might vary based on the predominant stakeholder interest represented by the CFP 
measure, because different stakeholder groups assess the same risks differently (Miller and 
Bromiley 1990; Barnett 2007; Freeman, Harrison, and Wicks 2007; Margolis, Elfenbein, and 
Walsh 2007; Lindblom 2010).
10
  Additionally, accrual based measures might add noise to the 
analysis by increasing the difficulty of linking CSP actions and decisions to the actual, current 
CFP actions and decisions.  Outcome measures based on cash flow, on the other hand might be 
more sensitive to CSP influence due to their capture of “real time” effects, and not the noise 
caused by different recognition timelines.  Net cash flow measures may also serve as a measure 
of earnings quality, and earnings quality measures – with their incorporation of transparency, 
honesty, and integrity – might be more sensitive to the CSP influence on CFP outcomes.  
Consequently, prior conflicting or weak research findings might be related to the aggregation 
level or accrual/cash basis of CFP outcomes measures, as well as to the measurement level of the 
CSP measures. 
In general, CSP will be positively associated with CFP as organizations are able to 
demonstrate their legitimacy, and, thus, receive greater allocations of scarce resources.   
Individual CSP components will vary in strength of association among CFP outcomes based on 
the similarity among the predominant stakeholder group(s) represented by each measure.  
Although better CSP performance will produce increased economic performance in the long run, 
it is possible that there might be a negative association in the short run if current expenditures are 
                                                 
10
 Paine (2003) seems to suggest that the ethics components of CSP specifically affect risk via information 
credibility and costs, which then influence CFP. 
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required to produce later efficiencies or increased profitability.  This study focuses on the 
business case for CSR, and the degree to which decisions and actions taken to reflect greater 
CSR will be associated with concurrent greater CFP due to a greater focus on operational 
efficiency and effectiveness, innovation, waste reduction, strategic matching, risk reduction, and 
stakeholder engagement.  
Prior research has concentrated to a large degree on outcomes related to market 
performance.  As such, these measures tend to concentrate on economic- and accrual-based 
performance. Measures focusing on operations and cash-based performance have been 
underutilized.  The assumption has been that stock prices adequately reflect and incorporate 
long-term value and expectations of future cash flow.  However, as Zhang (2010) demonstrated, 
High Frequency Trading (HFT) now predominates in the US capital markets, reducing 
investment horizons to an average of seven months, and significantly distorting market 
performance (specifically through the market’s inability to quickly or accurately incorporate 
information).  Consequently, there is valid cause for concern that market-based measures do not 
reflect long-term value and growth prospects, nor do they capture CSP influence.   
Stakeholder theory implies that different stakeholder groups will emphasize different 
CSP concerns and goals, which implies that different CFP outcome measures might be 
associated more strongly with different stakeholder groups and that there might not be a single 
CFP measure that adequately captures the association between CSP and CFP outcomes for all 
stakeholder groups.  Prior findings have indicated that there are significant differences in 
preferred outcome measures among shareholders and other stakeholder groups (Miller and 
Bromiley 1990; Wood and Jones 1995; McWilliams and Siegel 2001; Grow, Hamm, and Lee 
36 
 
2005; Boehe and Cruz 2010; Margolis, Elfenbein, and Walsh 2007).  However, there has been 
considerable difficulty in disaggregating the various stakeholder groups (Wood and Jones 1995).  
I approach the problem from the other direction:  by inspecting varying patterns of significant 
CSP components loading onto a range of CFP outcome measures, I attempt to match the revealed 
associations to the most likely associated stakeholder group responding to Wood and Jones’ 
(1995) criticism of “mismatched” CSP-CFP linkages (i.e., an “appropriate” match between CSP 
and CFP measures).  The mismatch appears to be based on both the overall association of the 
CFP measure with CSP (i.e., does stock price reflect concerns with CSR or simply a limited 
range of economic indicators?) and the appropriate match of the individual CFP measure with a 
CSP measure reflecting the same predominant stakeholder group(s) (reflected in the pattern of 
associated significant CSP components critical to that stakeholder group).  Therefore, I 
investigate two related research questions: 
RQ2a:  Do CFP outcome measures differ in their sensitivity to CSP? 
RQ2b:  Are CFP outcome measures associated with different CSP 
components? 
 
Research Design and Measures 
 
Population and Data 
 
The population for the study consists of organizations receiving a CSR rating from KLD 
STATS across the three year period 2007 to 2009.  This period was chosen to reflect years in 
which the economy was good (2007), bad (2008), and recovering (2009) to address performance 
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across a range of economic conditions.  The designation for each year was based on the annual 
percentage change in GDP:  2007 had a 2.33% increase, 2008 a 2.73% decrease, and 2009 
displayed an early stage of recovery with a small, but positive, increase (0.25%).
11
  Across this 
time period, there were 8,772 firm-years with KLD ratings.  Financial performance and firm 
characteristic data were then extracted from Compustat for as many of these companies as 
possible, resulting in a sample size of 8,138 firm-years (2,643 in 2007; 2,723 in 2008; 2,772 in 
2009). 
KLD Research and Analytics’12 KLD STATS13 database provides annual ratings of 
approximately 3,100 of the largest US companies by market capitalization.  KLD has a strong 
qualitative component and is based on independent evaluations of an organization’s degree of 
exposure to risk or superior performance across CSP categories.  These evaluations are based to 
a large degree on the objective presence/absence of a program or involvement in (or absence of) 
relevant controversies.  Wood’s (1991) model of CSP based on Carroll (1979) positions CSP as 
impacts, programs, or policies; consequently, KLD STATS scores for the presence/absence of 
these items align well with theoretical models.  Investors have been shown to prefer such third-
party reports, even with greater information costs, due to credibility and timeliness issues 
(Kothari, Li, and Short 2009); thus, KLD STATS is deemed a valid source of external 
assessment of organizational CSR performance and is widely used in the literature. 
The database provides scores across seven major CSR areas:  Community, Corporate 
Governance, Diversity, Employee Relations, Environment, Human Rights, and Product.  A 
                                                 
11
 The average annual percentage change in GDP from 2000 to 2006 was 2.48%. 
12
 KLD STATS has recently been purchased by MSCI ESG Research, which provides investment support tools to 
clients worldwide. 
13
 “STATS” stands for Statistical Tool of Analyzing Trends in Social and Environmental Performance and is now 
found at www.msci.com/products/esg/stats.  
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difficulty with KLD stats in prior years arose from the change within each component as new 
CSP issues arose or were resolved.  For example, organizations doing business in South Africa 
once received a concern score (now eliminated) and several social items have migrated across 
categories.  Fortunately, major shifts in composition took place in 2002, well before the study 
timeframe, and categories seem to have stabilized.
14
  Table 2 displays the number of items across 
categories which can vary considerably.  Prior criticism has focused on problems with 
comparability due to variance in items between and among components.  After conducting tests 
on summed scores, I also converted scores to percentages and conducted additional analyses with 
no significant differences in findings.  Summed scores are preferred as they are more easily 
interpretable and provide a measure of relative exposure to CSR expectations via the number of 
items within strength and concern scores for each category. 
 
Research Model 
 
Relationships between CSP components and CFP outcomes are tested using correlational 
analysis and the competing measurement models are tested for each outcome measure using 
hierarchical regression.  The general model tested is (subscripts for firm-years are omitted for 
simplicity): 
,  (1) 
where:  
                                                 
14
 Nevertheless, two items were eliminated because they were not present in all years of the study period.  Of those 
three items, only one had any companies scoring positively on the item (10 in 2008, 5 in 2009). 
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CFPp  = one of the group of p outcome measures (PRCHG, FINCF, INVCF, OPSCF, 
REV); 
Β0  = the intercept; 
Γ1  = vector of slope coefficients for CSPq;  
CSPq  = one of q measurement models for CSP scores (overall, component, directional, 
item-based); and 
ε  = error term containing CFP variance not contributed to by CSP. 
 
Measures 
 
Dependent Variables 
 
Five measures of CFP outcomes chosen to potentially represent the predominant interests 
of varying stakeholder groups are used within each of the four, alternate measurement models.
15
  
The percentage price change in the closing stock price at fiscal year-end, [(Pricet – Pricet-
1)/Pricet-1], captures stock market performance (PRCHG) and represents shareholders.  Three 
measures of cash flow are used to capture cash-based, “real time” operational performance:  net 
cash flows from financing activities (FINCF), from investing activities (INVCF), and from 
operating activities (OPSCF).  Within the cash flow measures, FINCF, in its focus on financing 
decisions, might predominantly capture management’s decisions involving investors and lenders 
                                                 
15
 While all stakeholder groups should be interested in all aspects of performance, most groups should also tend to 
concentrate predominantly on a few measures due to simple heuristic and saliency effects on their decision making.  
For example, shareholders will focus on quarterly earnings reports, analysts’ expectations, and share price 
movements (see Zhang 2010), whereas suppliers might focus more on cash flows, inventory levels, and investment 
plans.  The key here is that different stakeholder groups will have different dominant concerns, even though they 
might (and should) incorporate multiple aspects of financial and non-financial performance. 
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as stakeholders.  INVCF focuses on long-term investments in property, plant, and equipment and 
might capture relationships with local communities and governments and expectations regarding 
future regulation and taxation.  OPSCF is used to represent relationships with employees, 
suppliers, and management.
16
  All three measures are scaled by total assets to control for size 
effects.  Finally, revenue (REV) is also used as a measure of (product) market performance, 
predominantly reflects actions and interests of customers, and is also scaled by total assets.  
While other studies have used a relatively few measures, the range of outcome measures used in 
this study is designed to respond to Wood and Jones’ (1995) call to choose financial outcome 
measures that are matched to the interests, evaluations, and actions of stakeholder groups 
represented by the CSP measures used. 
 
Independent Variables 
 
KLD STATS reports dichotomous (1 = present) scores for multiple items categorized as 
“strength” or “concern” within each of seven categories: 
COM =  Community (Charitable giving, educational support, disadvantaged housing 
support, volunteer programs, in-kind giving, charitable drives, investment 
controversies, negative economic impact, tax disputes, etc.); 
CGOV =  Corporate Governance (executive compensation, ownership strength, 
transparency, political accountability, public policy support, etc.); 
                                                 
16
 OPSCF also incorporates relationships with customers, as does REV.  Both measures are retained in order to 
contrast the effects of aggregation level and number of predominant stakeholder groups. 
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DIV =  Diversity (female/minority presence in top ranks, as CEO, on Board, or as 
contractors; promotion, work/life benefits, employment of disabled, Gay & 
Lesbian policies, controversies, etc.); 
EMP =  Employee Relations (union relations, profit sharing program, employee 
involvement, retirement benefits and pension, health and safety, workforce 
reductions, etc.); 
ENV =  Environment (beneficial products/services, pollution prevention, recycling, clean 
energy, management systems, hazardous waste, regulatory problems, emissions, 
agricultural chemicals, climate change, etc.); 
HUM =  Human Rights (indigenous peoples relations, labor rights, involvement in Burma, 
etc.); 
PRO =  Product (quality, research and development, innovation, product safety, 
marketing/contracting practices, antitrust, mission to disadvantaged, etc.). 
Within each component, items are grouped into strength and concern categories and 
summed (both summations producing positive values) for each firm-year.  The individual 
strength [e.g., HUM(+)] and concern scores [e.g., CGOV(-)] for each component are then used in 
the directional component measurement model.  The component strength and concern scores are 
combined (strength – concern) to produce the score for the component measurement model, 
which might be a positive or negative value.  The seven component scores are then summed to 
produce the score for the overall measurement model which might, again, be either positive or 
negative.  For both component and overall measurement models, a negative score represents a 
preponderance of concern items.  An oblique factor analysis is conducted for all items (strength 
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and concern) within each component and the resulting scores for each factor are then used in the 
item-based component model. 
 
Additional Variables of Interest 
 
This study concentrates on measurement issues, and not on the construction of a 
predictive model to estimate the effects of individual firm characteristics.  Consequently, certain 
qualitative variables that might produce variation based on categorical membership are used to 
partition the sample for sensitivity tests following the main analyses.  These variables reflect 
profitability (net loss/net gain for reported net income), economic conditions (based on the three 
years of the study), and country of incorporation (United States or Other).  The appropriate level 
of measurement should remain constant across partitions, although sensitivity to and patterns 
among significant CSP factors might vary. 
 
Analysis and Discussion 
 
An examination of descriptive statistics for each of the variables highlights some 
interesting relationships (Table 3).  PRCHG shows a positive mean value, but a very large 
standard deviation.  Mean INVCF is negative, reflecting the expected outflow of cash in 
organizational investments in property, plant, and equipment, with levels very similar to OPSCF.  
Overall CSP is negative, but with a fairly large range.  Individual CSP components vary, with 
most having negative means.  At the directional level (where both strength and concern scores 
are represented by a positive, summed number), there is considerable variation within the mean 
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and the range of scores.  All factor-based issue scores have, by construction, identical means of 0 
and standard deviations of 1; ranges, however, display considerable variation. 
Directional scores, although more sensitive to different weights placed on strengths and 
concerns, might not sufficiently handle differences in weighting among issues.  Some CSR 
issues might be predominantly negative, others predominantly positive, and others might be 
equally balanced.  Some issues might have relatively few concern items, but those items might 
be so sensitive that they become highly weighted (e.g., use of child slave labor in outsourced 
production).
17
   If this were the case, measurement of CSP outcomes on an issue-based level 
would result in greater explanations of variance for the CFP outcome measure.  Principal 
component analysis (PCA) was conducted on all seven of the CSP components, using oblique 
rotation (oblimin) as inter-component items and factors are expected to be related to each other 
(Table 4).  The pattern matrix reported allows the clearest interpretation of the contribution of 
individual items to each factor;  although less easily interpretable, the structure matrix is reported 
as it incorporates the interdependent effects of items on each other (much as multiple regression 
does for a group of outcome variables). 
For COM (Panel A), the overall Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling 
adequacy was .67, and all KMO values for individual items were greater than .639, which is well 
above the acceptable limit of .5 (Field 2009).  Bartlett’s test of sphericity Χ2(55) = 3301.478, p  < 
.001, indicated that correlations among items were sufficiently large for the PCA.  An initial 
analysis resulted in three factors with eigenvalues over Kaiser’s criterion of 1 and which, in 
                                                 
17
 These highly sensitive items are also the most fluid and ephemeral, often representing the current public “hot 
button” based on recent disasters or press releases.  However, certain items are consistently of high salience and 
concern and would remain on this list over time and across stakeholder groups (e.g., regulatory fines for nuclear 
operators or concerns about inadequate storage of nuclear fuel rods). 
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combination, explained 37.38% of the variance.  After inspecting the scree plot, I retained all 
three factors in the final analysis.  Factor loadings after rotation suggest that COM1 represents 
community support (education, volunteerism, promotion of self-sufficiency among economically 
disadvantaged, affordable housing), COM2 represents the economic impact of operations on the 
community (community reinvestment, negative economic effects, affordable housing support, 
tax disputes), and COM3 represents charitable giving (charitable and in-kind giving, community 
opposition).  Because charitable giving seems to be associated with controversies mobilizing 
community opposition, this is likely reactive charitable giving. 
For CGOV (Panel B), after I dropped two items with inadequate individual KMO values, 
the remaining ten items had an overall KMO = .65 and the lowest individual item was KMO = 
.515.  Bartlett’s test of sphericity, Χ2(45) = 3311.188, p < .001, confirmed sufficient inter-item 
correlation for the PCA.  Four factors with eigenvalues greater than 1 resulted in 51.26% 
combined explanation of variance.  Factor loadings after rotation suggest that CGOV1 represents 
accountability (transparency, political accountability, support for public policy benefitting the 
environment and society), CGOV2 represents executive compensation levels (positively related 
to limited compensation and negatively related to excessive compensation),
18
 CGOV3 represents 
the (predominantly negative) tone at the top (presence of a strong corporate culture, ethics 
problems, failure to support public policy benefitting the environment and society), and CGOV4 
represents failure/inability to address CSR issues (presence of a weak corporate culture, 
controlled by another firm with CSR problems/controls another firm with CSR problems). 
                                                 
18
 Limited compensation is considered to be less than $500,000 per year for a CEO or $30,000 per year for outside 
directors; the organization is considered to have excessive compensation when exceeding $10 million per year for a 
CEO or $100,000 per year for outside directors. 
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All items loaded adequately on DIV (Panel C), overall KMO = .764, individual KMO 
scores > .592, Bartlett’s X2(55) = 9936.119, p < .001.  Three factors explained 45.44% of 
combined variation.  After rotation, item loadings suggest that DIV1 represents the openness of 
the work environment to the concerns of diverse groups (work/life benefits, women and minority 
contracting, employment of disabled, gay & lesbian policies, commitment to diversity), DIV2 
represents non representativeness (such that a minority/female CEO, promotion of 
minorities/females to line positions, and presence of minorities/women/disabled on the board of 
directors are negatively associated with this factor and a lack of women on the board or among 
senior line managers is positively associated with it), and DIV3 represents exposure to 
Affirmative Action/diversity controversies (recent substantial fines/penalties, involvement in 
controversies, lack of commitment to diversity). 
One item was dropped from EMP (Panel D), with the final model displaying an overall 
KMO = .620, individual KMO scores > .571, and Bartlett’s X2(45) = 2748.384, p < .001.  Initial 
analysis extracted four factors with a combined explained variance of 50.79%.  Item loadings 
following rotation suggest that EMP1 represents the general work environment (good union 
relations, strong health and safety programs, and recent involvement in or finds from major 
health and safety controversies).  Because EMP1 shows a positive correlation with recent 
involvement in Health/Safety controversy, this suggests responsiveness to employee concerns.  
Loadings on EMP2 suggest employee involvement (cash and profit sharing, stock options, 
information sharing, and other initiatives), on EMP3 suggest poor employee relations (history of 
poor union relations, other employee relations controversy), and on EMP4 suggest concerns 
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about pension funding and retirement obligations (negatively correlated with retirement benefits 
strength and positively correlated with underfunded or inadequate retirement benefits programs). 
One item was also dropped from the original analysis of ENV.  The resulting analysis 
(Panel E) has an overall KMO = .796, all individual KMO measures > .692, Bartlett’s X2(66) = 
10938.843, p < .001, and three factors with a combined explained variance of 42.99%.  
Following rotation, item loadings suggest that ENV1 represents exposure to operational energy 
and pollution concerns (hazardous waste liabilities/penalties, fines/penalties for air/water 
violations, excessive toxic emissions, revenues highly related to coal/oil combustion, other 
controversy, significant recent efforts to increase energy efficiency and/or use clean or renewable 
fuels), ENV2 represents proactive internal operational control and efficiency (pollution 
prevention programs, recycling programs, management systems and certification, proactive 
activities), and ENV3 seems to represent an industrial variable, with negative values representing 
oil/coal exposure and positive values representing agricultural chemical exposure. 
One item was also dropped from the initial analysis of HUM.  The final analysis (Panel 
F) produced an overall KMO = .572, all individual KMO > .503, Bartlett’s X2(15) = 2315.845, p 
< .001, with three factors with a combined explained variance of 63.73%.  After rotation, HUM1 
seems to represent exposure to human/indigenous rights issues (transparency/disclosure, 
indigenous right concerns, other human rights controversies) and HUM2 seems to represent 
exposure to offshoring or overseas outsourcing issues (transparency in disclosure and 
monitoring, labor rights initiatives, labor standard controversies in supply chain).  Both HUM1 
and HUM2 are measures of exposure to these issues, not performance, as both strengths and 
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concerns load positively on the related factors.  Finally, HUM3, with its single item for 
involvement in Burma, seems to be a measure of political exposure. 
Finally, analysis of PRO resulted in overall KMO = .621, all individual KMO > .519, and 
Bartlett’s X2(28) = 1752.560, p < .001 (Panel G).  Initial extraction produced three factors with a 
combined explained variance of 46.10%.  Following rotation, item loadings suggest that PRO1 
represents unethical treatment of consumers (product safety violations/fines, consumer fraud, 
misleading advertising, antitrust violations, predatory pricing, defective products, treatment of 
franchisees, etc.), PRO2 represents a reputation as a market leader in the quality and innovation 
of its products, and PRO3 represents a social mission. 
 
Evidence on Appropriate Measurement Level 
 
Once scores were calculated for each of the four measurement models (overall, 
component, directional, and item-based), a series of hierarchical regressions was conducted on 
each of the five CFP outcome measures (Table 5).  Overall measures of R
2
 are very small as 
much of CFP is associated with organizational size, and is controlled for in the model by scaling 
four of the five outcome variables. 
Overall CSP was only able to contribute to the explanation of variance within REV but at 
an extremely low level (F = 56.949, p < .001, adjusted R
2
 = .007).  None of the measurement 
levels produced a model able to explain PRCHG adequately, highlighting the poor linkage 
between stock-market based performance and CSP.  Component, directional, and issue based 
measurement levels all produced models with significant F-values for the remaining CFP 
outcomes.  Change in R
2
 indicates that the component level of measurement was able to explain 
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a greater amount of variance than an overall measure (H1a) and directional measures of CSP 
explained more variance in CFP outcome than component level (H1b).  Results for H1c are 
mixed.  The issue-based (factorial analysis of KLD STATS component) CSP measurement 
model explained more variance in REV than directional scores (change in R
2
 = .024, p < .001, 
adjusted R
2
 = .072), but there was no significant improvement in the directional model for 
FINCF, INVCF, or OPSCF; in fact, adjusted R
2
 decreased slightly for FINCF and OPSCF.  In 
general, it would appear that CSP should be measured at the directional level for net cash flow 
measures, and at the issue level for revenue, while market based measures are insensitive to the 
effect of CSP on CFP. 
 
Evidence on Varying Association with CSP among CFP Measures 
 
Correlations among outcome variables are all well below .80 (n. r.), indicating that 
multicollinearity is not an issue and different aspects of CFP are being captured by each measure.  
In fact, the two outcome measures of most concern, REV and OPSCF, are only correlated at r = 
.207, p < .001.  Within CSP scores, all component scores are significantly (p < .001) positively 
correlated with the overall score (n. r.).  As would be expected within directional scores, strength 
scores are significantly positively correlated and concern scores are significantly negatively 
correlated with the overall score (p <.001).  Strength and concern scores also load appropriately 
onto each of the component scores (p < .001, n. r.), with the exception of HUM(+) which is 
insignificant.  There are four directional measures with very high loadings on the associated 
component score (at r = .80 or better):  CGOV(-), DIV(+), HUM(-), and PRO(-).  The issue is 
more complicated at the issue-based score level (Table 6).  All three COM factors are positively 
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correlated with component COM and all three HUM factors are negatively correlated with 
component HUM; the other component scores have mixed correlations with their factors, but all 
are at a p < .001 significance level.  There are three factors with very high loadings on the 
underlying component score, and which appear to be driving that component:  CGOV2 
(executive compensation), DIV2 (non-representativeness), and PRO1 (unethical treatment of 
consumers). 
Correlations among predictors and outcomes provide an insight into the conflicting 
results in prior research and the degree to which CSP measurement level affects results as all 
CSP measures are not correlated with all CFP outcomes, nor does a single CSP measure show 
consistent directionality among CFP outcomes.  The overall measure (Table 7, Panel A) is 
correlated negatively to REV and uncorrelated with all other outcomes.  Neither COM nor ENV 
is correlated to any of the outcome measures.  CGOV and DIV have opposite effects on all 
measures except PRCHG (with which they are uncorrelated).  EMP is negatively correlated with 
PRCHG (the only component to be correlated with this outcome) and REV.  Both HUM and 
PRO are positively correlated with FINCF and negatively correlated with OPSCF; HUM is also 
negatively correlated with REV and PRO is negatively correlated with INVCF.   
There are more correlations among directional components and CFP measures (Panel B).  
The outcome measure most related to shareholders and market performance, PRCHG, is only 
correlated with EMP(-) (r = .037, p < .010), such that a higher concern score produces greater 
change in stock price.  FINCF is correlated with 13 out of 14 CSP directional scores, INVCF 
with 4 out of 14, OPSCF with 12 out of 14, and REV with 11 out of 14; this partially supports 
RQ2a by confirming a significant association between CSP and CFP measures, although the 
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relative strength of the association is very low.  There are clear differences among CFP outcomes 
both in which CSP measures are significant and in the direction of the relationship, providing 
support for RQ2b by confirming that outcomes are differently affected by CSP.  Intuitively, 
increased strengths should be associated with greater legitimacy and therefore greater resource 
allocation and superior opportunities, and increased concerns with decreased legitimacy, 
resource allocation, and opportunities, but many of the directional component relationships do 
not reflect this expectation  The counter-intuitive interpretation suggests that CSP might not be a 
simple matter of the relative quantity of strengths versus concerns, but might better be measured 
by issues within each component, with each issue containing some combination of strengths 
and/or concerns. 
Correlations among issue-based factors and CSP outcomes are displayed in Panel C.  
There are different patterns of directionality and significance among individual factors and CFP 
outcomes, supporting RQ2b’s assertion that CSP impacts on CFP outcomes are not 
homogeneous.  There are also differences in the number of significant factors (and the degree of 
relationship) associated with each CFP measures, supporting RQ2a’s assertion that CFP 
outcomes are not equally sensitive to CSP.  For example, PRCHG proves to be uncorrelated with 
any item-based measure of CSP, while FINCF is significantly correlated with 20 out of 23 
factors.  HUM1, HUM2, and PRO3 are uncorrelated with any of the tested CFP outcomes, while 
COM2, CGOV2, DIV1, and DIV2 are correlated with all CFP measures except PRCHG.  It 
should be noted that the correlations, although significant, are not large (absolute values range 
from .012 to .163, both for REV). 
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In considering the CSP-CFP relationship when CFP is regressed on CSP at the directional 
level, there are clear differences in patterns of significant CSP scores across outcomes (Table 8).  
Referring back to the hierarchical regression results reported in Table 7, INVCF is the least 
sensitive (adjusted R
2
 = .005) and REV the most sensitive (adjusted R
2
 = .049), with OPSCF 
similar to INVCF (adjusted R
2
 = .009) and FINCF (adjusted R
2
 = .022) between INVCF and 
REV (RQ2a).  The very small adjusted R
2
 values suggest that the CFP outcome measures used 
might still be too aggregated to display the influence of CSP, and a finer level of analysis might 
better demonstrate the linkage. 
For INVCF, only three concern scores are significant, with CGOV(-) leading to net cash 
inflows and DIV(-) and ENV(-) leading to net cash outflows.  For REV, both measures of COM, 
CGOV, and EMP are significant, as are DIV(+) and HUM(-).  EMP concerns have by far the 
largest effect on REV [nearly twice the size as the next largest effects, COM(+) and COM(-)].  
All four CFP measures show different patterns of significant directional scores and of the 
directional scores that are associated with more than one CFP outcome, only CGOV(+) shows 
the same directional relationship for all CFP outcomes.  Only ENV concerns show any 
significant association across CFP outcomes, with greater concerns producing greater net cash 
outflows from investing activities.  Likewise, only concern scores for HUM are significantly 
associated with CFP, as an increase in HUM(-) results in a corresponding increase in REV.  
Neither directional score for PRO is significantly associated with any CFP measures, which 
would suggest that perhaps the directional score is not capturing the effect of CSP on CFP as we 
would logically expect issues of product quality, innovation, and monopoly to have significant 
effects on REV, at the very least. 
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Issue level analysis of the CSP relationship to CFP outcomes proves somewhat easier to 
analyze (Table 9).  Excessive executive pay, negative tone at the top, and employee antagonism 
reduce FINCF, as do good employee relations (although this latter might possibly reflect a lesser 
need for increased financing due to increased operational efficiency and productivity).  The more 
non-representative the upper levels of the company and the more exposed the company is to 
pollution concerns, the greater is FINCF.  Economic impact on the community (which is largely 
negative for this issue) produces net cash inflows for investing activities, as does a negative tone 
at the top, the failure/inability to address CSP issues and membership in the agricultural 
chemicals industry.  Non-representativeness of upper management, on the other hand, seems to 
increase INVCF.  OPSCF is increased by a negative economic impact on the community 
(including issues such as plant closings and tax disputes), by excessive executive compensation, 
and by good employee relations, and is decreased by employee antagonism and non-
representativeness of senior management.  REV is increased by negative economic impact on a 
community (possibly via contracted services at unfavorable terms for the community), excessive 
executive compensation, involvement in an Affirmative Action controversy, good employee 
relations, employee antagonism, pension funding issues, and exposure to outsourcing/offshoring 
issues.  REV is decreased by community support activities, the failure/inability to address CSP 
issues, non-representativeness of senior management, exposure to pollution concerns, exposure 
to Indigenous/Human Rights issues, and involvement in unethical treatment of customers.   
While there are several individual issues that display puzzling relationships to CFP 
outcomes, the overall conclusion is that RQ2b is supported and individual CSP measures are 
associated with different CFP outcomes, and in different combinations.  It is especially notable 
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that PRCHG, which is focused on shareholders and financial performance, does not display 
significant associations with CSP issues which, nevertheless, do contribute significantly to CFP 
via net cash flow measures and revenue.  REV shows the greatest range of significant 
relationships – the extent (and counter-intuitive directionality) might suggest the effect of 
reported CSP on customer perceptions and associated factors of noise and reporting delay. 
 
Additional Analysis of Sensitivity to Qualitative Characteristics 
 
It is possible that the relationship between CSP and CFP is driven by overall profitability.  
There has been an ongoing debate whether good CFP provides the operational slack to devote to 
CSP, or whether good CSP results in improved CFP due to improved stakeholder relationships.  
At least one study has also found that negative CFP might drive CSP efforts in certain highly-
visible areas as a means of restoring legitimacy (Chen, Patten, and Roberts 2003).  By 
partitioning the sample into net loss and net profit reporting organizations, comparisons of the 
modeled relationships might be made (Table 10, Panel A).  If parsimonious model selection 
criteria are used (significant F-value and a significant increase in R
2
 from the prior level), it 
appears that REV is best modeled at the issue-level of CSP for both types of organization, 
echoing the overall model.  However, there are some differences.  Net profit organizations 
appear to best model the relationship between FINCF and INVCF and CSP at the component 
level and between OPSCF and CSP at the issue level. Net loss organizations, on the other hand, 
model FINCF-CSP at the directional level (mirroring the overall model) but use a less-detailed 
measure of CSP for OPSCF (component) and INVCF (overall) – interestingly, these 
organizations also show a significant model for the relationship between PRCHG and overall 
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CSP suggesting that the stock market becomes more sensitive to organizational non-financial 
performance when financial performance is suffering. 
It is also possible that differences in the country of incorporation might be significant.  
Organizations incorporated outside the United States might place more emphasis on CSR 
performance, or might emphasize different aspects of CSP.  For example, organizations in 
Europe have far greater regulatory and public pressure on environmental issues, as reflected in 
the Kyoto protocol, the Greens party, and widespread concern with greenhouse gas emissions.  
European and Asian companies also have significantly different regulations regarding employee-
employer relations and workplace conditions.  Partitioning on country of incorporation (United 
States or Other) and using the parsimonious model criteria from above, it appears that US-
incorporated organizations mirror the overall model, with the exception of INVCF that is 
modeled at the component level (Panel B).  Non US-incorporated organizations model the 
relationship at the component level for FINCF, OPSCF, and REV, but more appropriately model 
the CSP-INVCF relationship at the directional level. 
Conditions in the surrounding economic environment might also affect the model.  The 
sample covers a three-year period, with 2007 reflecting a good economy, 2008 a bad economy, 
and 2009 the beginning of an economic recovery.  Parsimonious model criteria would suggest 
that in years with a good economy, PRCHG is not directly associated with CSP; FINCF is 
modeled at the directional level; INVCF and OPSCF at the component level, and REV at the 
issues level (Panel C).  During years with a bad economy, REV and PRCHG are significantly 
associated with issue level CSP; FINCF, INFCF, and OPSCF are all modeled at the component 
level.  In years with a recovering economy, PRCHG is still associated with CSP, but at the 
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overall level; FINCF at the component level; OPSCF at the directional level; REV at the issue 
level; and INVCF is not significantly associated with CSP.    However, if we use a less restrictive 
model (significant F-value, highest adjusted R
2
) to help with the lesser power caused by both the 
smaller sample size and the single year in each condition, the pattern better reflects the overall 
model and isolates a few interesting variations.  In the less restrictive condition, INVCF is still 
unassociated with CSP at any level during an economic recovery and PRCHG is significantly 
associated with CSP during a poor economy (at issue level) and a recovering economy (at 
directional level). 
Differences in partitioned samples might also be reflected in differences in aspects of 
CSP contributing to CFP.  Table 11 illustrates the standardized Betas for REV regressed on CSP 
issue-level measurements for the overall model and across partitions.  Net profit-reporting 
organizations mirror the complete model, whereas net loss-reporting organizations do not include 
the significant relationships with CGOV4, DIV3, ENV1, and PRO1 found in the original model.  
Additionally, the relationship for COM2 is far weaker, the relationships for DIV2, EMP1, and 
HUM1 are far stronger, and there is an additional positive relationship to PRO3.  Organizations 
incorporated in the United States mirror the original model, whereas organizations not 
incorporated in the United States display a completely different model, with almost none of the 
same significant associations.  Only DIV1, EMP4, ENV3, HUM2, and HUM3 are significant, 
with HUM2 being far stronger than in the original model or the US-incorporated group.  The 
patterns of significance largely hold across all four economic conditions.  In good years, CGOV4 
and ENV1 are not significant; in bad years, DIV3, ENV1, HUM1, and PRO1 are no longer 
significant; and in recovering years, only HUM1 and PRO1 continue to be non-significant.  For 
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both bad and recovering economic years, COM2 contributes much less to a variance in REV than 
it does in good years or the overall model. 
Table 12 provides a comparison of the standardized Betas for the net cash flow measures 
regressed on CSP directional-level measures.  Interpretation of FINCF is not clear-cut as the 
level of cash flows can reflect a greater need for investment funds or easier access to investment 
funds (or both).  When FINCF is partitioned on profitability (Panel A), EMP strengths and 
concerns and DIV concerns drop out of the model, most probably due to issues of power.  For 
profitable organizations, COM strengths and ENV concerns increase inflows, whereas CGOV 
concerns and DIV strengths reduce inflows.  It should be noted that ENV concerns are not 
significant for either the overall model or the net loss group.  FINCF for net loss firms, on the 
other hand, is only significantly related to CGOV: both strengths and concerns for this 
component decrease inflows.  When partitioned on country of incorporation, there are clear 
differences in the CSP factors contributing to FINCF.  COM strengths increase inflows whereas 
CGOV strengths and concerns, DIV strengths, and EMP strengths and concerns decrease inflows 
for US firms’ FINCF.  Non-US firms’ FINCF, on the other hand, are only significantly related to 
COM concerns (decrease inflow) and DIV concerns (increase inflow).  Economic conditions also 
show different patterns, although these results should be interpreted with caution due to sample 
size and power.  In good economic years, CGOV concerns decrease and DIV concerns increase 
financing inflows.  In bad economic years, COM strengths increase and CGOV concerns, DIV 
strengths, and EMP strengths decrease financing inflows.  At the beginning of an economic 
recovery, CGOV and EMP concerns decrease financing inflows. 
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Net cash flow from investing is normally an outflow, and the standardized Beta values 
must be interpreted accordingly (Panel B).  In the original model, greater CGOV concerns reduce 
investment (or increase disinvestment), whereas greater DIV and ENV concerns lead to greater 
investment outflows.  When the sample is partitioned on profitability, ENV concerns are no 
longer significant for either net profit organizations, but PRO concerns significantly reduce 
investment outflows.  Net loss firms also appear to weight ENV and DIV concerns more heavily 
than the overall sample whereas net profit firms weight DIV concerns less than the overall 
sample.  Only DIV concerns are significant for INVCF in both US and non-US incorporated 
organizations (and are much more heavily weighted for non-US firms).  Across economic 
conditions, recovery years show no significant directional CSP relationships, and good economic 
years do not show the relationship to ENV concerns from the overall model. 
Interpretation of OPSCF is also confused as changes in cash flow might be the result of 
increased inflows from sales or decreased outflows from greater efficiencies.  In the original 
model, OPSCF were increased by CGOV concerns, DIV strengths, and EMP strengths, and 
decreased by COM strengths.  Partitioning the sample on profitability produces very different 
patterns for OPSCF (Panel C).  Net profit-reporting firms are much more sensitive to COM 
strengths (increasing cash outflows) and to DIV and EMP strengths (increasing cash inflows).  
Additionally, DIV, EMP, and HUM concerns also increase cash inflows (or reduce outflows), 
whereas COM, ENV, and PRO concerns reduce cash inflows (or increase outflows).  Only 
CGOV and ENV concerns are significant for net loss-reporting organizations; ENV concerns 
increase inflows/decrease outflows for this group in contrast to profitable companies.  Once 
again, there are considerable differences between US and non-US companies.  Organizations 
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incorporated in the United States show increased operational cash inflows (or decreased 
outflows) for CGOV and DIV strengths and CGOV concerns, and decreased inflows (or 
increased outflows) for COM strengths.  Organizations incorporated outside the United States, 
on the other hand, show increased cash inflows for COM concerns and both strengths and 
concerns in EMP, whereas CGOV strengths reduce inflows/increase outflows.  The contribution 
of EMP strengths to cash inflows are especially highly weighted for non-US organizations (Beta 
= .244, p < .001) in contrast to US firms (Beta = .027, p < .05).  Good economic years mirror the 
overall model (although CGOV concerns seem to be more weighted in their ability to increase 
cash inflows/decrease cash outflows).  In years with a bad or recovering economy, however, only 
CGOV concerns are significant (and contribute to increased cash inflow/decreased cash 
outflow). 
Overall, the sensitivity analyses have indicated potential areas for future research into the 
influence of key stakeholder groups, and their particular associated CSP concerns, on 
organizational CFP.  There are differences between net profit and net loss organizations, and 
during a bad or recovering economy, suggesting that scrutiny may increase in areas of non-
financial performance during times of financial difficulties.  Future research could pursue this 
implication and seek to determine if there are specific, predictable CSP components or issues 
that become critical during organizational performance failures.  A preliminary analysis also 
suggested that country of incorporation also influences the level of association between CSP and 
CFP measures.  A recent survey of European investors (Novethic 2010) supports this implication 
in finding that investors in different countries use different methods of evaluating organizations 
(e.g., performance monitoring, positive “best in class” screening, negative screening, etc.). 
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Conclusion 
 
There were mixed results for the first set of hypotheses, with the measurement level 
explaining the greatest amount of variance in CFP outcomes varying across CFP measures.  CSP 
measured at the issue level (H1c) appears to measure the greatest degree of variance in REV as a 
measure of CFP.  This might suggest that customers, the stakeholder group most directly 
responsible for REV, are focused on specific issues that are important to them or are widely-
reported.  Measures of net cash flows, on the other hand, seem to have more variance explained 
with a CSP measure of directionality within components (H1b).  This might indicate that net 
cash flow measures are still at too aggregated of a level and that the CSP-CFP relationship might 
differ across items contributing to cash flow.  Additionally, the CFP measures are not clearly 
associated with a single group of stakeholders, but rather related groups and this might also 
affect the degree of sensitivity in the measurement level.  Finally, variance in changes in stock 
price are not significantly explained by CSP, supporting Wood and Jones’ (1995) suggestion that 
prior research findings were contradictory due to mismatches among CSP and financial outcome 
variables. 
I suggest that these findings provide evidence that CSP does contribute to CFP, but that 
the link is not necessarily direct, nor is it the same for all types of financial performance.  CSP 
might most clearly be linked at the issue level with REV, which is then contained within OPSCF 
at the directional level.  By the time cash flows contribute to PRCHG, CSP shows no significant 
ability to explain variance within stock market measures.  The CSP-CFP relationship seems to be 
stronger as CFP is less aggregated and reflects fewer stakeholder groups.  Future research could 
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concentrate in these areas by examining the major accounts contributing to cash flow measures 
and their association both with CSP outcomes and with stakeholder groups. 
There were clear differences in patterns of association across CFP outcome measures for 
both directional and issue-based measurement levels, suggesting that different CFP outcomes 
capture the interests of differing stakeholder groups.  Patterns varied in terms of which CSP 
aspects were related to a given outcome measure (RQ2b) as well as relative strengths for the 
same CSP aspect on different CFP outcomes (RQ2a).  The sensitivity of the individual outcome 
measures to CSP measures also varied:  within the significant models INVCF was the least 
sensitive (adjusted R
2
 = .005 at a directional level of measurement) and REV the most sensitive 
(adjusted R
2
 = .049 at an issue-based level of measurement), further supporting RQ2a. 
Company profitability might affect how stakeholders evaluate CSP.  Profitable 
companies might be assessed by performance within CSP categories, except for revenue which is 
affected by customer focus on salient issues.  Non-profitable companies, however, might be 
assessed with a greater weight placed on negative performance and more sensitivity to CSP in 
stock market reactions.  Stakeholders in non-US incorporated companies might assess CFP at an 
overall component level whereas stakeholders in US incorporated companies place greater 
weight on negative performance.  These differences might be related to differences in the degree 
to which social and environmental performance is regulated among the United States and other 
countries.  During years with a poor or recovering economy, CSP appears to be significantly 
related to change in stock prices and might be used to differentiate organizations.  This also 
might reflect prior findings (Blacconiere and Patten 1994) that better CSR disclosure in the face 
of an industry crisis resulted in less of a stock price downturn.  INVCF might no longer be 
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significantly related to CSP during an economic recovery if corporate investment itself is being 
constrained due to the economic environment. 
Limitations of this study include the limited sample size across economic conditions.  
Future extensions could examine changes in CSP-CFP relationships both over time and across 
varying economic environments.  Additionally, further work is needed in moving to a more 
disaggregated level of CFP measure and attempting to associate specific stakeholder groups to 
specific measures.  This study has begun the process by grouping stakeholders into associated 
groups, but continued analysis would be very helpful.  The clear-cut differences among 
organizations incorporated within and outside the United States also indicate that future research 
in comparative CSR disclosure and performance would be fruitful and provide important insights 
into public policy, stakeholder relations, and corporate strategy.  At a more specific level, it 
could be interesting to apply these models at industry levels to determine if relationships and 
sensitivity vary significantly and predictably across industries.  Finally, this study has sought to 
answer methodological issues related to measurement levels, stakeholder-measure relationships, 
and variance within CSP-CFP relationships.  As such, the study is descriptive and focused on 
contemporaneous associations.  The logical next step is to take the evidence for CSP-CFP 
relationships found herein and work towards a predictive model of the influence of CSP on 
subsequent CFP, including the important question of the length of time among organizational 
choices in CSR action, CSP outcomes, and the final CFP outcomes. 
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Tables 
 
Table 2:  Number of Strength and Concern Items within each KLD STATS Component 
Component Number of strength items Number of concern items 
Community 7 4 
Corporate Governance 6 6 
Diversity 8 3 
Employee Relations 6 5 
Environment 6 7 
Human Rights 3 4 
Product 4 4 
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Table 3:  Descriptive Statistics for CSP and CFP Measures 
 N Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
CFP measures 
Price Change  7950 .1078 4.95327 -.98 417.57 
Cash Flows from Financing
#
 8124 .0010 .18036 -4.70 1.69 
Cash Flows from Investing
#
 8124 -.0626 .15048 -.99 4.91 
Cash Flows from Operations
#
 8124 .0701 .20046 -8.24 .75 
Revenue
#
  8128 .8580 .78861 -.33 13.18 
#Scaled by total assets 
Aggregated measurement level 
Overall CSP 8138 -0.6268 2.23768 -11.00 15.00 
Component measurement level 
COMM 8138 0.0015 0.4842 -2.00 4.00 
CGOV 8138 -0.2518 0.7789 -4.00 2.00 
DIV 8138 0.1698 1.2665 -2.00 7.00 
EMP 8138 -0.2443 0.8960 -4.00 5.00 
ENV 8138 -0.0686 0.6566 -5.00 4.00 
HUM 8138 -0.0424 0.2284 -3.00 1.00 
PRO 8138 -0.1911 0.5978 -4.00 2.00 
Directional measurement level 
COM(+)  Out of 7 8138 0.11 0.423 0 5 
COM(-) Out of 4 8138 0.11 0.333 0 3 
CGOV(+) Out of 6 8138 0.19 0.419 0 3 
CGOV(-) Out of 6 8138 0.44 0.639 0 4 
DIV(+) Out of 8 8138 0.60 1.043 0 7 
DIV(-) Out of 3 8138 0.43 0.515 0 2 
EMP(+) Out of 6 8138 0.30 0.621 0 5 
EMP(-) Out of 5 8138 0.54 0.725 0 4 
ENV(+) Out of 6 8138 0.15 0.512 0 4 
ENV(-) Out of 7 8138 0.22 0.657 0 5 
HUM(+) Out of 3 8138 0.01 0.073 0 1 
HUM(-) Out of 4 8138 0.05 0.240 0 3 
PRO(+) Out of 4 8138 0.05 0.224 0 2 
PRO(-) Out of 4 8138 0.24 0.580 0 4 
Issue-based measurement level 
Factor Minimum Maximum Factor Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum Maximum 
COM1 -2.0344 12.2774 DIV1 -1.1215 12.6702 ENV1 -1.3058 8.0342 
COM2 -6.1012 12.5653 DIV2 -4.4195 2.0693 ENV2 -1.8011 10.5080 
COM3 -1.6470 16.7751 DIV3 -14.9919 8.3137 ENV3 -4.1942 13.8777 
CGOV1 -1.0223 16.2148 EMP1 -1.2508 6.2804 HUM1 -1.2832 20.6706 
CGOV2 -3.1654 2.7064 EMP2 -0.9692 7.8973 HUM2 -0.7785 16.0790 
CGOV3 -2.3922 18.6047 EMP3 -2.2125 6.9442 HUM3 -5.9985 23.8207 
CGOV4 -9.6857 13.1123 EMP4 -3.5483 2.1227 PRO1 -1.3752 6.8940 
      PRO2 -7.3884 10.0229 
      PRO3 -2.0409 13.7260 
For all factors, n = 8138, mean = 0, SD =1.0 
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Table 4: Pattern and Structure Matrices for Principal Component Analysis on Individual KLD 
STATS Components 
Panel A: Community 
 Pattern Matrix Structure Matrix 
1 2 3 1 2 3 
COM _str_G .650   .635   
COM_str_B  .614   .611   
COM_str_D .549   .593   
COM_con_A  .563   .549  
COM_con_B  -.500   -.510  
COM_str_C .420 .496   .477  
COM_con_D  -.420   -.434  
COM_con_X   .610   .581 
COM_str_X   .608   .581 
COM_str_F   .537   .585 
COM_str_A   .486   .517 
 
Panel B: Corporate Governance 
 Pattern Matrix Structure Matrix 
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
CGOV_str_F .732    .710    
CGOV_str_E .693    .703    
CGOV_str_D .623    .659    
CGOV_str_A  .746    .725   
CGOV_con_B  -.726    -.731   
CGOV_con_G      -.425  .401 
CGOV_str_X   .643 -.446   .597  
CGOV_con_X   .606    .622  
CGOV_con_J   .571    .591  
CGOV_con_F    .772    .768 
 
Panel C:  Diversity 
 Pattern Matrix Structure Matrix 
1 2 3 1 2 3 
DIV_str_E .704   .723   
DIV_str_D .686   .702   
DIV_str_F .648   .644   
DIV_str_G .561   .616   
DIV_str_A  -.657   -.620  
DIV_str_B  -.637   -.645  
DIV_con_B  .624   .639  
DIV_str_C  -.554   -.607  
DIV_con_A   .597   .626 
DIV_str_X .432  -.597   -.556 
DIV_con_X   .528   .545 
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Panel D:  Employee Relations 
 Pattern Matrix Structure Matrix 
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
EMP_str_A .756    .709    
EMP_str_G .625    .656    
EMP_con_B .571    .621  .470  
EMP_str_D  .718    .705   
EMP_str_X  .651    .662   
EMP_str_C  .590    .593   
EMP_con_X   .693    .688  
EMP_con_A   .692    .690  
EMP_str_F    -.742    -.742 
EMP_con_D    .696    .692 
 
Panel E:  Environment 
 Pattern Matrix Structure Matrix 
1 2 3 1 2 3 
ENV_con_B .750   .750   
ENV_con_A .673   .697   
ENV_con_F .630  -.410 .555  -.412 
ENV_con_D .607   .659   
ENV_con_X .448   .448   
ENV_str_D .427   .504 .463  
ENV_str_G  .648   .695  
ENV_str_B  .604   .621  
ENV_str_C  .566   .530  
ENV_str_X  .449   .443  
ENV_str_A       
ENV_con_E   .837   .836 
 
Panel F:  Human Rights 
 Pattern Matrix Structure Matrix 
1 2 3 1 2 3 
HUM_str_X .769   .743   
HUM_con_G .699   .701   
HUM_con_X .624   .654   
HUM_str_G  .812   .807  
HUM_con_F  .788   .792  
HUM_con_C   .945   .947 
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Panel G:  Product 
 Pattern Matrix Structure Matrix 
1 2 3 1 2 3 
PRO_con_D .671   .675   
PRO_con_X .658   .647   
PRO_con_E .625   .628   
PRO_con_A .497   .510   
PRO_str_B  .682   .674  
PRO_str_A  .636   .647  
PRO_str_X   .738   .721 
PRO_str_C   .601   .618 
Loadings below .4 have been suppressed 
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Table 5: Hierarchical Regression of Measurement Models across CFP Outcome Variables 
Model PRCHG FINCF INVCF OPSCF REV 
1: Overall CSP (baseline) 
F 2.436 .025 2.286 .174 56.949*** 
Adj R
2
 .000 .000 .000 .000 .007 
2: Component CSP to Overall (H1a) 
F 1.191 18.592*** 5.235*** 6.664*** 40.744*** 
Adj R
2
 .000 .015 .004 .005 .033 
Δ R2 .001 .016*** .004*** .006*** .027*** 
3: Directional CSP to Component (H1b) 
F 1.097 14.093*** 3.861*** 6.212*** 30.676*** 
Adj R
2
 .000 .022 .005 .009 .049 
Δ R2 .001 .008*** .003* .005*** .016*** 
4: Issue CSP to Directional (H1c) 
F .258 7.199*** 3.492*** 3.967*** 28.307*** 
Adj R
2
 -.002 .017 .007 .008 .072 
Δ R2 -.001 -.004 .003 .000 .024*** 
Significance levels:  * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
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Table 6:  Pearson Correlations among Factors and Component Scores (2-tailed) 
Predictor COM1 COM2 COM3 CGOV1 CGOV2 CGOV3 CGOV4 DIV1 DIV2 DIV3 
Overall 
.291 
*** 
.150 
*** 
.158 
*** 
.253 
*** 
.228 
*** 
-.104 
*** 
-.120 
*** 
.307 
*** 
-.456 
*** 
-.169 
*** 
COM 
.519 
*** 
.312 
*** 
.268 
*** 
.192 
*** 
-.064 
*** 
.073 
*** 
-.017 
.279 
*** 
-.138 
*** 
.055 
*** 
CGOV 
-.094 
*** 
.099 
*** 
-.043 
*** 
.157 
*** 
.901 
*** 
-.299 
*** 
-.265 
*** 
-.170 
*** 
.119 
*** 
-.121 
*** 
DIV 
.380 
*** 
-.072 
*** 
.260 
*** 
.297 
*** 
-.245 
*** 
.200 
*** 
.026 
* 
.613 
*** 
-.851 
*** 
-.070 
*** 
EMP 
.138 
*** 
-.015 
.065 
*** 
.106 
*** 
.009 .005 -.006 
.100 
*** 
-.035 
** 
-.118 
*** 
ENV 
.091 
*** 
.156 
*** 
.028 
* 
.078 
*** 
.006 
-.123 
*** 
.006 
.088 
*** 
-.063 
*** 
-.010 
HUM 
-.182 
*** 
.223 
*** 
-.147 
*** 
-.199 
*** 
.125 
*** 
-.232 
*** 
-.093 
*** 
-.251 
*** 
.066 
*** 
-.051 
*** 
PRO 
-.253 
*** 
.099 
*** 
-.194 
*** 
-.213 
*** 
.185 
*** 
-.266 
*** 
-.108 
*** 
-.304 
*** 
.150 
*** 
-.164 
*** 
Predictor EMP1 EMP2 EMP3 EMP4 ENV1 ENV2 ENV3 HUM1 HUM2 HUM3 PRO1 PRO2 PRO3 
Overall 
-.044 
*** 
.418 
*** 
-.266 
*** 
-.246 
*** 
-.241 
*** 
.346 
*** 
-.054 
*** 
-.151 
*** 
.072 
*** 
-.059 
*** 
-.173 
*** 
.171 
*** 
.126 
*** 
COM 
-.040 
*** 
.235 
*** 
.028 
* 
-.015 
-.107 
*** 
.177 
*** 
-.049 
*** 
.010 
.172 
*** 
-.057 
*** 
.100 
*** 
.077 
*** 
.070 
*** 
CGOV 
-.090 
*** 
-.086 
*** 
-.161 
*** 
.045 
*** 
-.089 
*** 
-.056 
*** 
-.025 
* 
-.074 
*** 
-.055 
*** 
-.038 
** 
-.222 
*** 
-.072 
*** 
.011 
DIV .170*** .296*** .177*** -.109*** .166*** .308*** .013 .101*** .174*** .036** .327*** .137*** .095*** 
EMP 
.055 
*** 
.500 
*** 
-.507 
*** 
-.598 
*** 
.004 
.107 
*** 
-.022 
* 
-.007 -.018 .018 
-.029 
** 
.078 
*** 
.020 
ENV 
-.208 
*** 
.140 
*** 
-.103 
*** 
.047 
*** 
-.642 
*** 
.522 
*** 
-.052 
*** 
-.260 
*** 
.093 
*** 
-.059 
*** 
-.078 
*** 
.100 
*** 
.082 
*** 
HUM 
-.180 
*** 
-.056 
*** 
-.221 
*** 
.081 
*** 
-.314 
*** 
-.139 
*** 
-.055 
*** 
-.572 
*** 
-.402 
*** 
-.397 
*** 
-.240 
*** 
-.070 
*** 
-.022 
* 
PRO 
-.162 
*** 
-.021 
-.228 
*** 
.076 
*** 
-.233 
*** 
-.107 
*** 
-.047 
*** 
-.178 
*** 
-.090 
*** 
-.012 
-.910 
*** 
.182 
*** 
.089 
*** 
Significance levels:  * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001  
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Table 7:  Pearson Correlations among CSP Predictors and CFP Outcomes (2-tailed) 
Panel A:  Overall and Component Scores to Outcomes 
Outcome variable Overall COM CGOV DIV EMP ENV HUM PRO 
PRICECHG -.018 -.005 -.008 -.004 
-.031 
** 
-.001 .001 .003 
FINCF -.002 -.011 
.098 
*** 
-.090 
*** 
.002 -.003 
.031 
** 
.053 
*** 
INVCF .017 .019 
-.044 
*** 
.048 
*** 
-.001 .021 .008 
-.024 
* 
OPSCF -.005 -.005 
-.055 
*** 
.052 
*** 
.002 -.011 
-.036 
** 
-.029 
** 
REV 
-.083 
*** 
-.009 
-.085 
*** 
.036 
** 
-.154 
*** 
-.015 
-.057 
*** 
-.003 
 
Panel B:  Directional Scores to Outcomes 
Outcome variable 
COM 
(+) 
COM 
(-) 
CGOV 
(+) 
CGOV 
(-) 
DIV 
(+) 
DIV 
(-) 
EMP 
(+) 
EMP 
(-) 
ENV 
(+) 
ENV 
(-) 
HUM 
(+) 
HUM 
(-) 
PRO 
(+) 
PRO 
(-) 
PRICECHG -.008 -.004 -.013 .001 -.007 -.005 -.001 
.037 
** 
.004 .005 -.002 -.001 .001 -.003 
FINCF 
-.035 
** 
-.029 
** 
-.023 
* 
-.135 
*** 
-.090 
*** 
.039 
*** 
-.058 
*** 
-.052 
*** 
-.045 
*** 
-.032 
** 
-.019 
-.035 
** 
-.041 
*** 
-.071 
*** 
INVCF .012 -.012 -.001 
.053 
*** 
.036 
** 
-.045 
 
.002 .003 .000 -.021 .002 -.007 .008 
.028 
* 
OPSCF 
.023 
* 
.037 
** 
.025 
* 
.083 
*** 
.060 
*** 
-.006 
.051 
*** 
.041 
*** 
.041 
*** 
.043 
*** 
.019 
.040 
*** 
.029 
** 
.041 
*** 
REV 
-.051 
*** 
-.052 
*** 
-.035 
** 
.080 
*** 
.046 
*** 
.003 -.019 
.173 
*** 
.023 
* 
.033 
** 
.017 
.059 
*** 
.023 
* 
.012 
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Panel C:  Factor Component Scores to Outcomes 
Outcome variable COM1 COM2 COM3 CGOV1 CGOV2 CGOV3 CGOV4 DIV1 DIV2 DIV3 
PRICECHG -.008 -.004 -.003 .000 -.008 .000 .000 -.003 .005 -.004 
FINCF 
-.035 
** 
.036 
** 
-.030 
** 
-.030 
** 
.090 
*** 
-.075 
*** 
-.025 
* 
.073 
*** 
.072 
*** 
-.026 
* 
INVCF  .012 
.029 
** 
-.008 -.008 
-.031 
** 
.048 
*** 
.033 
** 
.022* 
-.046 
*** 
.008 
OPSCF 
.023 
* 
-.056 
*** 
.036 
** 
.034 
** 
-.055 
*** 
.031** -.003 
.050 
*** 
-.039 
*** 
.016 
REV 
-.065 
*** 
-.083 
*** 
.012 .006 
-.088 
*** 
.018 
-.034 
** 
.024 
* 
-.056 
*** 
.066 
*** 
 
Outcome variable EMP1 EMP2 EMP3 EMP4 ENV1 ENV2 ENV3 HUM1 HUM2 HUM3 PRO1 PRO2 PRO3 
PRICECHG .014 -.004 .012 .000 .004 .006 .007 .003 -.005 -.001 -.002 .002 -.005 
FINCF 
-.048 
*** 
-.047 
*** 
-.062 
*** 
.028 
* 
-.030 
** 
-.046 
*** 
-.024 
* 
-.012 
-.039 
*** 
-.005 
-.067 
*** 
-.044 
*** 
.003 
INVCF -.018 .014 -.005 -.007 -.020 .017 
.029 
** 
-.011 .006 -.011 
.025 
* 
.012 -.005 
OPSCF 
.059 
*** 
.037 
** 
.061 
*** 
-.017 
.041 
*** 
.032 
** 
.005 .020 
.035 
** 
.012 
.040 
*** 
.026 
* 
.001 
REV 
.081 
*** 
-.009 
.163 
*** 
.012 
*** 
.021 
.025 
* 
.025 
* 
-.020 
.097 
*** 
.092 .003 
.023 
* 
.011 
Significance levels:  * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
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Table 8: Patterns of Significance for CFP Outcomes Regressed on Directional CSP Predictors 
 FINCF INVCF OPSCF REV 
Beta t Beta t Beta t Beta t 
COM(+) .034 
2.552 
* 
-.006 -.459 -.029 
-2.148 
* 
-.089 
-6.687 
*** 
COM(-) .001 .062 -.015 -1.262 .012 1.022 -.081 
-6.779 
*** 
CGOV(+) -.028 
-2.366 
* 
.006 .526 .023 1.940 -.027 
-2.316 
* 
CGOV(-) -.118 
-9.532 
*** 
.053 
4.218 
*** 
.067 
5.387 
*** 
.058 
4.787 
*** 
DIV(+) -.041 
-2.968 
** 
.017 1.247 .033 
2.349 
* 
.063 
4.600 
*** 
DIV(-) .024 
2.102 
* 
-.041 
-3.550 
*** 
.006 .557 .005 .413 
EMP(+) -.027 
-2.148 
* 
-.004 -.292 .027 
2.091 
* 
-.038 
-3.031 
** 
EMP(-) -.025 
-2.135 
* 
.003 .260 .016 1.385 .167 
14.374 
*** 
ENV(+) .008 .062 -.007 -.547 -.002 -.148 .019 1.455 
ENV(-) .015 1.102 -.028 
-2.095 
* 
.007 .527 .001 .067 
HUM(+) -.005 -.408 .002 .144 .006 .488 .008 .686 
HUM(-) .008 .676 -.016 -1.256 .007 .520 .046 
3.727 
*** 
PRO(+) -.013 -1.078 .002 .207 .007 .600 .011 .981 
PRO(-) -.021 -1.610 .021 1.607 -.001 -.112 -.020 -1.615 
Betas reported are standardized coefficients 
Significance levels:  * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
PRCHG did not produce a significant F-value for the model. However, EMP(-) was significantly 
related to PRCHG, Beta = .042, t = 3.507*** 
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Table 9:  Patterns of Significance for CFP Outcomes Regressed on Item-level CSP Predictors  
 FINCF INVCF OPSCF REV 
Beta t Beta t Beta t Beta t 
COM1 .021 1.551 -.011 -.792 -.012 -.905 -.109 
-8.356 
*** 
COM2 .018 1.463 .029 
2.404 
* 
-.041 
-3.361 
** 
-.072 
-6.174 
*** 
COM3 .011 .862 -.023 -1.854 .009 .752 -.014 -1.127 
CGOV1 -.001 -.054 -.008 -.570 .004 .281 -.008 -.588 
CGOV2 .057 
4.791 
*** 
-.022 -1.865 -.030 
-2.548 
* 
-.066 
-5.758 
*** 
CGOV3 -.051 
-4.061 
*** 
.054 
4.286 
*** 
.005 .410 .005 .387 
CGOV4 -.013 -1.136 .027 
2.405 
* 
-.009 -.809 -.040 
-3.710 
*** 
DIV1 -.015 -.959 .015 .933 .003 .181 .007 .490 
DIV2 .050 
4.383 
*** 
-.041 
-3.518 
*** 
-.024 
-2.068 
* 
-.048 
-4.252 
*** 
DIV3 .000 .036 -.004 -.373 .001 .121 .036 
3.193 
** 
EMP1 -.028 
-2.146 
* 
-.019 -1.455 .043 
3.218 
** 
.079 
6.180 
*** 
EMP2 -.020 -1.676 .003 .268 .021 1.742 -.002 -.144 
EMP3 -.031 
-2.579 
* 
-.014 -1.175 .040 
3.272 
** 
.148 
12.512 
*** 
EMP4 .018 1.637 -.006 -.533 -.009 -.815 .094 
8.662 
*** 
ENV1 .032 
2.198 
* 
-.020 -1.321 -.017 -1.159 -.044 
-3.072 
** 
ENV2 .008 .571 .009 .679 -.011 -.839 -.011 -.857 
ENV3 -.017 -1.561 .026 
2.362 
* 
.001 .107 .017 1.607 
HUM1 .013 1.074 -.010 -.841 -.002 -.187 -.033 
-2.835 
** 
HUM2 -.013 -1.140 .001 .108 .015 1.301 .088 
7.676 
*** 
HUM3 .002 .168 -.007 -.637 .003 .258 -.005 -.430 
PRO1 -.019 -1.429 .013 .991 .004 .328 -.031 
-2.391 
* 
PRO2 -.022 -1.802 .009 .758 .006 .460 .007 .561 
PRO3 .006 .565 -.009 -.795 .001 .101 .021 1.926 
Betas reported are standardized coefficient 
Significance levels:  * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001
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Table 10:  Sensitivity Analyses of Hierarchical Regressions of Measurement Models across CFP Outcomes Partitioned on 
Profitability, Country of Incorporation, and Economic Conditions 
Panel A:  Split by Performance 
Model PRCHG FINCF INVCF OPSCF REV 
 Net Profit Net Loss Net Profit Net Loss Net Profit Net Loss Net Profit Net Loss Net Profit Net Loss 
1: Overall CSP (baseline) 
F 1.414 
9.503 
** 
.869 1.754 .364 
4.394 
* 
1.977 2.807 
43.216 
*** 
16.278 
*** 
Adj R
2
 .000 .004 .000 .000 .000 .001 .000 .001 .007 .007 
2: Component CSP to Overall (H1a) 
F 1.012 1.913 
9.238 
*** 
9.389 
*** 
4.380 
*** 
2.433 
* 
11.110 
*** 
3.566 
** 
30.314 
*** 
14.517 
*** 
Adj R
2
 .000 .003 .010 .025 .004 .004 .012 .008 .034 .039 
Δ R2 .001 .002 
.011 
*** 
.027 
*** 
.005 
** 
.005 
.013 
*** 
.010 
** 
.028 
*** 
.035 
*** 
3: Directional CSP to Component (H1b) 
F .988 1.472 
6.479 
*** 
8.079 
*** 
2.875 
*** 
2.222 
** 
11.603 
*** 
3.122 
*** 
24.181 
*** 
10.993 
*** 
Adj R
2
 .000 .003 .013 .041 .005 .007 .025 .013 .053 .057 
Δ R2 .001 .003 .004 
.019 
*** 
.002 .006 
.014 
*** 
.008 
.020 
*** 
.021 
*** 
4: Issue CSP to Directional (H1c) 
F .241 1.134 
4.643 
*** 
3.258 
*** 
2.667 
*** 
1.555 
* 
12.074 
*** 
1.675 
* 
19.535 
*** 
11.209 
*** 
Adj R
2
 .000 .001 .014 .022 .007 .005 .042 .007 .068 .092 
Δ R2 -.001 .003 .003 
-.015 
* 
.003 .002 
.019 
*** 
-.002 
.017 
*** 
.038 
*** 
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Panel B:  Split by Country of Incorporation 
Model PRCHG FINCF INVCF OPSCF REV 
 USA Non-USA USA Non-USA USA  USA Non-USA USA Non-USA 
1: Overall CSP (baseline) 
F 2.465 1.164 .000 1.030 1.737 .103 .204 
4.052 
* 
67.353 
*** 
.005 
Adj R
2
 .000 .001 .000 .000 .000 -.004 .000 .013 .008 -.004 
2: Component CSP to Overall (H1a) 
F 1.169 .845 
17.467 
*** 
5.046 
*** 
4.903 
*** 
1.712 
6.212 
*** 
3.259 
** 
39.455 
*** 
9.634 
*** 
Adj R
2
 .000 -.005 .014 .107 .003 .021 .005 .063 .033 .204 
Δ R2 .001 .022 
.015 
*** 
.130 
*** 
.004 
*** 
.050 
.005 
*** 
.074 
* 
.026 
*** 
.227 
*** 
3: Directional CSP to Component (H1b) 
F 1.073 .892 
13.823 
*** 
3.018 
*** 
3.515 
*** 
1.991 
* 
6.159 
*** 
3.810 
*** 
28.452 
*** 
6.353 
*** 
Adj R
2
 .000 -.006 .022 .100 .004 .052 .009 .134 .046 .228 
Δ R2 .001 .026 
.009 
*** 
.016 .002 .054 
.006 
*** 
.091 
.014 
*** 
.043 
4: Issue CSP to Directional (H1c) 
F .253 .549 
6.890 
*** 
2.141 
** 
3.329 
*** 
1.274 
3.701 
*** 
2.585 
*** 
27.872 
*** 
5.995 
*** 
Adj R
2
 -.002 -.050 .017 .100 .007 .026 .008 .134 .073 .327 
Δ R2 -.001 .007 -.004 .038 .004 .017 .000 .036 
.027 
*** 
.123 
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Panel C:  Split by Economic Condition 
Model PRCHG FINCF INVCF OPSCF REV 
 2007 2008 2009 2007 2008 2009 2007 2008 2009 2007 2008 2009 2007 2008 2009 
1: Overall CSP (baseline) 
F .615 1.839 
5.201 
* 
.182 2.465 3.773 .319 2.527 .214 .441 .174 .335 
18.478 
*** 
21.876 
*** 
16.701 
*** 
Adj 
R
2
 
.000 .000 .002 .000 .001 .001 .000 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .007 .008 .006 
2: Component CSP to Overall (H1a) 
F .632 1.538 
2.985 
** 
9.207 
*** 
7.435 
*** 
4.158 
*** 
3.184 
** 
2.833 
** 
1.010 
4.323 
*** 
2.156 
* 
1.851 
13.915 
*** 
13.226 
*** 
14.729 
*** 
Adj 
R
2
 
-.001 .001 .005 .021 .016 .008 .006 .005 .000 .009 .003 .002 .033 .030 .034 
Δ R2 .002 .003 
.006 
* 
.024 
*** 
.018 
*** 
.009 
*** 
.008 
** 
.006 
* 
.003 
.011 
*** 
.006 
* 
.005 
.029 
*** 
.025 
*** 
.030 
*** 
3: Directional CSP to Component (H1b) 
F .627 
1.847 
* 
2.755 
*** 
7.103 
*** 
5.132 
*** 
3.697 
*** 
2.247 
** 
2.223 
** 
.902 
3.545 
*** 
1.896 
* 
2.202 
** 
11.373 
*** 
10.048 
*** 
10.350 
*** 
Adj 
R
2
 
-.002 .004 .009 .031 .021 .013 .007 .006 .000 .013 .005 .006 .052 .044 .045 
Δ R2 .002 .006 .006 
.013 
** 
.007 .008 .004 .004 .002 .008 .004 .006 
.021 
*** 
.016 
*** 
.014 
*** 
4: Issue CSP to Directional (H1c) 
F .122 
2.126 
** 
1.519 
4.223 
*** 
3.031 
*** 
1.678 
* 
2.483 
*** 
1.836 
** 
1.109 
3.039 
*** 
1.166 1.262 
10.381 
*** 
9.081 
**** 
9.717 
*** 
Adj 
R
2
 
-.008 .010 .004 .027 .017 .006 .013 .007 .001 .005 .001 .002 .076 .064 .067 
Δ R2 -.003 .008 -.001 -.001 -.001 -.004 .009 .004 .004 .007 .000 -.001 
.027 
*** 
.023 
*** 
.025 
*** 
 
Significance levels:  * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
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Table 11: Comparison of Significant CSP Relationships for Revenue across Sensitivity Analysis Partitions 
M
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P
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3
 
Complete 
+          
.036 
** 
.079 
*** 
 
.148 
*** 
.094 
*** 
    
.088 
*** 
    
- 
.109 
*** 
.072 
*** 
  
.066 
*** 
 
.040 
*** 
 
.048 
*** 
     
.044 
** 
  
.033 
** 
  
.031 
* 
  
Net Profit 
+          
.042 
** 
.054 
*** 
 
.148 
*** 
.093 
*** 
    
.085 
*** 
    
- 
.117 
*** 
.081 
*** 
  
.069 
*** 
 
.050 
*** 
 
.037 
** 
     
.055 
** 
  
.030 
* 
  
.034 
* 
  
Net Loss 
+           
.133 
*** 
 
.130 
*** 
.111 
*** 
    
.114 
*** 
   
.055 
** 
- 
.096 
*** 
.046 
* 
  
.076 
*** 
   
.070 
** 
        
.066 
** 
     
USA 
+          
.036 
** 
.078 
*** 
 
.152 
*** 
.093 
*** 
    
.087 
*** 
    
- 
.097 
*** 
.088 
*** 
  
.068 
*** 
 
.040 
*** 
 
.040 
*** 
     
.051 
** 
  
.037 
** 
  
.030 
* 
  
Non USA 
+        
.385 
*** 
     
.156 
* 
  
.357 
*** 
 
.330 
** 
    
-                    
.161 
* 
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2009 
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Standardized coefficients reported 
Significance levels:  * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
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Table 12:  Comparison of Significant CSP Relationships for Net Cash Flows across Sensitivity 
Analysis Partitions  
Panel A:  FINCF 
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Panel B:  INVCF 
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Panel C: OPSCF 
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Significance levels:  * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
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CHAPTER THREE:  THE BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT:  RESILIENCE IN 
STAKEHOLDER ASSESSMENTS OF CORPORATE SOCIAL 
PERFORMANCE DISCLOSURE 
 
Introduction 
 
The purpose of this paper is to propose a new construct of resilience to explain why 
organizations choosing to engage in greater voluntary social disclosure will suffer less of a 
downturn (or recover more quickly) than others facing the same conditions.  Prior research has 
shown that voluntary corporate social responsibility (CSR) information might reduce reaction to 
an industry disaster (Blacconiere and Patten 1994; Patten and Nance 1998), might be able to 
repair damaged legitimacy (Milne and Patten 2002), is more closely allied to exposure risk and 
public pressure via industry membership and size (Patten 1991), and is negatively related to the 
associated CSR performance, especially for less regulated industries (Patten 2002).  Resilience, 
then, is the degree to which organizations providing voluntary CSR disclosure are insulated 
against performance shocks. 
Simply providing a single CSR disclosure is not likely to be sufficient to produce 
resilience.  A history of disclosure prior to the related performance shock (Blacconiere and 
Patten 1994; Patten and Nance 1998) is important, as is the individual exposure to risk due to 
location (Patten and Nance 1998), size (Patten 1991; Patten and Nance 1998), industry (Patten 
1991, 2002; Blacconiere and Patten 1994; Patten and Nance 1998), or investment horizon (Milne 
and Patten 2002).  The qualitative characteristics of the disclosure are equally important, 
including information credibility (O’Dwyer and Owen 2005; O’Dwyer, Unerman, and Bradley 
2005; Merkl-Davies and Brennan 2007; Simnett, Vanstraelen, and Chua 2009; Pflugrath, 
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Roebuck, and Simnett 2011) and the verbal tone used in the disclosure (Cho, Roberts, and Patten 
2010).  The extent to which disclosure correlates with actual performance will also produce 
organizational trustworthiness (Ullmann 1985; Wagner, Lutz, and Weitz 2009), with repeated 
evidence over time strengthening the effect. 
Resilience is the degree of protection from unexpected poor performance.  This assumes 
that the organization has an overall track record of competence and compliance with legal and 
regulatory requirements and the poor performance in question is unexpected and might be due to 
events outside of management control.  Prior studies have indicated that greater voluntary CSR 
disclosure insulates an “innocent” organization against industry disasters (Blacconiere and Patten 
1994; Patten and Nance 1998) and that greater voluntary financial disclosure might have 
insulated companies to a degree against the economy-wide shock of the Wall Street Crash of 
1929 (Barton and Waymire 2004).  This paper is motivated by a desire to understand the 
mechanism by which prior disclosure resulted in resilience to an industry disaster and the 
relevant information characteristics that influenced the mechanism involved.  In this paper I 
examine resilience to an industry scandal in which the organization of interest is not directly 
implicated, but which nevertheless has resulted in a significant market downturn for the entire 
industry and increased regulatory uncertainty. 
Globalization, liberalization of markets, and recent economic crises have increased the 
degree of interdependence and international exposure across industries and increased uncertainty 
and public scrutiny as a result (Porter and van der Linde 1995; Tomkins 2001; Doh and Guay 
2004; Freeman, Harrison, and Wicks 2007).  Widespread advances in information technology 
have increased the extent and timeliness of information available to investors, and the spread of 
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the Internet has made the ease of access to this information greater.  The Internet, global media, 
and the recent expansion of societal attention to social and environmental issues have contributed 
to the demand for disclosure and a focus on matching CSR claims to actual performance (Brown 
and Deegan 1998; McWilliams and Siegel 2001; Berthelot, Cormier, and Magnan 2003; 
Cormier, Gordon, and Magnan 2004; Freeman, Harrison, and Wicks 2007; Aerts and Cormier 
2009).  The combination of increased risk exposure, economic uncertainty, and public scrutiny 
emphasizes the importance of the role credible information, in the form of voluntary CSR 
disclosures, might play in investor decisions in the face of unexpectedly poor performance.  The 
study contributes to the literature by introducing the concept of resilience and further exploring 
the role voluntary CSR disclosure plays in organizational performance.  I also contribute by 
examining the information characteristics of voluntary disclosures which lead to subsequent 
resilience, via intervening perceptions of organizational legitimacy, extending prior research that 
examined the role between disclosure and post-shock financial performance. 
Using a 2 x 2 between-participants design with 100 non-professional but experienced 
investors, I first examine the relationship between information characteristics (accuracy x 
completeness) and perceived legitimacy.  I subsequently test the relationship between perceived 
legitimacy and resilience to unexpectedly poor performance.  I find that accuracy of voluntary 
disclosures significantly influences perceived legitimacy.  Perceived legitimacy then 
significantly positively influences resilience following an industry shock. 
The paper is organized into five sections.  Section two reviews relevant literature and 
develops the hypotheses for the theorized model.  Section three describes the research design, 
setting, and measures used.  Section four presents the analysis of the survey data.  Section five 
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concludes with a summary of key research findings and a discussion of the implications of these 
findings for future research. 
 
Literature Review and Research Questions 
 
Information characteristics of voluntary disclosures affect stakeholder perceptions of the 
organization (Merkl-Davies and Brennan 2007).  Because the disclosures are voluntary, 
differences in transparency are reflected in organizational choices in how much to report and 
how to present the information, with greater accuracy and completeness contributing to higher 
quality disclosures.  The demonstrated openness and honesty beyond the legal requirements of 
mandated disclosures influences stakeholder perceptions of organizational legitimacy (Lindblom 
2010).  Perceived legitimacy influences actions taken or choices made in interactions with that 
organization, particularly in the face of crises or unexpectedly poor performance (Figure 2).  
Organizations choosing to issue higher-quality voluntary disclosures should be perceived as 
more legitimate and greater legitimacy should result in greater resilience to crises and downturns. 
In the experimental model (Figure 3), higher quality disclosures are those with CSR 
voluntary reports with greater reporting accuracy and completeness.  These characteristics should 
strongly influence perceived legitimacy through assessments of disclosure credibility, 
organizational stability, and management integrity.  Perceived legitimacy should then result in 
greater resilience available to cushion the effects of performance shock in the form of higher 
assessments of investment quality or less disinvestment following an industry shock.  It also 
might be reflected in greater investor patience in waiting for the organization to recover 
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financially, with greater resilience producing a “premium” of allowed time for recovery beyond 
initial expectations of the time required.  
 
Disclosure Quality 
 
There are several, interrelated information characteristics that determine the quality of 
voluntary disclosures.  Prior research has considered accuracy, completeness, and timeliness to 
be among the most salient characteristics leading to high-quality disclosure (O’Dwyer and Owen 
2005; O’Dwyer, Unerman, and Bradley 2005; Merkl-Davies and Brennan 2007; Kothari, Li, and 
Short 2009; Simnett, Vanstraelen, and Chua 2009; Pflugrath, Roebuck, and Simnett 2011).  In 
this study, I concentrate on the degree of accuracy and completeness in a voluntary CSR 
disclosure as the experimental environment does not lend itself to timeliness manipulations. 
Disclosures that are high in accuracy will report items clearly, using specific language 
and quantitative measures that are then able to be compared to performance across time and 
across organizations.  Disclosures that are high in completeness will include reports of positive 
achievements and admission of negative performance and will report across a wide range of 
areas covering social, environmental, governance, and strategic concerns and not simply “cherry 
pick” those areas that are most visible or have the best performance.  Better completeness in 
disclosure will support perceptions of accountability and honesty and support perceptions of a 
lack of image management.
19
  Greater accuracy in disclosure will support perceptions of honesty, 
consistency, and management control and will contribute to comparability.  Greater accuracy 
                                                 
19
 Greater completeness might also support perceptions of management’s competence in being aware of, and 
monitoring, multiple aspects of non-financial performance. 
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also supports perceptions of disclosure as incremental information provision to assist in decision 
making (as opposed to image management).  Therefore, the first hypotheses are: 
H1a: Voluntary disclosure accuracy will be positively associated with 
perceived organizational legitimacy. 
H1b:  Voluntary disclosure completeness will be positively associated with 
perceived organizational legitimacy. 
H1c:  Voluntary disclosures with both high accuracy and high 
completeness will result in the greatest perceived organizational 
legitimacy. 
H1d:  Voluntary disclosures with both low accuracy and low completeness 
will result in the least perceived organizational legitimacy. 
 
Legitimacy 
 
Organizational legitimacy is a reflection of the degree to which organizational actions, 
goals, and values reflect those of society at large (e.g., responsible use of scarce resources, 
ethical treatment of employees, fair dealing with customers, etc.).  Legitimacy is especially 
reflected in organizational actions and accountability that go beyond regulations and mandatory 
requirement; thus, voluntary disclosure should help form stakeholders’ perceptions of 
organizational legitimacy.  Organizations which are perceived as more legitimate should be those 
which are considered to demonstrate credibility in reporting and trustworthiness in actions and 
intentions.  Voluntary disclosures should support assessments of credibility and trustworthiness 
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through the information characteristics chosen for reporting, with higher quality disclosures 
leading to greater perceived legitimacy.   
 
Credibility 
 
Once the decision has been made to engage in discretionary reporting, the organization 
must make a series of choices that will determine the credibility of the information.
20
  These 
decisions will determine what the organization discloses, who the key recipients are, when the 
information is disclosed, where the information is disclosed, and how the information is reported.  
To a great extent, these decisions are determined by why the organization chooses to engage in 
voluntary disclosure.  The reasons involved can range from pure impression management to pure 
incremental information provision, although most organizations fall somewhere along this 
continuum and display mixed motives.  Impression management attempts to hide poor 
performance, to present a false impression of the organization’s goals and values, or to control 
external information search (Dowling and Pfeffer 1975; Arya and Mittendorf 2005; Merkl-
Davies and Brennan 2007; Lindblom 2010).  Incremental information provision, on the other 
hand, assumes that the firm is signaling behavior because this allows it to (1) differentiate itself 
from competitors based on true performance, (2) reduce contracting costs, (3) and/or manage 
diverse stakeholder interests (Porter and van der Linde 1995; Koonce and Mercer 2005; 
Freeman, Harrison, and Wicks 2007; Merkl-Davies and Brennan 2007; Lindblom 2010). 
                                                 
20
 Mandatory reporting is less able to influence perceived credibility because it does not involve a decision whether 
to report or, in the majority of cases, what, when, where, and how to report. 
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Stakeholders are well-aware that organizations are likely to engage in some degree of 
impression management and as a result the credibility of voluntary disclosure is harder to 
establish due to the degree of managerial discretion involved (Berthelot, Cormier, and Magnan 
2003;  O’Dwyer and Owen 2005; Kothari, Li, and Short 2009).  The voluntary nature of CSR 
disclosure causes problems with consistency, comparability, completeness, the degree to which 
specific or qualitative data are provided, and reliability.  Consequently, voluntary disclosure is 
often met with skepticism as to the degree to which it provides incremental information versus 
an attempt at image management through “spin” in reporting (Merkl-Davies and Brennan 2007; 
Kothari, Li, and Short 2009).  The difference between the two extremes of disclosure intent is 
determined by the attributed degree of credibility in that disclosure.  Greater credibility is 
associated with higher-quality disclosure, based on key information characteristics of accuracy 
and completeness (Merkl-Davies and Brennan 2007; Kothari, Li, and Short 2009). 
 
Trustworthiness 
 
Trust is defined as “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another 
party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the 
trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party” (Mayer, Davis, and 
Schoorman 1995, 713).  Trustworthiness reflects the degree to which an organization will 
continue to perform as expected without constant monitoring or intervention.  Two items adapted 
from Mayer and Davis (1999) are used to capture this quality.  The first measures the extent to 
which the organization itself is perceived to be stable and predictable in its operations and 
results.  The second measures the extent to which organizational management is expected to 
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exhibit integrity and resist moral hazard pressures by acting in the long-term interests of 
stakeholders. 
Organizational trustworthiness determines whether the stakeholder makes the initial 
decision to engage in a transaction or enter into a relationship based on expectations of future 
behavior and assessments of associated risk.  Resilience is derived from this but reflects the post 
hoc use of prior assessments of trustworthiness in current performance assessments and 
determinations of future partnerships.  Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995) posit three 
antecedents to trustworthiness.  Ability trust encompasses judgments of basic organizational 
competence.  Integrity trust includes concepts related to legal and regulatory compliance, 
governance, structures, and ethical behavior.  Benevolence trust reflects demonstrated 
organizational actions that indicate a desire for a long-term, mutually beneficial relationship and 
includes issues of transparency, equity, respect, and accountability; these are characteristics that 
go beyond legal and regulatory requirements.  Ability and integrity trust – sometimes referred to 
as “thin” trust (Vosselman and van der Meer-Kooistra 2009) – reflect a basic level of legitimacy, 
or compliance with (but no more than) legal expectations (Lindblom 2010).  Ability, integrity, 
and benevolence (“thick” trust) reflect compliance above and beyond basic legal expectations 
and incorporate social values and norms, thus increasing perceptions of legitimacy (Vosselman 
and van der Meer-Kooistra 2009; Lindlbom 2010). 
 
Resilience 
 
Resilience functions as a repository of goodwill towards an organization, or the belief 
that poor outcomes are (1) honest mistakes (not questions of incompetence or illegal/unethical 
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behavior), (2) at least partially due to extenuating circumstances, or (3) the result of reasonable 
attempts to develop a new area of organizational learning or expertise which did not work out as 
expected.  As such, it is highly dependent on the perceived credibility of prior disclosures and the 
perceived trustworthiness of the reporting organization and its management.  This study extends 
Blacconiere and Patten’s (1994) findings that organizations engaging in prior CSR disclosure 
suffered less of a decrease in their stock price following an industry disaster. I extend this stream 
of research by suggesting that prior disclosure insulated the reporting organizations from the 
industry shock by establishing them as more legitimate.  I concentrate on accuracy and 
completeness as the underlying determinants of higher-quality voluntary disclosures, with 
higher-quality disclosures leading to perceived legitimacy which subsequently produces 
resilience to an unexpected performance downturn. 
Resilience will be reflected in multiple aspects of the stakeholder-organization 
relationship.  It can lead to a greater or longer-term allocation of resources, decreased 
governance costs, or smaller required returns.  Resilience might appear both as judgments (in re-
assessments following unexpected outcomes leading to less of a penalty applied or greater 
acceptable performance variability) and as actions (in the decision to buy or sell investments or 
in longer recovery times allowed prior to divestiture).  
Resilience operates mainly through the mechanism of decreasing relational risk (Das and 
Teng 2001), which then dampens the volatility of reaction to unexpected bad news, permitting 
recovery from (honest) mistakes, learning curves, industry issues, and economic downturns.  
During times of unexpected market turbulence, resilience can insulate the organization, because 
the decreased relational risk permits the absorption of greater environmental uncertainty (Barton 
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and Waymire 2004).  Resilience is a cumulative account and will change over time and might be 
depleted or damaged if voluntary information becomes non-credible or is reduced.  Newer 
organizations, which have not yet had the opportunity to establish a track record of relational 
outcomes, might still be able to establish resilience by disclosing greater amounts of (or higher 
quality) voluntary CSR disclosure. 
Unexpected poor performance outcomes might be the result of internal or external 
factors.  External factors include uncertainty in the environment and the actions of others and are 
beyond direct control of organizational management.  Examples of such factors include a general 
economic downturn, stock market crashes, natural disasters, or industry related disasters or 
scandals that do not directly involve the organization.  Prior research has included industry 
issues, such as the Exxon Valdez (Patten and Nance 1998) or the tragedy at Bhopal (Blacconiere 
and Patten 1994); political issues, such as elections in South Africa (de Villiers and van Staden 
2006); and overall economic shocks, such as the 1929 market crash (Barton and Waymire 2004).  
Internal factors include mistakes, incompetence, and fraud, as well as more benign internal issues 
such as learning curves, estimates in the face of new technology or markets, or reasonable 
assumptions that turned out to be incorrect. 
In this study, I choose to focus on an industry shock because CSR issues have been 
shown to be significantly related to industry (Ullmann 1985; Patten 2002; Margolis, Elfenbein, 
and Walsh 2007).  Further, industry-related downturns might be caused by external shocks – 
industry disasters which do not involve misbehavior by the specific organization studied – and 
influenced by internal characteristics, practices, or conventions common to all industry members. 
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The research cited above has done much to establish that organizations perceived as more 
accountable to society (by the decision to engage in voluntary CSR disclosures) have not 
suffered as greatly (or have recovered more quickly) during economic downturns or industry 
crises.  Consequently, after an industry shock I expect revised assessments of quality, 
disinvestment decisions, and expected future performance will be related to perceived legitimacy 
derived from the information characteristics of the organization’s voluntary disclosure.  Those 
organizations that, prior to the industry crisis, were perceived as exhibiting greater legitimacy 
should be granted the benefit of the doubt regarding their involvement in and ability to control 
conditions leading to an industry wide shock. 
The construct of resilience is reflected in multiple aspects.  Perceived investment quality 
of all members of an industry might decline following an industry shock, but organizations 
enjoying the benefit of resilience might still be considered higher quality investments, paralleling 
Blacconiere and Patten’s (1994) finding that prior-disclosing organizations experienced less of a 
stock price decline in the wake of an industry disaster.  Perceived quality and expectations of 
future performance should interact to affect volatility, with resilience leading to less 
disinvestment following the crisis.  Additionally, expectations of future performance should be 
affected such that investors are willing to show greater patience in waiting for a partial or full 
recovery in economic performance following an industry crisis, even beyond their initial 
expectations for time required.  In all cases, investor evaluations of quality and future 
performance expectations should be positively associated with perceived legitimacy.   
H2:  Perceived organizational legitimacy will be positively associated with 
resilience. 
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Research Methods 
 
Experimental Design and Administration 
 
This study uses a 2 x 2 between-participants design (Figure 4) for the initial hypothesis, 
followed by regression analysis for the second hypothesis.  The manipulated independent 
variables consist of two information characteristics leading to a high-quality voluntary 
disclosure:  accuracy and completeness.  Endogenous organizational characteristics are held 
constant in the case to isolate the effect of disclosure quality on non-professional investor 
judgments and actions.  An industry shock (in which the case organization is not directly 
involved) is used to measure change in investor judgments and consequent actions which 
represent the construct of resilience.  To control for individual differences among participants in 
the level of acceptable investment risk which might affect perceptions of the investment and 
subsequent decisions, a validated scale measuring risk appetite specifically in a business setting 
is used as a covariate in the analysis (Sitkin and Weingart 1995). 
After logging in to the site, reading the summary explanation of research required by the 
IRB, and indicating their willingness to participate, respondents were asked a series of screening 
and demographic questions.  Those that passed the screens then received the experimental 
materials (Appendix A) and were informed that they had inherited 10,000 shares in Dryad 
Forestry, Inc., a large, growth-and-income timber and forestry-products company listed on the 
New York Stock Exchange.  The company was reported to be considered a good addition to the 
participant’s investment portfolio by their investment advisor.  The amount was reported to 
double the participant’s investment portfolio and was selected to be large enough for serious 
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consideration but not so large as to be perceived as unbelievable.  Participants were prompted to 
think of a long-term investment account, as prior research has indicated significant differences 
between investment decisions based on short- and long-term strategy and the consequent 
appraisal of a risk-reward relationship (Milne and Patten 2002). 
All participants next received Part One, containing basic background and industry 
information for Dryad, along with excerpts from its financial reports (including audit opinion, 
analyst recommendation and earnings forecast, and outstanding litigation or regulatory issues).  
The background information included the manipulation of completeness and accuracy, with each 
group receiving a different excerpt from Dryad’s Sustainability Report.  After reading the 
excerpted financial and CSR performance reports, participants were asked to evaluate the overall 
quality of an investment in Dryad (PRE), the credibility of the Sustainability Report (CRED), 
and general comfort with investment stability (STABL) and management integrity (INTEG). 
In Part Two, participants were told of an industry scandal that did not involve 
misbehavior by Dryad, but which negatively impacted economic performance across the industry 
and increased uncertainty as to future regulatory impacts in response to the crisis.  The 
description was accompanied by an excerpt from an article from the business press.
21
  
Participants were then told they had the opportunity to shift any portion of their investment in 
Dryad to an indexed mutual fund linked to the S&P 500.  They were asked to re-evaluate their 
perception of investment quality following the crisis (POST) and report what percentage (in 
deciles) of their portfolio they would shift to the market-linked fund (SHIFT).  They were also 
                                                 
21
 Prior research (Kothari, Li, and Short 2009) has indicated that investors perceive the business press to be 
significantly more credible than either management or analysts; hence the decision to reinforce the information on 
the industry crisis and Dryad’s non-involvement in the illegal behavior using an article from the business press. 
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asked to estimate the time required for Dryad to make both a partial (EPART) and a full 
(EFULL) recovery of the drop in net income following the industry crisis, and the maximum 
time they would be willing to wait for Dryad to actually make a partial (WPART) and full 
(WFULL) recovery.  Manipulation check questions followed regarding Dryad’s role in the 
industry crisis and the information characteristics contained in the manipulated Sustainability 
Report.  The experiment concluded with the six items of the Business Risk Propensity Scale 
(Sitkin and Weingart 1995). 
The experimental materials were pilot tested twice.  PhD faculty and eight doctoral 
students participated in the first round, and changes in phrasing and organization were made 
based on their input.  The resulting materials were then pretested with a group of 35 master’s 
level business students.  Two items were added for clarification, and minor editing was 
conducted to improve readability for a non-academic audience.  Following Institutional Review 
Board (IRB) approval of revisions, the experimental materials were programmed on a new 
hosting website, Qualtrics (www.Qualtrics.com), and the panel company, EMpanel Online 
(www.EMpanelOnline.com), began the screening process. 
 
Participants 
 
The success of an organization depends upon multiple groups of stakeholders.  Because 
stakeholder groups vary in preferences for CSR components and in emphasized aspects of 
financial performance (Jones 1995; Wood and Jones 1995; Mitchell, Agle, and Wood 1997; 
Freeman, Harrison, and Wicks 2007; Lindblom 2010), I restrict this study to a single stakeholder 
group, non-professional investors.  This group has considerable, hidden influence due to their 
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choices in mutual funds and stocks held within investment and retirement portfolios, which are 
often measured at the aggregated, analyst-centered level.   
To test the hypotheses, I used experimental data collected from non-professional 
investors provided by a professional panel service, EMpanel Online.  The company screened 
participants from its registrants based on (1) age (greater than 18 years), (2) non-professional 
status, (3) possession of an investment or retirement account, (4) at least some degree of 
participation in the management of that account, (5) comfort reading financial statements, and 
(6) use of financial or investment media.  To be included in the experiment, participants also had 
to pass the manipulation checks, pass an attention check item embedded in the experiment, and 
take a reasonable amount of time to complete the experiment.  During the screening process, 623 
prospective participants passed the initial screenings.  After attention (186 failed), manipulation 
(322 failed), and time checks (14 failed), 101 individuals completed the instrument.
22
  The final 
participant pool consists of 100 participants who were randomly distributed in each of the four 
cells, with 25 participants per cell.
23
   
Participants were 57% male, predominantly in age ranges from 40 to 59 years, 38% held 
an undergraduate degree,  and predominantly employed in manufacturing (12%), 
finance/accounting/insurance (14%), and “other” (33%).  The majority of participants (56%) 
reported that they were solely responsible for the management of their portfolio, reported 
                                                 
22
 Within each sample, the pattern of failed manipulation checks resulted in an interesting discovery: participants 
were easily able (only 25% manipulation check failure) to recognize a very high quality disclosure (high accuracy 
and high completeness), but had difficulties (manipulation failure ranging from 53% to 58% across the cells) 
distinguishing between information characteristics for low quality (low accuracy and low completeness) and mixed 
disclosures.  In general, failed manipulations consisted in failure to distinguish one of the characteristics, suggesting 
that accuracy and completeness might not be sharply distinguished in participant perceptions of high quality 
disclosure. 
23
 Due to a math error in quota adjustments, there were initially 26 good completes in Cell C. One participant was 
randomly deleted to equalize cell populations. 
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experience was evenly split between “some” (46%) and “considerable” (47%), 43% reported an 
average portfolio of $100,001 to $500,000, 61% were “definitely” likely to invest in the next 12 
months, and participants tended to be optimistic (48%) or neutral (38%) about the market (Table 
13).  Correlation analysis indicated that there were no significant differences among groups in 
relation to either measured or manipulated variables. 
 
Variable Measures 
 
Manipulated Variables 
 
The construct representing the information characteristics influencing voluntary 
disclosure quality consists of two manipulated variables:  ACCURACY and COMPLETENESS.  
Information characteristics of specificity, completeness, and accuracy have been found to be 
important in determining perceived voluntary disclosure quality and credibility (O’Dwyer and 
Owen 2005; O’Dwyer, Unerman, and Bradley 2005; Merkl-Davies and Brennan 2007; Kothari, 
Li, and Short 2009; Simnett, Vanstraelen, and Chua 2009; Pflugrath, Roebuck, and Simnett 
2011).  Operationalization of these measures has included third-party assurance (Simnettt, 
Vanstraelen, and Chua 2009; Pflugrath, Roebuck, and Simnett 2011), the use of credible 
frameworks or standardized reporting to ensure consistency and completeness (O’Dwyer and 
Owen 2005; O’Dwyer, Unerman, and Bradley 2005), the use of specific, quantifiable measures 
(Merkl-Davies and Brennan 2007), and the inclusion of both positive and negative information 
(Kothari, Li, and Short 2009).   
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In this study, ACCURACY is manipulated as the degree to which the Sustainability 
Report contains specific language with quantifiable, comparable measurements (High Accuracy) 
versus vague language and non-verifiable or non-quantifiable measures which could not be 
compared to prior years’ or other organizations’ performance (Low Accuracy) (Cho, Roberts, 
and Patten 2010).
24
  COMPLETENESS is operationalized as the inclusion of items within the 
Sustainability Report across a range of non-financial performance areas and the disclosure of 
both positive and negative performance within these areas (High Completeness).  Low 
Completeness, on the other hand, reports only a few areas within the Sustainability Report and 
only discloses good performance (O’Dwyer and Owen 2005; O’Dwyer, Unerman, and Bradley 
2005).  The combination of accuracy and completeness determines the degree to which the 
voluntary disclosure can be considered high quality. 
 
Measured Variables 
 
There are two groups of measured variables that address the constructs of Legitimacy and 
Resilience, with both constructs having multiple measures.  ANCOVA analysis of the effect of 
information characteristics on the legitimacy construct is used to test the first hypotheses.  A 
regression of the construct of resilience on the legitimacy construct tests the second hypothesis. 
 
                                                 
24
 As an example, the high accuracy condition might contain wording such as “achieved our goal of a 5% increase in 
philanthropic contributions” while the low accuracy conditions might report this as “increased philanthropic 
contributions”. 
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Legitimacy 
 
Legitimacy is operationalized as three measures reflecting societal expectations for 
organizational credibility and trustworthiness.  Credibility (CRED) of the Sustainability Report 
(CRED) directly reflects perceived honesty and transparency of the information disclosed.  
Trustworthiness is a measure of willingness to be vulnerable to unmonitored/uncontrolled 
outcomes and is assessed by two items.  Investor comfort level with the unmonitored investment 
(STABL) reflects perceptions of organizational stability.  Investor comfort level with 
management’s intentions or unmonitored actions (INTEG) reflects perceptions of management 
integrity. All three items are measured on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (very believable/very 
comfortable) to 7 (very doubtful/very uncomfortable). 
Factor analysis confirmed that all three measures loaded onto a single construct, 
explaining 59.805% of variance.  Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measures of sampling adequacy were 
mediocre for both the overall model (KMO = .652) and for individual items (lowest KMO = .635 
for CRED and INTEG).  Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity (p < .001) confirmed that items are 
correlated, but all correlations were well under .80 and the determinant of the correlation matrix 
was .646, well above the required .000001 level (Field 2009) to establish lack of 
multicollinearity.  Factor scores were therefore retained for use as the dependent variable 
representing the legitimacy construct.  
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Resilience 
 
The Resilience construct is operationalized by four measures representing perceived post-
crisis quality of investment
25, disinvestment percentage, and a “buffer” allowed for both partial 
and full recovery in organizational net income following an industry crisis beyond original 
expectations for required recovery time. Post-crisis quality of investment (POST) is measured on 
a Likert scale ranging from 1 (an excellent investment – low risk and great long-term potential) 
to 7 (a very poor investment – high risks and a lot of uncertainty about long-term growth 
potential).   Disinvestment is measured by an item asking for percentage (by decile) of Dryad 
holdings participants would choose to shift to a market-indexed mutual fund following the 
industry crisis (SHIFT).  Both POST and SHIFT are then reverse coded for ease of 
interpretation, such that higher values reflect greater assessments of quality and a greater 
percentage of the investment retained.   
Participants are asked two items to evaluate the flexibility allowed Dryad in recovery, 
should that recovery not occur within the original estimate of time required, assuming they 
adopted a “wait and see” strategy.  These measures represent a “premium”, or additional buffer, 
allowed for recovery and the degree of acceptable volatility in future expectations.  Expectations 
of the time required for a partial recovery of at least 10% of the post-crisis decline in net income 
are subtracted from the length of time investors are willing to wait for a partial recovery to 
produce the first premium measure (PREMPART).  Both expected time and the time investors 
are willing to wait are measured on a four point scale:  (1) one month or less, (2) six months or 
                                                 
25
 A pre-crisis assessment of quality is used as a covariate to control for individual differences in perceived risk (see 
following section). 
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less, (3) one year or less, and (4) more than one year.  The same measure is taken for the allowed 
buffer for a full recovery of the level of net income prior to the crisis (PREMFULL).   Expected 
time and the time investors are willing to wait for full recovery are measured on six point scales:  
(1) one month or less, (2) six months or less, (3) one year or less, (4) between one and three 
years, (5) more than three years and up to five years, and (6) five years or more. 
Factor analysis confirmed that all four measures loaded onto a single construct, 
explaining 64.007% of variance.  Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measures of sampling adequacy were 
good for both the overall model (KMO = .741) and for individual items (lowest KMO = .716 for 
SHIFT).  Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity (p < .001) confirmed that items are correlated, but all 
correlations were under .80 and the determinant of the correlation matrix was .240, well above 
the required .000001 level (Field 2009).  Factor scores were therefore retained for use as the 
dependent variable representing the resilience construct. 
 
Covariates 
 
Individual psychological aspects affecting risk appetite might be potentially significant.  
Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995) specifically included both individual risk propensity and 
perceived risk in their seminal model of organizational trust.  The Business Risk Propensity 
Scale (BRPS), which measures individual risk propensity in business settings (Sitkin and 
Weingart 1995), is incorporated to control for differences in participant risk appetite that might 
affect assessments of investment quality and subsequent decisions.  The BRPS scale has been 
validated (Huff et al. 1997) and used in prior literature and is based on 7 point Likert scales (1 = 
“Much less than others” to 7 = “Much more than others”) with a midpoint of 4 reflecting a 
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neutral value.  Factor analysis indicated that all 6 items loaded onto a single construct which 
explained 56.02% of variance.  The overall KMO score was .816 (“great” according to Field 
2009) and individual scores were no less than .730.  Bartlett’s test was significant (p < .001) and 
the determinant of the correlation matrix was .085.  The resulting factor score is used as a 
covariate in both the ANCOVA and the regression analysis.   
An initial assessment (PRE), using the same scale as POST, was also taken following the 
manipulation of information characteristics but prior to informing the participants of the industry 
crisis.  This measure is entered as a covariate during the regression of resilience on legitimacy to 
control for individual differences in initial quality evaluations and perceived risk.  As with 
POST, initial scores for PRE were subsequently reverse-coded for ease of interpretation.  Using 
PRE as a covariate is preferred to a difference measure of the change in perceived quality due to 
its greater sensitivity. 
 
Model 
 
The initial stage of the model reflects the influence of information characteristics of 
voluntary disclosure on judgments of legitimacy.  This stage is evaluated by a ANCOVA 
analysis of the 2 x 2 experimental design, with the BRPS factor score as a covariate and the 
legitimacy factor score as the dependent variable: 
Legitimacy = ACCURACY + COMPLETENESS + BRPS. (2) 
The second stage reflects the influence of legitimacy on resilience to unexpectedly poor 
performance following an industry crisis.  This stage is evaluated by regressing the factor score 
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for resilience on the legitimacy factor score.  The BRPS factor score and PRE (reverse coded) 
are used as covariates to adjust for individual differences in risk propensity and perceived risk 
(Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman 1995). 
Resilience = Legitimacy + PRE + BRPS (3) 
Following initial results, follow up tests are conducted to determine the sensitivity of 
individual components of the factor scores used as outcome measures. 
 
Results 
 
Variable Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 14 presents descriptive statistics.  For the overall sample, individual items tend to 
be optimistic (above the midpoint), with a wide range of reported variables.  For individual cells, 
the legitimacy items (CRED, STABL, and INTEG) exhibit the hypothesized relationship, with 
high quality disclosure (Cell A:  high accuracy/high completeness) consistently showing the 
greatest mean and the low quality disclosure (Cell C:  low accuracy/low completeness) 
displaying the lowest mean.  The initial quality rating (PRE) also shows this pattern.  However, 
the items used to measure the construct of resilience (POST, SHIFT, PREMPART, 
PREMFULL) do not display consistent or clear relationships, suggesting that information 
characteristics of voluntary disclosures are not directly associated with resilience.  As a general 
validity check, POST scores are lower than PRE scores for overall and individual cell means, 
indicating that respondents perceived a drop in investment quality following an industry crisis. 
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The two constructed measures (PREMPART and PREMFULL) show identical means in 
the overall sample, but considerable variation among the four cells.  Based on cell means, high 
completeness seems to contribute to a greater willingness to wait for a partial recovery, whereas 
willingness to wait for full recovery seems to strongly (and negatively) differentiate the low 
quality disclosure (low accuracy/low completeness).  Factor scores, by construction, have a mean 
of 0.000 and a standard deviation of 1.000 for the overall sample.  Individual cell scores suggest 
that information accuracy might be associated with legitimacy assessments (both high accuracy 
cells display positive scores, and both low accuracy cells display negative scores).  
Completeness, on the other hand, seems to be associated with resilience, such that both cells with 
high completeness have positive factor scores for resilience, whereas both conditions with low 
information completeness display negative factor scores. 
For the perceived legitimacy factor score, and for the individual measures contained 
within that factor score, H1c and H1d are both supported.  Greatest perceived legitimacy occurs 
in cell A (high accuracy/high completeness) and least perceived legitimacy occurs in cell C (low 
accuracy/low completeness).  Likewise, the greatest assessments of credibility, stability, and 
management integrity are found in cell A and the lowest assessments are in cell C. 
 
Influence of Information Characteristics on Perceived Legitimacy 
 
Higher quality (greater accuracy and completeness) voluntary disclosures should produce 
greater investor assessments of legitimacy.  The accuracy and completeness of reported CSR 
items in Dryad’s Sustainability report are manipulated (high vs. low) to produce perceptions of 
quality.  Using ANCOVA analysis (Table 15), with the BRPS factor score as a covariate to 
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control for individual risk preferences and the legitimacy factor score as the outcome variable, 
the model was found to be significant, F(4, 95) = 3.320, p < .05.  There was a significant effect 
of accuracy, F(1, 95) = 10.168, p < .01, on the factor score for legitimacy.  Examining parameter 
estimates, low accuracy, when compared to high accuracy conditions, will significantly decrease 
overall perceived legitimacy (t = -2.170, p < .05).  Consequently, H1a is supported and H1b is 
not supported. 
 
Influence of Perceived Legitimacy on Resilience 
 
Greater perceived legitimacy should produce greater resilience to unexpectedly poor 
performance, as investors are willing to offer reporting organization the “benefit of the doubt” as 
to the cause of the poor performance and expectations for future recovery.  The factor score for 
resilience was regressed on the perceived legitimacy factor score (Table 16), with PRE and 
BRPS scores as covariates to adjust for individual differences in risk perceptions and risk 
appetite.
26
   The model itself significantly explains variance in resilience, F(3, 96) = 8.201, p < 
.001, adjusted R
2
 = .179.  Within the model, legitimacy (t = 3.469, p < .01) significantly and 
positively affected the outcome variable, with a standardized Beta of b = .381.  Consequently, 
H2 is supported, with greater legitimacy producing greater resilience to unexpected poor 
performance following an industry crisis. 
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 Results were nearly identical if the factor score for resilience was regressed on the individual items comprising the 
factor score for legitimacy, PRE, and BRPS, F(5, 94) = 5.332, p < .001, adjusted R2 = .180, and if resilience was 
regressed on the factor score for legitimacy, PRE, BRPS, and accuracy and completeness, F(5, 94) = 5.415, p < 
.001, adjusted R2 = .182. 
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Conclusion 
 
The relationship between information characteristics of high quality disclosure and 
resilience to unexpectedly poor performance following an industry crisis operates through 
perceptions of organizational legitimacy.  In this case, the construct of perceived legitimacy is 
specifically operationalized as perceived disclosure credibility, organizational stability, and 
management integrity.  In evaluating voluntary CSR disclosures, investors should tacitly 
incorporate perceptions of organizational honesty, integrity, and transparency, and these 
evaluations determine the extent to which the investor perceives the reporting organization as a 
responsible and contributing member of society.  In turn, the degree of assessed organizational 
legitimacy determines the degree of latitude granted organizational performance in terms of post-
crisis assessed quality of investment, disinvestment, and acceptable recovery time (all measures 
of the construct of resilience).  Voluntary disclosures and the information characteristics 
incorporated therein do not have a direct influence on resilience, but appear to operate through 
perceived legitimacy, with higher quality disclosures (specifically in terms of accuracy) leading 
to higher investor perceptions of organizational legitimacy. 
Initial ANCOVA analysis indicated that information characteristics leading to high 
quality voluntary disclosures did significantly explain variation in perceived legitimacy.  
Accuracy appears to be the primary driver of perceived legitimacy.  Individual cell means for 
factor scores of legitimacy also demonstrated a difference between high and low accuracy, with 
high accuracy producing positive perceived legitimacy and low accuracy leading to negative 
legitimacy scores.  Consequently, the hypothesis that greater accuracy is associated with greater 
perceived legitimacy is supported (H1a).  The hypothesized relationship between reporting 
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completeness and perceived legitimacy is only unsupported supported for the measure of 
credibility.  The hypothesized interaction of accuracy x completeness is partially supported.  The 
interaction was non-significant in the ANCOVA model.  However, the individual cell means for 
legitimacy factor scores do show the hypothesized relationships, with the greatest perceived 
legitimacy associated with high accuracy and high completeness (cell A, H1c) and the least 
perceived legitimacy associated with low accuracy and low completeness (cell C, H1d).  In the 
second step of the model, regressing a resilience factor score on perceived legitimacy scores was 
also able to explain a significant part of the variation in resilience, supporting H2.  Interestingly, 
individual cell means for resilience also suggested that greater completeness in disclosures was 
associated with greater resilience.   
The results suggest that, when faced with a choice, organizations should devote resources 
to ensuring accurate, quantitative measures of reported indicators that also support comparability 
and consistency in reporting.  It would seem that investors prefer a few measures done well and 
precisely to a broad range of issues with vague or incomplete measurement.  The significant 
association of accuracy with perceived legitimacy would also imply that organizations should 
emphasize quantifiable, consistent, and comparable reporting and avoid “feel good” prose 
designed more for information management than information provision.  Nevertheless, after 
controlling for perceived legitimacy, completeness of disclosure does appear to be associated 
with greater resilience to performance shocks.   
The implication is that high quality voluntary disclosure can benefit organizational 
financial performance during exogenous shocks by its effect on perceived legitimacy.  
Organizations demonstrating incorporation of societal values, such as transparency, 
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accountability, and truthfulness, in their reporting are perceived as more credible and 
trustworthy, and, thus, more legitimate.  The costs of more extensive, detailed reporting are 
offset by the benefits of resilience, or the degree to which investors are willing to wait for 
recovery or maintain current positions in the organization’s stock despite performance shocks.  
Results suggest that management should emphasize openness and stakeholder engagement to 
address the long-term interests of all key groups (not just management and/or shareholders).  
Mean factor scores for resilience across conditions suggest that this openness might be supported 
by reporting completeness, incorporating both positive and negative performance and multiple 
performance areas. 
This study focused on only two characteristics of information quality.  Future work 
should continue to explore the factors producing high-quality voluntary disclosures to understand 
how information characteristics interact with cognitive, affective, and behavioral user 
characteristics in affecting organizational performance.  As future research increases the number 
of information characteristics and potential measures of these characteristics, the model could 
profitably be studied using a structural equation modeling approach.  The focus in this 
experiment was on non-professional investors, a large but understudied group often directly 
affected by non-financial performance through direct experience with an organization and whose 
financial influence is often buried inside aggregated data for mutual fund companies or analyst 
reports.  Future research could move beyond this single group to compare the effects of 
information characteristics on the judgments and actions of other key stakeholder groups 
following unexpectedly poor performance. 
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There are some additional limitations with this study that could be addressed in future 
versions.  Completeness might not have been sufficiently apparent to the participants without a 
contrasting CSR disclosure.  Future research projects could ask participants to rank a series of 
CSR disclosures based on the degree of completeness to explore this information characteristic 
in more detail.  The nature of the experiment also might not have provided sufficient time 
between a pre-industry crisis quality assessment and post-crisis quality assessment.  Future 
research might address this via an experimental markets-type experiment over several months 
using repeated measures analysis.  Finally, the allowed buffer measures might not be sufficiently 
sensitive as the participants were not asked for their expectations regarding financial recovery of 
other organizations affected by the industry crisis.  Future research could also concentrate on this 
area, specifically examining the degree of volatility allowed in expected performance. 
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Figures 
 
 
 
Figure 2:  Theoretical Model of Relationship among Disclosure Quality, Perceived Legitimacy, 
and Resilience 
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Figure 3:  Research Model of Relationships among Information Characteristics, Perceived Legitimacy, and Resilience 
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Figure 4:  Research Design 
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Tables 
 
Table 13:  Demographic Description of Sample Population 
Age 
21-29 years 6 
Experience with 
investing 
Very little 4 
30 – 39 years 16 Some 46 
40 – 49 years 35 Considerable 47 
50 – 59 years 26 Expert 3 
60 or older 17 
Average portfolio size 
Under $10,000 4 
Gender 
Male 57 $10,000 - $100,000 24 
Female 43 $100,001 - $500,000 43 
Industry in 
which 
respondent 
employed 
Manufacturing 12 $500,001 - $1,000,000 18 
Finance/Accounting/Insurance 14 Over $1,000,000 11 
Marketing/Sales/Retail 5 Likely to invest (in any 
vehicle other than real 
estate) in next 12 months 
Not at all  2 
Agriculture/Forestry/Fisheries 1 About 50/50 37 
Personal Services 3 Definitely 61 
Transportation/Logistics 2 
Perception of market 
Optimistic 48 
Law/Military/Security 1 Pessimistic 13 
Health Care/Medicine 7 Neutral 38 
Government/Not for profit 3 Don’t know/No opinion 1 
Education 9 
Highest degree earned 
High School 2 
Information Service/Technology 8 Some 
college/Associate’s 
degree 
19 
Engineering/Aeronautics 1 
Retired 1 Undergraduate degree 38 
Other 33 Some graduate school 10 
Responsibility 
for 
management 
of portfolio 
Self 56 
Graduate/Professional 
degree 
3
1 
Self + advisor 32 
Self + spouse 12 
n = 100, numbers represent percentages 
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Table 14:  Descriptive Statistics for Variables 
 Overall 
Sample 
Cell Mean (S.D.) 
Max. 
Scale 
Mean 
(S.D) 
Range 
High  
Accuracy/ 
High 
Completeness 
High  
Accuracy/  
Low 
Completeness 
Low  
Accuracy/  
Low 
Completeness 
Low  
Accuracy/ 
High 
Completeness 
Overall, assuming you were not concerned about 
balancing your stock portfolio, how would you rate 
this company? (PRE)
1 
7 
5.420 
(0.843) 
4.00 
5.560 
(0.821) 
5.520 
(0.963) 
5.200 
(0.913) 
5.400 
(0.646) 
How believable did you find Dryad’s Sustainability 
Report? (CRED)
1 7 
5.530 
(0.999) 
5.00 
6.040 
(0.790) 
5.720 
(0.936) 
5.000 
(1.041) 
5.360 
(0.952) 
Under normal economic conditions, and without 
considering a need to balance your portfolio, how 
comfortable would you be holding this investment 
and not monitoring it regularly? (STABL)
1 
7 
5.290 
(1.289) 
6.00 
5.600 
(1.354) 
5.480 
(1.358) 
5.000 
(1.384) 
5.080 
(0.997) 
If there was a crisis and you could not monitor 
management’s actions, how comfortable would you 
be that top management would do what’s in the best 
long-term interests of the company and its 
stakeholders, and not simply in their short-term 
interest? (INTEG)
1 
7 
4.990 
(1.227) 
5.00 
5.280 
(1.173) 
5.160 
(1.179) 
4.560 
(1.227) 
4.960 
(1.274) 
Overall, assuming you were not concerned about 
balancing your stock portfolio, how would you rate 
this company? (POST)
1 
7 
4.770 
(1.563) 
6.00 
4.640 
(1.655) 
4.680 
(1.651) 
4.920 
(1.441) 
4.840 
(1.573) 
If you were not concerned with diversifying your 
investments, and if you had the opportunity to do so 
without transaction costs, what percentage of your 
original, inherited investment in Dryad would you 
shift to a market-indexed mutual fund? (SHIFT)
1 
10 
7.960 
(2.881) 
9.00 
8.200 
(3.215) 
7.840 
(2.968) 
7.960 
(2.606) 
7.840 
(2.868) 
If you were to choose a “wait and see” strategy, and 
assuming that all industry stocks recovered at the 
same rate, what is the maximum time you would be 
willing to wait to see a partial recovery in Dryad 
stock of at least 10% of the fall in Net Income? 
(WPART) – All else being equal, how long would 
you expect it to take for Dryad Stock to show a 
partial recovery of at least 10% of the recent decrease 
in Net Income? (EPART) = (PREMPART)
2 
3
4 0.210 
(0.977) 
5.00 
0.320 
(0.852) 
0.120 
(1.269) 
0.040 
(0.935) 
0.360 
(0.810) 
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 Overall 
Sample 
Cell Mean (S.D.) 
Max. 
Scale 
Mean 
(S.D) 
Range 
High  
Accuracy/ 
High 
Completeness 
High  
Accuracy/  
Low 
Completeness 
Low  
Accuracy/  
Low 
Completeness 
Low  
Accuracy/ 
High 
Completeness 
If you were to choose a “wait and see” strategy, and 
assuming that all industry stocks recovered at the 
same rate, what is the maximum time you would be 
willing to wait to see a full recovery to the level of 
Net Income prior to the industry scandal? (WFULL) 
– All else being equal, how long would you expect it 
to take for Dryad stock to show a full recovery of the 
recent decrease in Net Income? (EFULL) = 
(PREMFULL)
2 
5
5 0.210 
(0.880) 
6.00 
0.240 
(0.831) 
0.280 
(1.061) 
0.000 
(0.866) 
0.320 
(0.748) 
Summated score for Business Risk Propensity Scale 
(BRPS)
3 42 
20.800 
(6.008) 
29.00 
20.800 
(5.260) 
19.560 
(6.378) 
20.800 
(6.416) 
22.040 
(6.017) 
Factor Scores 
Factor score for Business Risk Propensity Scale 
(BRPS)
 n/a 
0.000 
(1.000) 
4.758 
-0.013 
(0.893) 
-0.190 
(1.065) 
-0.006 
(1.071) 
0.210 
(0.981) 
Factor score for Legitimacy 
n/a 
0.000 
(1.000) 
4.603 
0.428 
(0.769) 
0.205 
(1.041) 
-0.481 
(1.071) 
-0.152 
(0.896) 
Factor score for Resilience 
n/a 
0.000 
(1.000) 
5.222 
0.045 
(0.948) 
-0.037 
(1.219) 
-0.093 
(0.989) 
0.086 
(0.860) 
1
Reported statistics represent reversed scores for ease of interpretation.  Higher values indicated greater ratings of quality, 
credibility, stability and trustworthiness and a greater percentage of retained investment. 
2
Higher scores indicated a greater amount of time investors were willing to wait for recovery beyond initial expectations of 
time required. 
3
Higher scores indicate a greater tendency to accept risk in business situations. 
4
There are 4 ordinal categories in both EPART and WPART, so the maximum difference would be 4 (more than one year) – 1 
(one month or less).   
5
There are 6 ordinal categories in both EFULL and WFULL, so the maximum difference would be 6 (five years or more) – 1 
(one month or less).
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Table 15:  Statistical Results for Tests of Information Characteristics’ Effect on Perceived 
Legitimacy 
ANCOVA Results for H1a and H1b 
Source of Variance Type III SS df F-value p-value 
Overall Model with Factor Score for Legitimacy     
Model 12.141 4 3.320 .014 
Independent Variables:     
Accuracy 10.168 1 11.121 .001 
Completeness 1.786 1 1.953 .165 
Accuracy*Completeness .068 1 .075 .785 
Covariate:     
BRPS .131 1 .144 .706 
Error 86.859 95   
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Table 16:  Statistical Results for Tests of the Effect of Perceived Legitimacy on Resilience 
Regression Results for H2  
 
F(3, 96) Sig. 
Adjusted 
R
2
 
Overall model 8.201 .000 .179 
Independent Variables 
Unstandardized 
Coefficient 
t-stat Sig. 
Intercept -.707 -.994 .323 
Legitimacy .381 3.469 .001 
PRE .131 1.003 .319 
BRPS .012 .130 .897 
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CHAPTER FOUR:  IN BAD COMPANY:  VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE 
AND PRESERVING CREDIBILITY DURING EXTERNAL CRISIS 
 
Introduction 
 
The purpose of this paper is to explore voluntary disclosure choices used by 
organizations in response to an exogenous credibility crisis.  Such a crisis occurs when an 
external source of assurance for (mandatory) organizational information loses its own legitimacy, 
especially when that source of assurance is a member of the institutional framework supporting 
economic markets.  If the third party is not perceived to reflect the values and norms of society, 
then its own credibility suffers.  The assurance offered by such a third party is inherently non-
credible and consequently the “innocent” disclosing organization might be perceived as less 
credible even if the disclosing organization itself has done nothing to merit this skepticism.  
Voluntary disclosure, as a signal of greater transparency and by the inclusion of non-mandated 
reporting that nonetheless reflects areas of performance of concern to society as a whole, might 
be used by organizations as a means of preserving their own legitimacy in the face of a crisis 
affecting the institutional framework surrounding mandatory financial reports. 
Public accounting firms and their attestation of the reliability of mandatory financial 
reporting were intended to protect the public interest by independent, credible examination of 
organizational disclosures.  As such, they serve as a key component of the institutional 
framework supporting the capital market and overall economy.  US audit firms suffered a severe 
shock to credibility after the Enron/Andersen scandal in 2001 – 2002 and the emergence of other 
scandals involving all of the major public accounting firms.  Concurrently with accounting 
127 
 
scandals and regulatory oversight failure, corporations, audit firms, and legislators were 
perceived to be in collusion and compromised by lobbyist activity (Bazerman, Loewenstein, and 
Moore 2002; Bazerman et al. 2006; Moore et al. 2006).  This study is the first to examine how 
organizations attempt to use voluntary reporting, as a means of signaling transparency and 
credibility, to preserve legitimacy in the face of an external threat involving the institutional 
framework of the market itself.  I contribute to the academic literature by theorizing regarding 
the role voluntary disclosure and credibility-enhancing disclosure choices play in organizational 
legitimacy.  I also contribute to practitioner understanding of how voluntary disclosure choices 
might serve to insulate an “innocent” organization from scandals affecting the surrounding 
institutional environment.
27
 
By examining patterns of voluntary Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)
28
 disclosure 
choices (whether to engage in voluntary disclosure and whether to enhance credibility through 
the use of independent assurance and/or reporting frameworks) within the S&P 500 around the 
Enron scandal, I shed light on how firms use information disclosure to affect their perceived 
legitimacy.  Discretionary reporting strategies might be conceptualized as choices involving both 
the elements of discretionary reporting used (increased disclosure, reporting framework, third-
party assurance) and the combination of those elements used (for example, the use of CSR 
disclosure alone versus the use of CSR disclosure within a reporting framework).  Using 
qualitative data of CSR disclosure strategies used by the S&P 500 over an eight year period, I 
                                                 
27
 Throughout the rest of this chapter, “institutional environment” is to be understood to specifically refer to those 
institutions supporting the capital market and overall economic environment.  These institutions consist principally 
of governmental and professional regulatory bodies, professional associations, financial exchanges, and the public 
accounting firms.  This chapter extends Chapter 3, The Benefit of the Doubt, where the exogenous shock affecting 
organizational credibility and legitimacy was due to a crisis within the same industry. 
28
 Corporate Social Responsibility includes aspects of organizational social, environmental, and ethical performance. 
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find that the use of both CSR disclosure and a reporting framework increases steadily and 
significantly across all time frames while the use of third-party assurance remains steady and 
extremely minimal.  I also find that the use of auditors as third-party assurance providers is never 
more than 50% and drops significantly during the crisis period.  Finally, I find that the 
combination of CSR disclosure with one means of credibility enhancement (primarily the use of 
a reporting framework) accelerates following the crisis while CSR disclosure alone remains 
fairly steady (although at a high level). 
The next section presents the theorization of the role of voluntary CSR disclosure choices 
in establishing organizational legitimacy.  The key role of information credibility in establishing 
that legitimacy is postulated and a theory of organizational behavior in the face of an exogenous 
threat to legitimacy centered on the institutional framework is presented.  The following sections 
outline the methodology used, analyze the findings, and conclude with a discussion of limitations 
and future research directions. 
 
Development of Theory and Research Questions 
 
Legitimacy is based on compliance with expected norms of legal/economic behavior and 
societal values which might not be incorporated into legislation (Dowling and Pfeffer 1975).  
This implies that there is both a basic level of legitimacy, supported by mandatory disclosure 
(determined and vouched for by the institutional framework),
29
 and “full” legitimacy, supported 
by voluntary disclosure.  Full legitimacy is largely theoretical; most organizations will fall 
                                                 
29
 Details of the mandatory framework, the emphasis on individual components, the expectations of corporate 
responsibility to society, and the degree of involvement in the marketplace will vary with culture and over time (Doh 
and Guay 2006; Freeman, Harrison, and Wicks 2007; Ioannou and Serafeim 2010). 
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somewhere along the continuum between basic and full legitimacy, which is also referred to as 
the “legitimacy gap” (Lindblom 2010).   
The use of voluntary CSR disclosure to signal differing compliance with societal values 
is especially evident in the United States, where very little mandated reporting exists with regard 
to CSR performance and/or disclosure.  The KPMG International Survey of Corporate 
Responsibility Reporting (2008) highlights the increasing focus of US organizations on CSR 
disclosure:  among the 100 largest US companies by revenue, CSR reporting rose dramatically 
from 32% in 2005 to 74% in 2008.  The range of definitions, methodologies, and reporting 
formats within CSR disclosures complicates assessments and comparison of organizational 
performance, as does the extent of managerial discretion in reporting and a severe organizational 
aversion to reporting the “wrong answer” (Gray 2010).30  Because US CSR disclosure is not 
required to be audited, the credibility of such disclosure remains in question.
31
  In response to 
this issue, external sources of credibility enhancement might be utilized, such as an independent 
reporting framework or the use of a third-party assurance provider.  Third-party assurance 
providers might be public accounting firms,
32
 consulting firms specializing in CSR assurance 
and possessing the necessary technical skills to assess environmental impacts, or non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) which might also provide certifications for the organization 
to display (e.g., Fair Trade, the Forestry Stewardship Council, etc.).  Within the United States, 
public accounting firms aggressively positioned themselves as the primary providers of third-
                                                 
30
 I.e., one that either discloses poor performance or inaccurately reflects stakeholder concerns and therefore leads to 
negative consequences. 
31
 A recent study found that of US organizations engaging in environmental reporting only 3% used external 
assurance of those reports (Simnett, Vanstraelen, and Chua 2009). 
32
 A notable study (O’Dwyer, Owen, and Unerman 2011) examined the process by which audit firms positioned 
themselves as legitimate third-party assurers of CSR disclosures. 
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party assurance (Power 1997, 2003; O’Dwyer and Owen 2005); consequently, a credibility crisis 
affecting public accounting firms might result in a shift to other forms of credibility enhancement 
of voluntary disclosure during the crisis. 
 
Role of Voluntary Disclosure in Legitimacy 
 
The success of the legitimation process depends on stakeholders’ knowledge of the 
organization’s efforts to reflect social norms in its outcomes, processes, and procedures and their 
interpretations/perceptions of the organizational information provided (Milne and Patten 2002; 
Cormier, Gordon, and Magnan 2004).  Thus, organizations will engage in voluntary disclosure in 
order to bring this information to public attention and/or to differentiate themselves from 
competitors, especially organizations whose behavior is in fact reflective of societal norms but is 
largely unobservable to the (probably misinformed) public (Buhr 2002; Lindblom 2010).
33
  
Consequently, legitimacy theory is an appropriate lens to examine organization choices in 
disclosure (Chen and Roberts 2010).  The revolution in information technology, the growth of 
the Internet, and the liberalization of the global marketplace have increased stakeholder demand 
and the availability of information from other, independent sources (Freeman, Harrison, and 
Wicks 2007).  This, in turn, creates pressures for the organization to increase voluntary CSR 
disclosure as a way of controlling information (Arya and Mittendorf 2005) or in an effort to 
avoid being perceived as secretive, or less than transparent.  Increased disclosure implicitly 
                                                 
33
 In fact, communication of organizational behaviors does not have to be originated by the organization itself, as 
many companies know to their great discomfort.  In the Internet era, organizational (mis)deeds are quickly 
communicated world-wide with rapid effects on reputation, profits, and stock price (Brown and Deegan 1998; 
Freeman, Harrison, and Wicks 2007; Aerts and Cormier 2009). 
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acknowledges the desire of stakeholders for information and that key stakeholder groups have 
interests and concerns that are not covered by mandatory reporting.  As a result, the decision to 
engage in voluntary CSR disclosure supports legitimacy through increased transparency.
34
 
Organizational choices in voluntary CSR disclosure represent signaling behavior to 
establish or repair public legitimacy.  Brown and Deegan (1998) found that when media 
coverage of environmental issues threatened legitimacy in environmentally sensitive industries, 
those industries responded by increasing the extent of disclosure.  CSR information will vary 
across voluntary disclosers in terms of its quality, depth, breadth, completeness, and timeliness 
(Adams, Hill, and Roberts 1998; Patten 2002; Cormier, Gordon, and Magnan 2004; Aerts and 
Cormier 2009) and some organizations might initiate CSR in a proactive, direct engagement with 
stakeholders whereas others simply do so to manage legitimacy (Chen and Roberts 2010).  
Organizational decisions that determine what information is included in voluntary CSR 
disclosure, as well as when it is disclosed and how it is measured and reported, will determine the 
perceived legitimacy of the organization, especially in relation to its competitors.  Mere 
publication of information is not enough to ensure legitimacy.  The process depends on the 
credibility of the information as well as its availability.  
                                                 
34
 This does not automatically assume that increased disclosure is completely honest, accurate, or open.  In this case, 
transparency is narrowly defined as simply the provision of additional desired information beyond that required by 
GAAP.  Issues of honesty, openness, and accuracy are addressed through the means utilized to enhance the 
credibility of information disclosed. 
132 
 
Role of Information Credibility in Legitimacy 
 
Legitimacy not only depends on the information provided in voluntary CSR disclosure, 
but also on the public’s perception of the credibility of this information.  Credibility of disclosure 
is driven by its perceived accuracy and completeness (Merkl-Davies and Brennan 2007; Aerts 
and Cormier 2009; Kothari, Li, and Short 2009).
35
  Completeness can be both the inclusion of 
positive and negative performance and the extent of coverage across a range of stakeholder 
concerns (O’Dwyer and Owen 2005; Merkl-Davies and Brennan 2007).  One means of ensuring 
completeness is to utilize an accepted framework.  An accepted framework developed by an 
independent third party also provides consistency in definitions and stakeholders to assess the 
degree of reliability of the information disclosed (and/or of the systems used to produce that 
information), conferring legitimacy through information credibility (Doh et al. 2010).  In 2005, 
KPMG reported that 660 companies throughout 50 countries had adopted the framework 
supplied by the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI).  By 2008, the majority of the Global 250 and 
N100 companies were found to use the GRI Guidelines (KPMG 2008). 
Public accountants, despite concerns regarding their technical competence in non-
financial fields (Power 1997), have reportedly been the preferred source of third-party assurance 
for US corporations (Solomon 2000; Simnett, Vanstraelen, and Chua 2009; Pflugrath, Roebuck, 
and Simnett 2011), most probably due to their familiar role as auditors of financial statements 
(O’Dwyer, Owen, and Hession 2005).  One study found that companies seeking to enhance CSR 
disclosure were more likely to use assurance, although it did not seem to matter whether the 
                                                 
35
 Timeliness (and manipulation of timing of disclosure) is also a potentially important element in credibility; at least 
one study (Aerts and Cormier 2009) finds that proactive environmental disclosures seem to be completely 
discounted as impression management. 
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assurance provider was a professional auditor and the use of auditors is minimal (Simnett, 
Vanstraelen, and Chua 2009).
36
  For the period 2002 – 2004, out of 40,993 firm-years, 2,113 
provided sustainability reports, with 31% of those being assured and 42% of those assured (n = 
275) using auditors (Simnett, Vanstraelen, and Chua 2009).
37
 The key point is that third-party 
assurance provides information credibility in voluntary disclosures, but the choice of third-party 
assurer is not necessarily automatically a public accounting firm nor is third-party assurance 
necessarily the main source of information credibility. 
 
Role of External Credibility in Legitimacy 
 
Legitimacy is not simply a matter of the degree of the accuracy, completeness, and 
truthfulness of information provided by a reporting organization, but also of the credibility of the 
source of assurance that the information is accurate, truthful, and complete.  The fundamental 
source of organizational information signals to stakeholders is mandatory financial reporting and 
the credibility of that information is supported by the institutional framework as embodied in 
public accountants.  When the credibility (and even legitimacy) of the institutional framework is 
shaken, organizational legitimacy will be threatened even if the reporting organization itself has 
done nothing to damage its own credibility and the economy will be disrupted (Kothari, Li, and 
Short 2009).  When the credibility of mandatory disclosures is compromised, a legitimacy gap 
(Lindblom 2010) develops between what society expects and what the institutional framework is 
                                                 
36
 A follow-up study found that US financial analysts perceived CSR disclosures assured by professional auditors to 
have greater credibility than those assured by other sources, although this did not hold with UK and Australian 
analysts (Pflugrath, Roebuck, and Simnett 2011). 
37
 It should be noted that this represents a 5.15% CSR disclosure rate, but of the total 40,993 international companies 
only 1.6% used assurance and only 0.7% used auditor-based assurance. 
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perceived to be capable of assuring.  Voluntary CSR disclosure might reduce this gap and 
establish (comparatively greater) legitimacy.  However, the public is often skeptical of voluntary 
disclosure intent and truthfulness (Merkl-Davies and Brennan 2007).  Increased disclosure 
partially increases perceptions of completeness, but credibility enhancement choices, such as the 
use of reporting frameworks and third-party assurance, provide a greater degree of comfort 
regarding the completeness and accuracy of the information provided.  Nevertheless, a threat to 
the credibility of the institutional framework increases uncertainty in the market and the 
legitimacy gap and can have significant performance implications for the “innocent” 
organization which may experience credit shortages or decreases in stock price as investors and 
creditors reassess the risk and decision-usefulness of reported information.  This will be 
especially powerful in conditions of greater economic uncertainty or in the face of industry-
related disasters. 
CSR accounting and reporting have emerged in an environment of increasing public 
attention to organizational behavior and its impact on society.  Failure to address issues of 
concern might result in public pressure to increase regulation.  To some extent, increased 
voluntary disclosures function as a means of staving off future increases in regulation by 
demonstrating an organization’s concern with issues of CSR and thus the organization’s 
alignment with societal values (Walden and Schwartz 1997; Neu, Warsame, and Pedwell 1998; 
Buhr 2002).  Credible public disclosures bridge the gap between the (functioning) regulatory 
environment and internal management actions and support the public interest (Power 1997).  The 
source of credibility assurance must be perceived as independent and credible itself, however, or 
alternative sources will be sought.  In the wake of Enron, the success of organizations such as 
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GRI, Fair Trade, the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO), and AccountAbility, among others, has provided alternative sources of 
third-party information assessment and assurance in response to stakeholder skepticism 
regarding the credibility and independence of public accountants and the overall institutional 
environment. 
 
Development of Research Questions 
 
Voluntary CSR disclosures provided to stakeholders are intended to bridge the legitimacy 
gap between institutional and societal values through demonstrated transparency and respect for 
societal values and concerns.  The intent of the disclosure provided is evaluated by individual 
stakeholders based on reputation, prior experience, and perceptions of organizational motivation 
and interacts with informational content (completeness and accuracy) to produce evaluations of 
credibility.  Credibility is especially dependent on external validation, so the use of an 
independent reporting framework (e.g., the GRI Guidelines) and/or the use of third-party 
assurance become important sources of credibility enhancement and support evaluations of 
organizational legitimacy.  The combination of framework-and-assurance might be especially 
potent as it mirrors the structure of the familiar financial reporting format.  In short, 
organizations have three options to increase perceived legitimacy:  (1) increase the amount of 
information provided, (2) use a reporting framework to enhance credibility, or (3) use third-party 
assurance to enhance credibility.  Further, a combination of options might provide different 
levels of voluntary disclosure intensity. 
136 
 
Organizations that had not previously engaged in voluntary CSR disclosure are still 
affected by a credibility crisis centered on public accounting firms as such a crisis affects the 
credibility of (auditor-assured) mandatory disclosures.  Non-voluntary disclosing organizations 
in especially socially- or environmentally-sensitive industries (or those whose financial 
statements had formerly been audited by Andersen) might face an increased threat to their 
legitimacy and choose to begin engaging in voluntary disclosure in response.  There should be no 
reduction in voluntary CSR disclosure as this would signal decreased transparency, increase 
information uncertainty, and produce greater costs to the organization.
38
  Following the 
credibility crisis, increased use of meaningful voluntary disclosure should continue due to the 
sunk costs involved in management systems developed to provide the disclosure and the negative 
effect on reputation that would accompany a subsequent decrease in transparency.  For CSR 
disclosures consisting largely of unsupported “feel good” statements (e.g., “We support the 
environment”, “We care about our community”) and representing image management more than 
the provision of incremental information, however, the use of such voluntary disclosure might 
decrease following the resolution of the crisis as there have been no significant investments into 
management systems and no significant reputation for openness and accuracy of reporting has 
been established.  The first research question addresses this basic state as the frequency of CSR 
voluntary disclosure as both a component choice (all instance of CSR disclosure) and an 
intensity level (organizations choosing only to provide CSR disclosure without any other means 
of enhancement). 
                                                 
38
 It is, however, possible that very high levels of market uncertainty might lead to non-rational behavior where all 
firms reduce signaling behavior and wait for the instability to resolve.  This should appear only when the source of 
the threat is not clear, which was not the case with the Enron crisis. 
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RQ1a:  To what degree will S&P 500 organizations provide voluntary 
CSR disclosures before, during, and after an exogenous legitimacy 
threat? 
RQ1b:  To what degree will S&P 500 organizations provide voluntary 
disclosures alone (without additional credibility enhancements) 
before, during, and after an exogenous legitimacy threat? 
Information credibility depends on assessments of accuracy and completeness supported 
by external, independent sources.  Theoretically, stakeholders should prefer less, but more 
accurate, information to large amounts of misleading or meaningless information (see Chapter 
Three for evidence of this preference).  Third-party assurance functions to provide at least a 
degree of comfort regarding information accuracy (sampled information found to be accurately 
reported) and uses procedures and providers familiar to the organization from the auditing of its 
financial statements.
39
  This would suggest that under most threats to legitimacy an organization 
might seek to enhance credibility by adopting third-party assurance even before the use of a 
framework (and the associated extensive adoption of managerial systems).  A basic source of 
credibility enhancement is the use of a reporting framework to emphasize the completeness and 
extent of information, however, without the problematic (in terms of high-annual cost, assurance 
of only targeted areas, and questions of competence to assure more scientific/technical 
performance issues) question of third-party assurance.  Because they also increase consistency 
and comparability, stakeholders might prefer the use of reporting frameworks to third-party 
                                                 
39
 Theoretically, it might also provide a degree of comfort regarding the completeness of the information provided 
(an accurate representation, omitting no salient facts) but in practice third-party assurance of CSR disclosures tends 
to be confined to specific, limited subtopics that are more easily quantified and verifiable. 
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assurance.  Further, during a crisis centered on institutional providers of assurance, organizations 
previously utilizing third-party assurance might choose to shift their emphasis from third-party 
assurance to an independent framework.  Following resolution of the crisis, and given the sunk 
costs involved in supporting either third-party assurance or a reporting framework, the likelihood 
is that the use of either option will continue. 
RQ2a:  To what degree will those S&P 500 organizations engaging in 
voluntary CSR disclosure before, during, and after an exogenous 
legitimacy threat utilize an independent reporting framework to 
enhance credibility? 
RQ2b:  To what degree will those S&P 500 organizations engaging in 
voluntary CSR disclosure before, during, and after an exogenous 
legitimacy threat utilize third-party assurance to enhance 
credibility? 
When credibility enhancement is considered as a measurement of intensity, and not 
simply the individual components, two options are possible.  Either option is dependent on the 
initial decision to increase transparency by providing voluntary CSR disclosure.  Once that 
decision is made, reporting organizations can choose to provide a disclosure with one source of 
credibility enhancement, either a reporting framework or third-party assurance (CSR-OR), or to 
provide voluntary disclosure with two sources of credibility enhancement, a reporting framework 
and third-party assurance (CSR-AND).  When the credibility crisis is focused on public 
accountants, and if auditors are the usual source of third-party assurance of voluntary disclosure, 
CSR-OR organizations should prefer to add a framework.  For organizations already using one 
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method but perceiving a need to enhance legitimacy, the most likely option is to add the second 
method.   
RQ3a:  To what degree will S&P 500 organizations provide voluntary 
CSR disclosures with one source of credibility enhancement, either 
a reporting framework OR third-party assurance, before, during, 
and after an exogenous legitimacy threat? 
RQ3b:  To what degree will S&P 500 organizations provide voluntary 
CSR disclosures with two sources of credibility enhancement, both 
a reporting framework AND third-party assurance, before, during, 
and after an exogenous legitimacy threat? 
Finally, within the subcategory of organizations choosing to use third-party assurance, 
what will be the source of that third-party assurance?  In a legitimacy threat centered on public 
accounting firms, organizations previously using auditors to provide third-party assurance of 
voluntary information are likely to shift to a different source of third-party assurance.  The audit 
profession has claimed to be pre-eminently qualified to provide assurance on voluntary CSR 
disclosures due to experience in performing financial audits, although at least one study finds 
that consultants are more likely to assess completeness and consistency than are auditors 
(O’Dwyer and Owen 2005).  Alternatives to auditor-based third-party assurance exist in the use 
of external consultants or NGOs, which might also provide certifications for the organization to 
display on their packaging, advertising, or website. 
RQ4:  To what degree will those S&P 500 organizations using third-party 
assurance of voluntary CSR disclosure before, during, and after an 
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exogenous legitimacy threat utilize public accounting firms to 
provide that assurance? 
A summary of these predictions for CSR component choice is presented in Table 17.  No 
predictions are made for CSR intensity. 
 
Research Design and Methodology 
 
Population 
 
The population for this study consists of the S&P 500 for the period 1998 to 2005.  This 
population captures the largest actively traded companies in the United States listed on either the 
NYSE or NASDAQ exchanges.  Composition of the S&P 500 does change slightly from year to 
year and within years (consequently, the sample ranges from n = 503 to n = 526), but relative 
rank within the index is not important.  For certain of the statistical tests used in this study, it is 
important that the cell sizes are equal and that the same companies are in each cell:  in such 
instances, the population is restricted to those organizations present in each of the eight years (n 
= 337).  Concentration on large-cap, publicly traded companies and US markets restricts the 
sample to organizations that are most likely to be affected by an exogenous legitimacy threat 
centered on the institutional framework supporting the US market and on the largest public 
accounting firms which provide assurance of their mandatory financial disclosures.  These 
organizations cover a range of industries and should better reflect an exogenous legitimacy threat 
and not simply perceived risk from an implicated industry or market segment.  This is an 
exploratory study of organizational behavior in the aggregate during a credibility crisis, not a 
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case study of individual organization reactions.  Therefore, the focus is on the overall frequency 
of CSR components or intensity levels utilized within each time segment within the entire S&P 
500, rather than on changes within individual organizations; the study is descriptive, rather than 
predictive. 
 
Research Design and Methods 
 
When the Enron scandal surfaced in 2001, audit firms entered a turbulent period of 
accounting scandals, independence crises, and prosecution that continued through the collapse of 
WorldCom and the dissolution of Andersen in 2002 (Table 18).  There had been warning signals 
in prior years, and other incidents followed, but the years 2001 – 2002 produced a crisis of 
confidence in the entire audit profession and resulted in vocal societal and governmental pressure 
for increased industry regulation.  This study examines corporate voluntary CSR disclosure 
behavior across the period 1998 – 2005, divided into three groups:  pre-crisis, crisis, and post-
crisis.  There might be a lagged period before firms are able to implement systems and internal 
processes to change reporting behaviors and biennial voluntary reporting cycles are common 
during the test period, so each group consists of at least two years. 
Using frequency counts of the behavior of interest across the period, the patterns of US 
voluntary CSR disclosure behavior before, during, and after a credibility crisis involving audit 
firms are examined.  Largely exploratory in nature, the study utilizes graphical analysis of 
relationships between qualitative variables and tests of changes in frequencies and proportions 
over time.  As the data are categorical and only partially independent, non-parametric tests are 
utilized.  Friedman’s non-parametric ANOVA is initially used to determine whether there are 
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significant differences in either the use of individual components or in intensity levels across the 
entire test period.  Wilcoxon’s signed-rank tests are then used to test for difference in reporting 
choices or intensity levels among the three testing groups (pre-crisis, crisis, post-crisis).  Finally, 
two-proportion z-tests of changes in frequency are used to determine which specific components 
or intensity levels are significantly different.  The significance level used is α = .05 (adjusted 
using Bonferroni corrections where appropriate) with one-tailed tests. 
Data for this study come from the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) and 
CorporateRegister.com websites.  GRI not only has developed one of the most widely adopted 
and endorsed frameworks for CSR reporting, but also maintains a database of organizations 
using the framework and subscribing to GRI procedures.  The reporting framework features 
profile disclosures, performance indicators, and management disclosures designed to be adopted 
incrementally across key areas of CSP.  The original G1 Guidelines (launched in 2000) were 
much less elaborate, but the G2 Guidelines (released in 2002) introduced distinctions within 
levels of reporting frameworks and encouraged the additional use of third-party assurance.
40
  The 
CorporateRegister.com website contains a unique, proprietary database of all known CSR 
reports, including listings of frameworks utilized, source of external assurance, and .pdf files of 
historical reports.  For each year of the period 1998 – 2005, each of the S&P 500 companies for 
that year is checked to see if they published voluntary CSR disclosures, which might consist of 
“sustainability,” “environmental,” “social,” “citizenship,” or any other reporting title that is 
discretionary, primarily involves non-financial performance, and includes information reflecting 
CSR.  A categorical nominal variable is coded for each firm-year for the presence of each 
                                                 
40
 The current GRI Guidelines are in version G3.1 (2011), replacing G3 (2006).  The release of G4 is projected for 
May 2013. 
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potential CSR component choice (CSR Disclosure, Framework, Assurance, Auditor Assurance) 
and a categorical ordinal variable is used to reflect the selected intensity level (CSR-ONLY, 
CSR-OR, CSR-AND). 
Independent variables are simply the years of the study or the grouping variables (pre-
crisis, crisis, post-crisis) to which the years belong.  Dependent variables are measures of the 
frequency with which individual CSR components or CSR intensity levels were utilized.  As 
these are categorical variables with counts, the calculation of means is meaningless; however, 
frequencies can be compared across unequal cell sizes.  CSR components are coded (0 = not 
present, 1 = present) for each potential choice:  the production of a CSR disclosure (CSR) the use 
of an independent reporting framework (FRAMEWORK), the use of third-party assurance 
(ASSURE), and the use of an auditor, specifically, as third-party assurer (AUDITOR).  
FRAMEWORK and ASSURE are nested within CSR (an organization must produce a CSR 
disclosure in order to use a framework or third-party assurance, but there are CSR-disclosing 
organizations that provide neither framework nor third-party assurance); AUDITOR is nested 
within ASSURE.  For any firm-year, there might be more than one component.
41
 
The measure for CSR disclosure intensity is based on the assumption that the 
combination of individual components to produce legitimacy is more telling than simple counts 
of components present.  Three levels of intensity, reflecting progressively greater efforts to 
signal legitimacy, are coded as ordinal variables.  CSR-ONLY (coded “1”) are those 
organizations which produce a CSR disclosure alone, with no additional source of credibility 
enhancement (neither a reporting framework nor third-party assurance).  Organizations which 
                                                 
41
 For example, a single company with (1) a CSR disclosure using both (2) a framework and (3) third-party 
assurance, with the third party assurer being (4) a public accounting firm will have a count in all four components. 
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use one method of credibility enhancement, either a reporting framework or third-party 
assurance (CSR-OR), are coded “2”.  Organizations using both methods of credibility 
enhancement, a reporting framework and third-party assurance (CSR-AND), are coded “3”.  For 
any given firm-year, there can be only one level of intensity, although intensity might change 
across firm-years. 
Certain industries might be more sensitive to the credibility crisis than others, due to 
greater perceived risk, exposure to environmentally/socially sensitive areas, or association with 
organizations directly implicated in the crisis.  Information on each organization’s industry 
membership, quality rating, financial statement auditor, and relative risk was obtained from 
Compustat or CRSP.  Additionally, since a credibility crisis involving public accounting firms 
(and thus the credibility of the audited financial statements) might affect financial performance, 
measures of total assets, revenues, and net income for each firm-year were also tracked. 
 
Analysis and Discussion 
 
The initial time period of interest was estimated to be between 1998 and 2005 to bracket 
a period of increasing auditor-focused crises, with 1998 and 2005 both containing no significant 
crises (refer to Table 18).  However, there are two factors that might influence where and how 
the time frame is broken into related periods:  this introduction of the GRI first generation 
framework in 2000 and a possible time-lag effect for reporting.  Graphing the frequency of CSR 
disclosure components across each year of the study (Figure 5), there appear to be three distinct 
periods for CSR:  an increase across 1998 – 2001; a plateau for 2002 – 2003; and an increase 
again for 2004 – 2005.  However, there appear to be four periods for FRAMEWORK:  relatively 
145 
 
low and flat for 1998 – 1999; an increase during 2000 – 2001; a plateau during 2002 – 2003; and 
an increase during 2004 – 2005.  ASSURE (and within this component AUDITOR) displays a 
consistently low frequency with no clearly discernible pattern. 
Organizational signaling behavior consists not only of individual components, but also of 
a measure of intensity in how those components are combined.  A visual inspection of the 
frequency of CSR disclosure intensity across the time frame (Figure 6) seems to indicate that 
there are four distinct periods.  For CSR-ONLY organizations, there is a low but increasing 
period in 1998 – 1999; a sudden increase but relatively flat period in 2000 – 2001; and a slight 
increase but relatively flat period from 2002 – 2005.  For CSR-OR organizations, 1998 – 1999 is 
relatively flat; there is an increase across 2000 – 2001; 2002 – 2003 plateaus at a higher level; 
and 2004 – 2005 displays another sharp increase in frequency.  There were no CSR-AND 
organizations until 2000; the frequency of this intensity level remains relatively flat from 2000 – 
2002 and then increases slowly through 2005. 
Based on the graphed frequencies, the eight-year testing period is grouped into four 2-
year periods.  The period 1998 – 1999 functions much as a “base line,” prior to the introduction 
of the GRI framework and (allowing for a one year reporting lag) prior to major accounting 
scandals.  The following period, 2000 – 2001, represents a pre-crisis period, with the presence of 
accounting scandals but without the widespread public skepticism and regulatory backlash that 
occurred in the wake of Enron.  Disclosures released during 2002 – 2003 represent the crisis 
period in reactions to Enron (2001), WorldCom (2002), and the fall of Andersen (2002).  Finally, 
2004 – 2005 represents a post-crisis period, following the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the 
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creation of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), and a decrease in the 
number of auditor-based scandals. 
 
CSR Components 
 
The research questions in this study concentrate on increases in specific behaviors shown 
in response to an exogenous legitimacy threat that can be perceived to threaten an organization’s 
reporting credibility and overall legitimacy.  Counts of the frequency of each of four behaviors 
(CSR, FRAMEWORK, ASSURE, AUDITOR) are tabulated and two-proportion z-tests for 
differences in frequencies are used to check for significant changes across the grouping periods.  
There are clear increases in both CSR and FRAMEWORK across all years (Table 19, Panel A).  
ASSURE, however, only begins to increase (and that a minimal level) during the post-crisis 
years, while AUDITOR fluctuates but remains extremely limited and never returns to the 1998 
level of 50% of ASSURE. 
The increase in the absolute use of CSR disclosure and of an independent reporting 
framework is significant for changes across all four periods (Table 20, Panel A).  Neither the use 
of third-party assurance nor of auditor provided third-party assurance of the CSR disclosure is 
significant for any of the time periods.  As there is some ambiguity in the years 2000 – 2001, an 
alternate analysis was conducted using only three periods (baseline, crisis, post-crisis) with 
identical results for trends in CSR component frequency.  
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CSR Intensity 
 
Individual components of voluntary disclosure are not necessarily of most interest.  
Instead, the combination of these components differentiates organizational behavior in 
demonstrations of transparency and credibility.  Consequently, the analysis continues by looking 
at CSR disclosure intensity across the groups centered on the crisis period.  We would expect to 
see an increase in disclosure intensity in response to increased legitimacy pressure during the 
crisis.  Following the crisis, behavior will depend on perceived effectiveness of credibility 
enhancement versus transparency and perceptions of relative effectiveness between 
FRAMEWORK and ASSURE.  The frequency counts for each intensity level across the study 
period are given in Table 19, Panel B.  As the data are not independent, but are ordinal repeated 
measures, Friedman’s non-parametric ANOVA is used to test for significant changes across the 
entire period for the restricted set (n = 337), Χ2(3) = 108.498, p < .001.42  Next, Wilcoxon 
signed-rank tests (based on negative ranks)
43
 is used to follow up the initial finding, using both a 
3- and 4-group analysis.
44
  Voluntary CSR disclosure intensity significantly increases across 
every period, from the base period (1998) to pre-crisis (2000), z = -5.458, p < .001, r = 0.210; 
from pre-crisis to crisis (2002), z = -3.238, p < .001, r = 0.125; and from crisis to post-crisis 
(2005), z = -3.887, p < .001, r = 0.150.  If the analysis is conducted using only three periods 
(comparing 1998 to 2002), the significant increase is even more apparent, z = -6.458, p < .001, r 
                                                 
42
 It is not appropriate to additively combine frequency counts of ordinal data or to calculate a mean.  Therefore, the 
analysis uses the years 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2005 as the representative years of each sample.  2005 is used to 
bracket the final year of the study period, but if 2004 is used to represent the post-crisis period, the analysis does not 
change. 
43
 Wilcoxon signed-rank tests based on negative ranks indicate an increase in later periods and will produce a 
negative z-score. 
44
 Bonferroni corrections were applied and all effects are reported at a .0125 level of significance. 
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= 0.250.  Although there is a significant increase across all three periods in the intensity of 
disclosure period, the effect size for the initial movement from base period is much larger than 
from crisis to post-crisis, indicating a sharp increase in intensity, most probably as organizations 
adopted the newly-available GRI G1 framework in 2000 and the improved G2 version in 2002. 
Finally, a series of two-sample z-tests for differences in proportion for each level of 
intensity is conducted across the grouping periods (Table 20, Panel B).  These tests use the entire 
sample of S&P 500 firms across all 8 years.  CSR-ONLY shows a significant increase from 
baseline to pre-crisis periods, Χ2(1) = 10.29, p = .001, but does not significantly increase in 
subsequent periods.  CSR-OR shows significant increases across all groups, with the greatest 
increase occurring in the final crisis to post-crisis stage, Χ2(1) = 10.46, p = .001.  There are no 
instances of CSR-AND until 2000, and the frequency of organizations at this intensity level is 
quite small across time, producing non-significant results across all periods. 
 
Sensitivity Analyses 
 
It is possible that factors endogenous to an organization might render that organization 
more vulnerable to exogenous threats and thus produce different patterns of CSR disclosure 
behavior.  Four contextual factors (Andersen-audited, membership in certain industries, quality, 
and risk) were used to partition the data and compare findings (Table 21).  The exogenous crisis 
in this study centers around two devastating audit failures and the subsequent dissolution of 
Andersen.  It is possible, therefore, that all disclosures from organizations with financial 
statements audited by Andersen at any point during 1998 – 2002 might be treated with more 
skepticism.  Friedman’s ANOVA was significant for the Andersen group (n = 63, Χ2(3) = 
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12.810, p < .01), indicating a significant relationship overall between time period and disclosure 
intensity.  Wilcoxon signed-rank tests (with Bonferroni correction), however, demonstrated no 
significant differences between pairs of groups.  To untangle these conflicting results, two-
sample z-tests for differences in proportion were conducted for each level of CSR disclosure 
between each grouping period.  These results indicated that Andersen-audited organizations 
showed a significant increase between pre-crisis and crisis periods for both CSR-ONLY (Χ2(1) = 
4.800, p < .05) and CSR-OR (Χ2(1) = 14.470, p < .001).  For organizations which were not 
audited by Andersen at any point during the study period, overall intensity level changed 
significantly across all three groups at the p < .01 level or better.  CSR-ONLY and CSR-AND 
significantly increased from both baseline to pre-crisis and pre-crisis to crisis (p < .05 or better), 
while CSR-OR significantly increased across all three groups (p < .01 or better). 
Industry membership has been shown to be an important covariate for CSR research 
(Margolis and Walsh 2001).  Additionally, financial firms and public utilities are frequently 
excluded from research data because it is felt that the highly regulated nature of their industries – 
which results in extensive, detailed mandatory reporting and restrictions on management actions 
– might give non-typical results.  Two separate analyses were run on the data to test for a 
significant effect for either of these groups.  Organizations with Industry Segment Codes relating 
to the energy industry (n = 38) had a significant Friedman’s ANOVA, Χ2(3) = 8.792, p < .05, but 
insignificant Wilcoxon signed-rank tests for overall intensity between groups, unless tested 
between baseline and crisis, z = -2.352, p < .05.  None of the individual z-tests were significant.  
Organizations in the financial services and utilities sectors (n = 79) also had a significant 
Friedman’s ANOVA, Χ2(3) = 24.920, p < .001, but had significant Wilcoxon’s signed-rank tests 
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between both baseline to pre-crisis, z = -3.153, p = .001, and pre-crisis to crisis, Χ2(1) = 2.324, p 
< .05.  These results were driven by significant differences in CSR-ONLY between baseline and 
pre-crisis, Χ2(1) = 7.239, p < .01.  In contrast, the remaining part of the sample in both instances 
displayed significant increases in overall intensity across all groups at p < .01 or better, and an 
identical pattern of CSR-ONLY significantly increasing from baseline to pre-crisis and CSR-OR 
significantly increasing from both pre-crisis to crisis and crisis to post-crisis at p < .05 or better. 
Organizational characteristics such as quality and risk might also affect sensitivity to 
exogenous shocks.  Using the S&P Quality ratings from Compustat, organizations were divided 
into high quality (A+, A, A-, B+) and low quality (B, B-, C, D).  The low quality group (n = 138) 
had a significant Fisher’s ANOVA, Χ2(3) = 37.298, p < .001, with Wilcoxon’s signed-rank tests 
indicating significant increases in overall intensity across all three groups (baseline to pre-crisis, 
z = -3.900, p < .001; pre-crisis to crisis, z = -1.874, p < .05; crisis to post-crisis, z = -2.148, p < 
.05.  These differences were driven by significant increases in CSR-ONLY from baseline to pre-
crisis, Χ2(1) = 3.466, p < .05, and in CSR-OR from crisis to post-crisis, Χ2(1) = 4.563, p < .05.  In 
both instances, when comparing baseline to crisis the increase was also significant at the p < .05 
level.  The only difference in this pattern with high quality organizations (n = 198) was that 
CSR-OR also significantly increased from pre-crisis to crisis at the p < .05 level. 
Using Betas from the CRSP database, a high risk group was formed based on Beta values 
greater than 1.5 (n = 66).  Friedman’s ANOVA was significant, Χ2(3) = 23.749, p < .001, with 
Wilcoxon’s signed-rank test indicating the significant increase was concentrated in the baseline 
to pre-crisis period, z = -3.051, p < .001, or, alternatively, baseline to crisis, z = -3.368, p < .001.  
CSR-ONLY from baseline to pre-crisis, Χ2(1) = 5.893, p < .05, drove these results.  In 
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comparison, all other organizations showed significant increases in overall intensity across all 
groups (p < .001 or better) and showed significant increases in CSR-ONLY from baseline to pre-
crisis (p < .05) and CSR-OR from crisis to post-crisis (p < .01). 
 
Discussion 
 
The purpose of this study was to explore whether organizations change their signaling 
behavior in response to exogenous crises in which the reporting organizations are not themselves 
directly implicated, but which might nevertheless impact the credibility of their disclosures, 
voluntary and otherwise.  The expectation is that organizations would change voluntary 
disclosure behavior in an attempt to increase transparency and credibility and reinforce their 
claims to be a legitimate, trustworthy entity.  An initial analysis confirmed that there was a 
change over time in voluntary disclosure behavior, with three to four distinct groups during the 
study period.  The questionable group, years 2000 – 2001, also brought to light an important 
point.  Voluntary CSR disclosure behavior not only consists of the individual components (CSR, 
FRAMEWORK, ASSURE), but also of the degree of intensity of voluntary disclosure behavior 
created by the combination of these components.  Intensity consists of three levels:  CSR-ONLY 
(transparency), CSR-OR (credibility), and CSR-AND (credibility).  Table 22 summarizes the 
research findings for both CSR components (Panel A) and CSR intensity (Panel B). 
Components of voluntary disclosure seem to group 2000 – 2001 with 1998 – 1999, and 
there is a clear increase in the use of CSR disclosure between 1998 (pre-crisis) and 2002 (crisis), 
a plateau during the crisis, and another increase in the use of CSR disclosure between 2002 and 
2005 (post-crisis).  Further testing indicated that both increases were significant, with the 
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majority of the pre-crisis to crisis change occurring during the common baseline years of 1998 – 
1999.  Thus, to answer RQ1a, absolute use of CSR disclosure rises over time, up to a crisis; 
plateaus during a crisis; and then continues to increase following the resolution.  The plateau 
during the crisis period might reflect a pause to allow reporting organizations to assess the 
magnitude and source of the crisis and determine the best means of response.   
The use of independent reporting frameworks also showed a similar pattern, although the 
pre-crisis period 1998 – 2001 is clearly broken into two periods, the baseline (1998 – 1999) and 
pre-crisis (2000 – 2001), most probably due to the introduction of the GRI G1 framework in 
2000.  There is a significant increase in FRAMEWORK between all three groups, with an 
increase prior to a crisis, during a crisis but at a slower rate, and then escalating again post-crisis 
(RQ2a).   
On the other hand, neither the use of third-party assurance (RQ2b) nor the use of an 
auditor to provide such assurance (RQ4) demonstrate any significant change across the period 
and remain at quite minimal levels.  Interestingly, and in contrast with prior findings, the use of 
auditors as a proportion of third-party assurance providers is not as high as expected, with a 
range of 50% (1998) to 17% (2003).  Although changes in AUDITOR did not reach significance, 
primarily due to the extremely small number of cases, during a crisis centered on public 
accounting firms, AUDITOR fell dramatically between the pre-crisis and crisis period, and then 
recovered partially (29% of third-party assurance utilized) by 2005 in the post-crisis period.  
Audit firms never regained their formal share of overall ASSURE, indicating continued 
skepticism of their ability to enhance credibility following a legitimacy crisis based on auditors 
as a member of the institutional framework. 
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Voluntary CSR disclosure intensity across the testing period might be a better way of 
conceptualizing organizational response to a perceived legitimacy threat.  Visual inspection of 
these three ordinal measures across the time period confirmed the grouping patterns exhibited by 
CSR components.  Organizations issuing a CSR disclosure alone (with no additional source of 
independent credibility enhancement) increased from baseline (1998 – 1999) to pre-crisis (2000 
– 2001) and then largely stabilized (RQ1b).  The level of CSR-OR intensity grew sharply during 
the pre-crisis period, held at a plateau during the crisis, and then accelerated post-crisis (RQ3a).  
There were no instances of CSR-AND during the baseline, but starting in 2000 instances began 
to appear in very small numbers and then began to increase (while never reaching significance) 
post-crisis (RQ3b).  Overall, it appears that there was a sudden increase in transparency efforts 
around 2000, with subsequent increases in disclosure intensity mainly coming from efforts to 
establish transparency and credibility.  CSR-OR behavior increased in significance, largely 
replacing CSR-ONLY around 2000, possibly due to the introduction of the G1 Guidelines.  
When comparing baseline to crisis, there were significant increases across all levels of intensity, 
but following the crisis only CSR-OR continued to be significant.  It is also noteworthy (see 
Table 19, Panel B) that within the CSR-OR level, the overwhelming majority of organizations at 
this level are using an independent reporting framework (92% by 2002 and 98% by 2005). 
Sensitivity tests for the influence of organizational-level factors on these overall 
relationships showed some interesting differences.  Organizations whose financial statements 
were audited by Andersen did increase CSR-ONLY and CSR-OR behavior between pre-crisis 
and crisis periods, suggesting a response to an increased legitimacy threat.  Prior to 2001, all 
CSR-OR for Andersen-audited organizations was based on third-party assurance; in 2001 there 
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was a shift, with one of the three CSR-OR instances using a framework; there were no instances 
of CSR-OR disclosures released in 2002 or 2003 using third-party assurance.  In contrast, other 
organizations showed increased CSR-ONLY and CSR-AND across baseline, pre-crisis, and 
crisis periods and CSR-OR across all three periods.  This would suggest that the Andersen 
audited organizations increased reporting behaviors in response to an increased legitimacy threat, 
while non-Andersen organizations steadily continued to increase voluntary disclosure, possibly 
to differentiate themselves from the Andersen-tainted organizations.  It also appears that between 
crisis and post-crisis, non-Andersen firms determined both that (a) transparency alone was not 
sufficient to preserve legitimacy and that (b) third-party assurance did not significantly add to 
credibility, probably due to public skepticism of auditor independence. 
The influence of industry segments is even more of a contrast.  Organizations 
concentrated in the vulnerable energy sectors, or the highly regulated financial services and 
utilities sectors, showed no significant changes, with the exception of an increase in CSR-ONLY 
reporting between the baseline and pre-crisis periods for financial services/utilities which 
appears to be driven by philanthropy reports released by banks.  All other organizations first 
significantly increased CSR-ONLY behavior between baseline and pre-crisis and then 
significantly increased CSR-OR behavior between pre-crisis and crisis and again between crisis 
and post-crisis periods.  There are two possible explanations for this result: (1) energy, utilities, 
and financial services are so highly regulated that mandatory reporting is deemed sufficient to 
assess organizational behavior, or (2) organizations not in those segments are signaling their 
differential reflections of societal values.  Further, it appears that the majority of organizations 
first tried increased transparency, but then switched intensity behavior to CSR-OR in response to 
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a crisis.  Apparently real benefits were perceived from this behavior, as the significant increase 
in CSR-OR intensity behavior continues into the post-crisis period. 
When partitioned along S&P quality ratings, the high quality group shows a significant 
increase between baseline and pre-crisis for CSR-ONLY, which is then replaced by CSR-OR 
between pre-crisis and crisis and again between crisis and post-crisis, as before.  Low quality 
organizations, on the other hand, also increased transparency efforts from baseline to pre-crisis, 
and then made no significant changes in behavior until a tardy increase in CSR-OR intensity 
level between crisis and post-crisis.  Apparently, lower quality organizations are associated with 
a reluctance to provide credibility-enhanced voluntary disclosures.  When partitioned on risk 
based on Beta values, higher risk organizations only show a significant increase in transparency 
efforts (CSR-ONLY) between baseline and pre-crisis and no efforts to provide credibility-
enhanced voluntary disclosures.
45
  Lower risk organizations (all organizations with a Beta < 1.5), 
on the other hand, show increased transparency (CSR-ONLY) efforts for both baseline to pre-
crisis and pre-crisis to crisis periods, and credibility-enhancement efforts (CSR-OR) between 
baseline and again between pre-crisis and crisis and crisis and post-crisis.  This would suggest 
that lower risk is associated with responding to an exogenous crisis by first increasing 
transparency, followed by enhancing the credibility of those disclosures.  It should also be noted 
that lower risk organizations were those that adopted credibility enhancement measures (CSR-
OR) earlier than any of the others. 
                                                 
45
 What is truly interesting is that this pattern exactly mirrors those of organizations in the Financial 
Services/Utilities sector, down to the finding that only in these two groups do we find no instances of CSR-AND 
intensity behavior whatsoever.  As 67% of the organizations within the Financial Services/Utilities sectors are 
associated with Financial Services, this suggests that Financial Services were considered to be high risk, a 
conclusion borne out by subsequent events. 
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One of the persistent questions in prior research is whether CSR disclosure is driven by 
the size or profitability of the organization, or whether a focus on CSR within the company leads 
to increased size and profitability due to increased efficiency and effectiveness.  Although 
solving this “chicken-or-egg” riddle is beyond the scope of this study, it is informative to 
examine CSR disclosure intensity behaviors by relative size or profitability.  Size is 
operationalized by total assets (a widely used proxy across literatures and profitability by net 
income). 
When intensity level is graphed against mean total assets across the entire study period 
(Figure 7), several patterns are apparent.  Smaller organizations do indeed tend to be associated 
with no CSR reporting; the very smallest organizations between 2000 and 2004, however, are 
associated with CSR-AND intensity levels.  An examination of the specific companies 
displaying CSR-AND behavior (Table 23) reveals that few consistently use this method (Baxter 
International, Newmont Mining, Starbucks), but for the majority the “extra enhancement” is 
suspiciously coincidental with a potential or recent scandal (and taking into account necessary 
lag time to produce the report).  This would suggest that third-party assurance is not regarded as 
adding long-term value, but is, instead, used for the purposes of image management and short-
term credibility enhancement.  The largest organizations, on the other hand, are consistently 
associated with CSR-OR behavior, with the exception of a single year (2001).  By 2002, CSR-
ONLY is associated with mid-range organizations.  It is interesting to note that the chart suggests 
that the rate of change in the size of organizations is greatest for those choosing CSR-OR 
behaviors, whereas the size of those organizations choosing not to engage in any CSR disclosure 
behavior remains fairly level across time. 
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Behaviors accounted for by CSR-AND intensity levels are somewhat difficult to interpret 
due to the relative non-persistence of organizations within the category:  a single entrance or exit 
can drastically alter the measure of mean size or profitability for that year.  Setting aside CSR-
AND, and using net income to differentiate organizations by profitability, we see a clear dip in 
mean net income across all other intensity levels from 2001 – 2002, with organizations choosing 
not to use CSR disclosure being associated with a net loss in 2002 (Figure 8).  While we cannot 
infer causation from this, it is a clear indication that organizations using greater transparency and 
enhancing the credibility of their voluntary CSR disclosures are associated with far greater 
profitability during legitimacy threats to the surrounding institutional framework. 
Overall, firms not providing CSR disclosure remain associated with a consistently low 
level of profitability across time.  CSR-ONLY firms are also fairly stable, recovering from the 
across-the-board dip in profitability during 2001 and 2002.  CSR-OR organizations are nearly 
equivalent to CSR-ONLY prior to 2001, suggesting that credibility enhancements were not 
considered necessary (both CSR-ONLY and CSR-OR contain CSR reports).  However, in 2001, 
the profitability of CSR-ONLY firms exceeds CSR-OR, possibly hinting at a backlash against 
third-party assurers (16% of the CSR-OR category at this point).   
By 2002, when the use of a reporting framework accounts for 92% of the CSR-OR 
behavior, the profitability of CSR-OR organizations surpasses CSR-ONLY companies and 
continues at a positive rate of growth.  By 2004, CSR-OR behavior is clearly associated with the 
highest profitability levels, CSR-ONLY with mid-range levels, and organizations choosing not to 
provide voluntary CSR disclosure are associated with the lowest profitability levels.  Overall, 
organizations utilizing CSR disclosure appear to enjoy greater profitability than those which 
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choose not to do so, and those firms choosing also to incorporate a reporting framework see 
greater rates of growth in profitability. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This study has looked at qualitative characteristics of voluntary CSR reporting behavior 
for firms confronting an exogenous legitimacy threat centered on the institutional framework.  
Public accounting firms are a critical component of that framework through their role in assuring 
mandatory financial statements.  The public skepticism regarding auditor independence in the 
wake of Enron and the fall of Andersen created a climate of mistrust towards all organizational 
disclosures.  Lack of credibility in the institutional framework created a legitimacy gap between 
societal expectations of corporate behavior and institutional enforced expectations and created a 
credibility crisis for the “innocent” reporting firms which had not been directly involved in the 
scandal.  Although this study is an initial exploration of this area, the research questions 
addressed are of great relevance in the current environment of global uncertainty and volatile 
economic conditions.  If “innocent parties” are able to insulate themselves through their 
voluntary disclosure behaviors from the increased risk and uncertainty caused by exogenous 
forces beyond their control, the importance of this question for practitioners and corporate 
stakeholders is evident. 
An examination of discretionary reporting behaviors over an eight year period 
surrounding the 2001 – 2002 Enron/Andersen crisis supports this study’s suppositions.  In 
regards to individual CSR disclosure components, the use of third-party assurance is very limited 
and the proportion of that assurance provided by auditors remains insignificant and decreases 
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during the crisis period.  In regards to CSR disclosure intensity levels, the results are even 
clearer.  Organizations sought to demonstrate their commitment to societal norms and values by 
first increasing the amount of voluntary disclosure and then, as the crisis deepened, by enhancing 
credibility of voluntary disclosures through the use of an independent reporting framework.  The 
perceived efficacy of this strategy was great enough that following the crisis, the frequency of 
organizations engaging in CSR-OR intensity behavior continued to increase at a strong rate of 
growth and CSR-AND behavior slowly began to make an appearance.  Additionally, lower 
quality/higher risk organizations seem to choose lower levels of CSR disclosure (including no 
CSR disclosure) or to delay in adopting credibility enhancement measures.  Smaller, less 
profitable organizations are associated with no CSR disclosure whereas, by 2002, the largest, 
most profitable organizations are associated with CSR disclosure with credibility enhancement. 
There are several limitations of this study.  First, overall numbers for third-party 
assurance (and, within that group, auditor provided assurance) are very small, making it difficult 
to meaningfully test changes in frequency of behavior over time.  These numbers need to be 
treated cautiously as an indicator of overall trends but with the realization that they are 
statistically negligible.  Also, the first generation of GRI Guidelines was released for comment in 
1999 and became available in 2000 and this fact per se might have contributed to the increase in 
the use of reporting frameworks between the baseline and pre-crisis periods.  The use of the S&P 
500 allowed us to look at a group of economically powerful companies which are exposed to a 
range of stakeholder interests and pressures; however, this might also produce a dispersion of 
stakeholder power which insulated them somewhat from legitimacy pressures.  Further, due to 
the study population, tests of the association of CSR intensity behavior with size and profitability 
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of firms is also restricted to the largest, most profitable firms in the US market.  Finally, the 
categorical nature of the data restricts the types of testing possible, as do the unequal numbers of 
reporting organizations within the S&P 500 during each period. 
Future extensions of this study would help to clarify some of the associations, especially 
extensions which might be able to examine general growth over time in disclosure behaviors 
versus those resulting from specific events.  It would be interesting to compare reporting 
behaviors from small and mid-sized organizations to see if there is a difference in vulnerability 
to legitimacy pressures.  Extending the study to behavior around the 2008 market collapse and 
general economic crisis would be informative.  Finally, an examination of lagged financial 
performance would be helpful in determining the subsequent effect of CSR disclosure choices.  
The continued examination of how voluntary disclosure behavior (and associated stakeholder 
perceptions of credibility and trustworthiness) might insulate the organization against external 
crises has the potential to be extremely useful to regulators, stakeholders, and organizational 
management faced with the uncertainty inherent in an interdependent global marketplace.  
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Figures 
 
 
Figure 5:  Frequency of CSR Disclosure Components across Time Period 
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Figure 6:  Frequency of CSR Disclosure Intensity across Time Period 
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Figure 7:  CSR Disclosure Intensity Behavior by Organizational Size (Total Assets) 
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Figure 8:  CSR Disclosure Intensity Behavior by Organizational Profitability 
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Tables 
 
Table 17:  Research Predictions 
Pre-Crisis: 1998 
Expected 
Change 
Crisis: 2001 - 2002 
Expected 
Change 
Post-Crisis:  2005 
Disclosing companies/ 
total companies 
 
< 
Disclosing 
companies/ total 
companies 
? 
Disclosing companies/ 
total companies 
Framework/ total 
disclosing companies 
 
< 
Framework/ total 
disclosing companies 
<= 
Framework/ total 
disclosing companies 
Assurance/ total 
disclosing companies 
 
> < 
Assurance/ total 
disclosing companies 
<= 
Assurance/ total 
disclosing companies 
Auditor assurance/ 
total assuring 
companies 
> 
Auditor assurance/ 
total assuring 
companies 
? 
Auditor assurance/ total 
assuring companies 
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Table 18:  Major Accounting Scandals 1999 – 2004 
Year Companies Accounting firms 
1999 Waste Management Andersen 
 
2000 MicroStrategy, Computer Associates, Xerox PricewaterhouseCoopers, KPMG 
 
2001 Enron Andersen 
 
2002 Adelphia, AOL, Bristol-Myers Squibb, CMS 
Energy, Duke Energy, Dynergy, El Paso 
Corporation, Global Crossing, Halliburton, 
ImClone, Kmart, Nicor, Reliant Energy, Tyco, 
WorldCom 
 
Andersen, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & 
Young, KPMG, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers 
2003 Royal Ahold, Parmalat, HealthSouth, Nortel, tax 
shelter fraud 
Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, 
Grant Thornton, KPMG 
 
2004 AIG PricewaterhouseCoopers 
  
167 
 
Table 19:  Frequency of CSR Disclosure Components and Intensity Levels for S&P 500 1998 – 
2005 
Panel A:  Frequency of CSR disclosure component by year 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
S&P 500 population 508 510 526 512 515 505 507 503 
CSR disclosure 45 54 78 88 97 96 114 121 
Use of framework* 1 3 9 18 25 28 43 52 
Use of third-party assurance* 6 3 4 5 4 6 5 7 
Use of auditor for third-party assurance* 3 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 
Panel B:  Frequency of CSR disclosure intensity level by year 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
CSR disclosure only 38 48 66 67 70 66 70 68 
CSR disclosure with framework OR 
assurance 
7 6 11 19 25 26 40 47 
Percentage of CSR-OR using framework as 
method of credibility enhancement 
14% 50% 73% 84% 92% 92% 98% 98% 
CSR disclosure with framework AND 
assurance 
0 0 1 2 2 4 4 6 
*Values are nested:  framework and third-party assurance are proportions of CSR disclosure for 
each period and use of auditor is a proportion of third-party assurance.  
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Table 20:  Two-Proportion z-test for Change in Frequency across Periods 
Panel A:  CSR component 
 Baseline to pre-Crisis Pre-Crisis to 
Crisis 
Crisis to Post 
Crisis 
CSR disclosure 17.98*** 3.065* 5.760** 
Use of framework 8.972** 6.459** 7.873** 
Use of third-party assurance 1.319 0.010 0.001 
Use of auditor for third-party 
assurance 
1.000 0.014 0.489 
Panel B: CSR intensity 
 Baseline to pre-
Crisis 
Pre-Crisis to 
Crisis 
Crisis to Post 
Crisis 
CSR report only 10.29*** 0.123 0.047 
CSR report with framework OR 
assurance 
6.531** 6.057** 10.461*** 
CSR report with framework AND 
assurance 
2.966 1.058 1.048 
Test statistic is Χ2 (1) for all cases 
Exact Significance (one-sided): p < .05*, p < .01**, p < .001*** 
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Table 21:  Sensitivity Analyses Using Two-Proportion z-tests for Change in Frequency for CSR Intensity Levels across Groups 
 Entire 
Sample 
Andersen 
audited
a
 
Energy 
sector
b
 
Financial services/ 
utilities sector
c
 
Low 
quality
d 
High 
quality
d 
High 
risk
e 
Low 
risk
e 
Sample size 336 63 38 79 138 198 66 270 
CSR-
ONLY 
Baseline to Pre-
Crisis 
10.29*** 0.000 1.754 7.239** 3.466* 5.428* 5.893* 4.305* 
 Pre-Crisis to 
Crisis 
0.123 4.800* 0.060 0.918 0.0992 0.074 0.000 0.217 
Crisis to Post-
Crisis 
0.047 0.878 0.244 0.318 1.216 0.158 1.234 0.013 
CSR-OR Baseline to Pre-
Crisis 
6.531** 0.000 0.347 1.006 1.833 0.677 1.008 1.630 
 Pre-Crisis to 
Crisis 
6.057** 14.470*** 0.214 1.026 0.852 4.168* 1.871 3.3032 
Crisis to Post-
Crisis 
10.461*** 1.260 0.157 0.149 4.563* 5.036* 2.877 6.733** 
CSR-
AND 
Baseline to Pre-
Crisis 
2.966 --- -- -- -- 1.003 -- 1.002 
 Pre-Crisis to 
Crisis 
1.058 2.032 -- -- 1.004 0.000 -- 0.335 
Crisis to Post-
Crisis 
1.048 1.008 1.013 -- 0.337 0.336 -- 0.674 
Pearson Chi-square reported for two-sample z-test of difference among proportions at significance levels: p < .05 *, p < .01 **, 
p < .001*** 
a
Andersen audited organizations are those which had Andersen as financial statement auditor at any time during the period 
1998 – 2002 
b
S&P ISC codes used to indicate involvement in Energy sector:  170, 375, 380, 382, 385, 390, 705, 710, 720 
c
S&P ISC codes used to indicate involvement in Financial Services or Utility sector: 462, 463, 705, 710, 715, 720, 725, 810, 
815, 817, 820, 822, 823, 825, 830, 835, 837, 840, 845, 850 
d
Based on S&P Quality rating from Compustat, where A+, A, A-, B+ = high quality; B, B-, C, D = low quality 
eHigh risk companies are those with a Beta ≥ 1.5  
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Table 22:  Summary of Findings 
Base line: 1998 - 1999 Relation Pre-Crisis: 2000 - 2001 Relation Crisis: 2002 - 2003 Relation Post-Crisis:  2004 - 2005 
Panel A:  CSR components 
Disclosing companies/ 
total companies 
< 
Disclosing companies/ 
total companies 
< 
Disclosing companies/ 
total companies 
< 
Disclosing companies/ 
total companies 
Framework/ total 
disclosing companies 
< 
Framework/ total 
disclosing companies 
< 
Framework/ total 
disclosing companies 
< 
Framework/ total 
disclosing companies 
Assurance/ total 
disclosing companies 
= 
Assurance/ total 
disclosing companies 
= 
Assurance/ total 
disclosing companies 
= 
Assurance/ total 
disclosing companies 
Auditor assurance/ total 
assuring companies 
= 
Auditor assurance/ total 
assuring companies 
= 
Auditor assurance/ total 
assuring companies 
= 
Auditor assurance/ total 
assuring companies 
Panel B:  CSR intensity 
CSR disclosure only < CSR disclosure only = CSR disclosure only = CSR disclosure only 
CSR disclosure with 
framework OR 
assurance 
< 
CSR disclosure with 
framework OR 
assurance 
< 
CSR disclosure with 
framework OR 
assurance 
< 
CSR disclosure with 
framework OR 
assurance 
CSR disclosure with 
framework AND 
assurance 
= 
CSR disclosure with 
framework AND 
assurance 
= 
CSR disclosure with 
framework AND 
assurance 
= 
CSR disclosure with 
framework AND 
assurance 
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Table 23:  Organizations Choosing CSR-AND Behavior 
Company Industry 
2
0
0
0
 
2
0
0
1
 
2
0
0
2
 
2
0
0
3
 
2
0
0
4
 
2
0
0
5
 
Comments 
Baxter 
International 
Health Care X X X  X X  
Bristol-Myers 
Squibb 
Health Care  X  X   
Series of accounting scandals of 
manipulated earnings surfaced in 
2002 
Dow 
Chemical 
Chemicals   X X   
Dioxin scandal came to light in 
2002 
Newmont 
Mining 
Gold & Precious 
Metals Mining 
   X X X  
AES Power Producer    X   Implicated in Enron scandals 
Nike Retailer – Footwear     X  
2002 – 2004 intensive effort by 
company to recover from child 
labor scandal 
Gap 
Retailer – Specialty 
Apparel 
    X  
2003 class action lawsuit by 
sweatshop workers in Saipan 
(unsafe working conditions, 
unpaid overtime) 
Starbucks Restaurants     X X  
Exxon Oil (International)      X 2003 foreign bribery scandals 
Applied 
Materials 
Semiconductors      X  
Office Depot Retailer – Specialty      X  
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CHAPTER FIVE:  CONCLUSION 
 
Introduction 
 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has its roots in the social activism of the 1960s 
and 1970s.  The early emphasis on social change agendas led to Milton Friedman’s (1970) 
famous denunciation of such policies as “theft”.  In more recent years, the emphasis has shifted 
from business’s responsibility in shaping society in response to a social or political agenda, to 
business’s accountability for operations (including long-lasting effects on surrounding 
communities) and ethical behavior.  Such a shift in understanding is not outside of Friedman’s 
conception of management’s responsibility to “make as much money as possible while 
conforming to the basic rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in 
ethical custom (Friedman 1970, 33; emphasis added).”  The latter part of Friedman’s statement is 
often omitted, but it has clear parallels to the concept of organizational legitimacy, where the 
social contract between business and society determines the allocation of scarce resources 
(Dowling and Pfeffer 1975).  In fact, the degree to which organizations move beyond mandated 
behavior to incorporate “ethical custom” (and societal expectations for behavior) determines the 
relative degree of legitimacy (Lindblom 2010). 
The emphasis within CSR has also shifted over time.  Whereas the 1960s tended to 
emphasize social programs, the focus has shifted in recent decades to environmental, 
sustainability, and ethical factors.  This is not to say that environmentalism did not appear in 
earlier periods.  Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (1962) focused widespread public attention on the 
issue of the long-term health effects of chemical contamination.  The Love Canal crisis in the 
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late 1970s intensified these concerns in the light of the effect on surrounding communities from 
the irresponsible use and disposal of chemical waste, as did the dangerously rising mercury 
levels in the Great Lakes.  The Three Mile Island accident (1979) and the oil crises of 1973 and 
1979 also contributed to an interest in alternative energy sources and increased energy efficiency.  
During the 1980s an increasing dissatisfaction with quality, innovation, and competitiveness led 
to attempts in the 1990s to expand organizational performance measures to capture aspects of 
non-financial performance (Johnson and Kaplan 1991; Kaplan and Norton 1996; Elkington 
1999) and to address the concerns of stakeholder groups beyond shareholders (Freeman 1984).  
An increasing number of ethical scandals in the early years of the 21
st
 century, following the 
excesses of the 1980s, also produced a greater interest in questions of ethical behavior in 
business, governance structures, and the role of independent boards in increasing accountability 
and responsibility for organizational actions (Paine 2003).  CSR, then, reflects an organization’s 
stewardship and accountability to a broad audience.  Stewardship and accountability, in turn, 
influence organizational efficiency, effectiveness, and strategy. 
The current business environment is one that increasingly embraces CSR, while making a 
business case for doing so.
46
  While, admittedly, many organizations employ CSR reporting as 
image management and fail to report anything of actual substance, others are making efforts to 
report non-financial performance and learning as they go.  These efforts are driven by solid, 
performance-oriented reasons.  Top management increasingly associates sustainability efforts 
with gains in efficiency and innovation (KPMG 2011), superior long-term value creation 
                                                 
46
 I note a recent trend to refer to these matters as “ESG” – Environment, Social, and Governance – reports, thus 
distancing non-financial responsibility, performance, and reporting from the more activist-oriented perception of the 
term CSR. 
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(Generation 2012), and the ability to manage risks, enhance reputations, and identify potential 
strategic opportunities (IIGCC et al. 2010), and obtain financial benefits from higher credit 
ratings, lower cost of debt, and greater access to capital (Bauer and Hann 2010; Generation 
2012).  Researchers have also found that sustainable firms have significant increases in profits 
and stock returns when compared to a matched sample (Eccles, Ioannou, and Serafeim 2011; 
Generation 2012), significantly outperform organizations with lower sustainability in the long-
term (Eccles, Ioannou, and Serafeim 2011), and have a clearer link between strategic decisions 
and capital (Cheng, Ioannou, and Serafeim 2010).  Prior research has also speculated that the 
growth of non-financial performance reporting is linked to the dramatic decline in tangible asset 
market value from around 80% in 1975 to less than 20% in 2009 (Eccles, Ioannou, and Serafeim 
2011, Eccles, Serafeim, and Krzus 2011).  Measures, methodologies, and direct relationships are 
not always clear, but there is increasing evidence that there is a “mutually reinforcing 
relationship between financial and non-financial performance (Eccles, Ioannou, and Serafeim 
2011, 1)” and a significant market interest in the degree of organizational transparency regarding 
CSR (Eccles, Serafeim, and Krzus 2011). 
Within the stream of research contained in this dissertation, I have examined the 
relationship between financial and non-financial performance using a legitimacy perspective and 
a focus on stakeholder groups.  I have found evidence suggesting that stakeholder groups differ 
in their emphasis on areas of non-financial performance and that the measurement level most 
sensitive to variance in financial outcomes is dependent on the level of aggregation in the 
outcome measure as well as the number of stakeholder groups associated with it and the ability 
to isolate the interests of these groups (Study One).  I have also found evidence that CSR 
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disclosure has important effects on financial performance via an increased tolerance for 
unexpected poor performance.  CSR disclosure produces this increased tolerance (resilience) by 
leading to greater perceived legitimacy (Study Two).  Organizations seem to have at least an 
intuitive grasp of the benefit of increased transparency, especially during threats to perceived 
legitimacy caused by an external credibility crisis affecting the market’s institutional framework 
(Study Three).  During such an event, organizations might seek to protect their own legitimacy 
by emphasizing their credibility and transparency, increasing the amount of CSR reporting, and 
utilizing independent sources of credibility enhancement (primarily reporting frameworks). 
 
The Relationship between Financial and Non-Financial Performance 
 
There are many reasons behind the growth of CSR.  Mandatory reporting by US GAAP 
covers financial performance, but does not cover reporting of non-financial performance.
47
  
Mandatory reporting also does not allow for flexible, evolving measures of non-tangible assets or 
the incorporation of strategic initiatives, nor does it address non-economic concerns of key 
stakeholder groups.  Voluntary reporting (CSR, ESG, Sustainability, etc.) is able to address this 
need, as well as demonstrate differential legitimacy in the degree to which organizations move 
beyond mandated compliance to reflect societal expectations.  It is not a costless process, but 
organizations have found the benefits outweigh the costs. 
                                                 
47
 There is an increase in reporting within the European Union and under IASB rules.  However, reporting is not 
mandatory in all countries, for all companies, or for all (or even the same aspects) of CSR performance.  In many 
cases, organizations can evade regulation by not listing on the country-based exchange, not engaging in certain 
activities, or maintaining in-country employment below a certain threshold. 
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Incentives to engage in CSR vary widely, and might range across items such as top 
management’s personal convictions, organizational reputation, risk management, and financial 
performance (Novethic 2010).  Top corporate management publicly states that good corporate 
citizenship makes a tangible contribution to the bottom line (BCCCC 2007) and that increased 
disclosure adds business value (SustainAbility 2010).  Institutional investors have gone through a 
recent sea-change in their attitude to CSR disclosure; just a few years ago consideration of non-
financial performance was regarded as a conflict with fiduciary duty, but a strategy that includes 
non-financial performance assessment is now believed to maximize long-term client benefit 
(Novethic 2010).  Importantly, firms with better CSR performance and disclosure appear to have 
significantly lower capital constraints (Kothari, Li, and Short 2009; Cheng, Ioannou, and 
Serafeim 2010; Dhaliwal et al. 2011) and outperform equivalent, non-CSR firms in the stock 
market (Eccles, Ioannou, and Serafeim 2011).  Greater access to capital appears to be the result 
of reduced agency costs and increased revenue opportunities resulting from increased 
stakeholder engagement and the reduced information asymmetry costs resulting from increased 
transparency (Kothari, Li, and Short 2009; Cheng, Ioannou, and Serafeim 2010). 
Market leaders appear to be setting the pace and standards of CSR reporting practices 
(KPMG 2011).  However, stakeholders are driving the need for CSR reporting.  Investors and 
consumers incorporate rankings into their decisions (often as a measure of risk), and the more a 
company discloses, the better it is likely to score on these ratings, which often are based solely 
on publicly-available information (SustainAbility and GlobeScan 2010).
48
  CSR, especially 
                                                 
48
 According to a recent international survey of institutional and individual investors (Novethic 2010), 69% of 
investors incorporate ESG into their asset management decisions and 38% believe ratings agencies (non-analyst 
rankings) to be the most useful source of information.  This supports findings from Kothari, Li, and Short (2009) 
that analysts and management are not regarded as credible sources of information by investors. 
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environmental performance and policies, affects exposure to legal, reputational, and regulatory 
risk, influencing corporate solvency and credit, risk, and quality ratings (Bauer and Hann 2010).  
Rankings are also highly volatile and stakeholders appear to regard CSR as dynamic, with an 
emphasis on “what have you done lately?” in their evaluations (SustainAbility and GlobeScan 
2010).  Overall, change is constant and one measure or method does not address the needs of all 
stakeholder groups at all times (SustainAbility 2011).  Earlier discussions of CSR had objected 
that attempts to increase disclosure would harm more transparent companies, especially if 
organizations had to report less-than-ideal performance.  However, recent surveys have indicated 
that if it is not publicly reported, the organization is assumed to either be ignoring or failing in 
the relevant CSR area and that stakeholders reward responsiveness, even in the face of poorer 
performance (SustainAbility 2011). 
In general, then, acceptance of the need for CSR disclosure is not the issue; rather, it is 
the execution of CSR reporting that remains problematic (Accenture 2010).  Organizations have 
increasingly focused on CSR as an investment driving their business model for long-term 
competitiveness and flexibility, rather than an additional cost (Porter and van der Linde 1995; 
Environics 1999; KPMG 2011).  The integration of CSR into core business values (and thus 
long-term strategy) causes it to function as a long-term investment (KPMG 2011) and to drive 
perceptions of organizational leadership and reputation (SustainAbility and GlobeScan 2010).  
The adoption of CSR reporting and its integration with the long-term business model tend 
to proceed in three distinct, overlapping phases (Generation 2012).  First, organizations use CSR 
reporting to align themselves with key stakeholders to enhance their strategic position through 
brand enhancement, increased public trust and reputation, and improved competitive positioning.  
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The second phase produces operational benefits as organizations realize that the stewardship 
focus of CSR can reduce waste, increase energy efficiency, improve human capital benefits, and 
generally lower the capital structure.  Following prior stages of profit enhancement and cost 
minimization, the final stage focuses on compliance and risk management, improving internal 
control and governance, and increasing predictability and stakeholder confidence in 
management’s integrity and ethical behavior.  Eccles, Ioannou, and Serafeim (2011) hypothesize 
that CSR-disclosing companies are perceived as less risky by the markets because greater 
transparency decreases uncertainty about ability (and thus, expectations for future performance). 
Increased organizational responsibility for actions, and subsequent results, is becoming a 
global expectation (Environics 1999; Generation 2012).  The Millennium poll in 1999 was the 
largest global survey of public expectations of corporations, across 23 countries and 6 continents.  
In all but three countries, responses from the majority of citizens presented a view of the proper 
role of business as somewhere between Friedman’s profit maximization and the maximization of 
stakeholder interests.  Specifically, organizational behavior was expected to (1) demonstrate 
commitment to societal values and contribute to societal goals; (2) insulate society from any 
negative impacts of business operations or products; (3) share benefits with key stakeholders (not 
shareholders alone); and (4) make profits by “doing the right thing” (Environics 1999).  These 
expectations closely echo legitimacy theory; organizations are expected to behave in a manner 
that reflects and respects the implied societal contract in their allocation of resources and 
permission to continue operating.  This is not the radical view for supporting social engineering 
that Friedman protested.  Capitalism is supported, but capitalism held accountable for long-term 
outcomes, behavior, and choices. 
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...[W]hile the present form of Capitalism has proven its superiority, it is 
nevertheless abundantly clear that some of the ways in which it is now 
practiced do not incorporate sufficient regard for its impact on people and the 
planet...These include short-termism, overreliance on GDP growth as a 
primary metric of prosperity, diverting wealth into shadow banking and 
financial engineering and away from addressing real needs...(and) also include 
rising inequality, increasing volatility in the global financial market, and 
growing contributions to the climate crisis perpetuated by a resistance to 
internalize externalities. (Generation 2012, 6) 
Public expectations for greater corporate responsibility in addressing social and 
environmental challenges continue, with increasing regulatory pressure outside of the United 
States to influence behavior in these areas (BCCCC 2007).  However, large gaps remain between 
organizational perceptions of responsibility and public expectations for organizational behavior:  
55% of businesses and 79% of the public believe business has a responsibility to produce 
sustainable products or use only sustainable materials; 35% of businesses and 62% of the public 
believe business has a responsibility in preventing or resolving Human Rights issues (BCCCC 
2007).  Increasing public mistrust and skepticism from corporate ethical scandals and rising 
anger over excessive CEO pay in the face of increasing economic marginalization of workers are 
increasing pressure for government intervention and regulation, although confidence in 
governmental leaders and belief in their ability to fairly enforce the social contract has been 
severely eroded (Bazerman, Loewenstein, and Moore 2002; Bazerman et al. 2006; SustainAbility 
and GlobeScan 2010).  In order to preserve the functioning of a free market, and prevent 
government control, there is an urgent need for organizations to shift their focus to long-term 
economic value creation (a shift from “quarterly capitalism”), to address “real needs,” 
incorporate all costs, and address the needs of all stakeholders (Barton 2011; Generation 2012).  
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Relationships with key stakeholders provide the critical interface between organizational 
economic actions and legitimacy: 
...society ultimately does require, in one way or another, that a company earns 
the right to operate.  When managers do not consider the impact of their 
decisions on all stakeholders, not just shareholders, we believe that they are 
putting this license to operate at risk. (Generation 2012, 8) 
With the recognition of the importance of non-financial performance to overall organizational 
outcomes, there has been a gradual shift towards stakeholder engagement,
49
 although there is a 
wide range within the process used or extent of engagement (Novethic 2010).  Stakeholder 
engagement has also demonstrated both that stakeholders do consider non-financial factors 
important (Environics 1999)
50
 and that there are considerable differences among CSR aspects of 
interest between investors and other stakeholders (IFAC 2012). 
Mainstream economic theory is heavily dependent on investors, to the point of implying 
that organizations are more dependent for their existence on shareholders than they are on 
customers (Eccles, Ioannou, and Serafeim 2011).  There is an obvious fallacy involved here, as 
without customers to purchase the product or service the organization will cease to operate (or, at 
the very least, to have a meaningful existence as more than a vehicle for “shadow banking”51).  
Customers as stakeholders drive organizational profits and their interests and information 
                                                 
49
 Stakeholder engagement is the process of specifically determining, from the stakeholders themselves, the areas of 
both financial and non-financial performance of concern to key stakeholders and their desired measures and targets 
for performance in these areas. 
50
 When asked to choose from a list of factors to describe their impression of individual companies, 49% of those 
surveyed chose social responsibility items, 40% also chose quality or reputational items, and 32% used business 
fundamentals (Environics 1999). 
51
 “Shadow banking” is the system of financial vehicles, practices, organizations, and networks that exist outside of 
existing regulation (including regulation for monitoring or reporting exchanges).  This is the realm of financial 
instruments and deals structured to take advantage of loopholes in current regulations or between countries. 
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demands should drive CSR performance and disclosure (Accenture 2010).
52
  Consumers 
surveyed scrutinized corporations most in areas of employee health and safety, equal treatment 
of all employees, bribery and corruption, environmental impacts, and the use of child labor.  
Further, consumers held corporations accountable for their behavior in these areas before holding 
them accountable for profitable operations or paying a fair share of taxes (Environics 1999). 
For investors, on the other hand, CSR is focused more on measuring risk exposure and 
potential rewards through strategy and innovation, and appears to function as an assessment of 
management quality (Eccles, Ioannou, and Serafeim 2011; Eccles, Serafeim, and Krzus 2011).  
Regardless of the overwhelming focus on shareholders in corporate decision making, there is still 
a mismatch between the CSR reporting provided by the organization and that demanded by 
shareholders (Eccles, Searfeim, and Krzus 2011).  Further contradicting the claim that investors 
do not care about non-financial performance, Eccles, Serafeim, and Krzus (2011) found that over 
six months (using Bloomberg data) investors accessed a long list of environmental or social 
performance metrics approximately 34 million times.  Environmental factors, which can 
dramatically effect legal liability or fines, future remediation risks, and access to critical 
resources, are especially influential as risk factors in investment strategies:  for example, 87% of 
asset managers and 98% of asset owners consider climate change to be a material investment risk 
(IIGCC et al. 2010). 
                                                 
52
 The stakeholder group of customers can affect ongoing organizational performance through means other than their 
own purchasing power.  A majority of consumers talk to others about corporate behavior, influencing potential 
customers and other stakeholder groups, and one in five consumers reports boycotting or publicly speaking out 
against a company (Environics 1999).  The growth of internet consumer rating sites (e.g., Amazon.com’s customer 
reviews or consumer ratings of personal services on Angieslist.com) has accelerated the speed and impact of 
consumer opinions. 
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It has been argued that explicitly incorporating CSR factors into corporate financial 
models results in long-term, holistic business models better able to make resource allocation 
decisions (Eccles and Serafeim 2011).  Likewise, by engaging with stakeholders honestly, and 
seeking to develop trust, credibility, and a long-term focus, organizations are able to avoid 
increased costs to prevent opportunistic behavior (Eccles, Ioannou, and Serafeim 2011).  Short-
termism seems to be a significant factor in organizations that have poor CSR performance and/or 
choose not to engage in CSR disclosure.  The investment horizon of an organization’s investors 
can ultimately end up affecting its decision making process and benchmarks.  Companies appear 
to be able to attract investors with different investment horizons based on their disclosure 
policies (IFAC 2012), with sustainable organizations apparently attracting longer-term investors 
(Eccles, Ioannou, and Serafeim 2011).  An emphasis on short-term performance, chiefly through 
quarterly earnings guidance, tends to attract momentum investors and results in much greater 
volatility for the underlying stock (IFAC 2012).  A survey of CIOs from top asset management 
firms recently reported that only 20% have time horizons longer than a year and fully 55% have 
time horizons of a quarter or less (Generation 2012). 
A focus on meeting the demands of short-term focused investors also tends to lead to a 
decrease in value through the failure to engage in long-term investments to support product or 
process improvements and also tends to impose externality costs disproportionately on other 
stakeholders; in essence, the organization trades short-term profits for long-term value (Eccles, 
Ioannou, and Serafeim 2011; Generation 2012).
53
  The effect of the “pernicious orthodoxy of 
short-termism” (Generation 2012) produces wide-ranging effects:  managers use inappropriate 
                                                 
53
 The International Federation of Accountants (2012) reported that 80% of CFOs would sacrifice future economic 
value to satisfy investor expectations of short-term returns. 
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discount rates, causing them to mistakenly reject profitable long-term projects, the return horizon 
does not match the asset horizon, and managers reject positive NPV projects based on the effect 
on analysts’ quarterly earnings estimates (Haldane and Davies 2011).  Over 75% of managers 
report they would give up economic value in order to smooth earnings (Haldane and Davies 
2011) and extreme short-term CEO tenures with the accompanying IBG/YGB (“I’ll be 
gone/You’ll be gone”, Knee 2006, 23) attitude towards maximizing their ability to cash out stock 
options exacerbates the problem (Generation 2012). 
The average holding period of securities was about 7 years and relatively stable from 
1940 to the mid-1970s, but the rise of computer trading, especially High Frequency Transactions 
(HFT), has caused holding periods to fall dramatically to only around 7 months (Barton 2011; 
Generation 2012).  From 1995 on, the decreased return horizon especially accelerated with the 
emphasis on quarterly returns and performance reporting (Haldane and Davies 2011).  HFT now 
accounts for around 70% of consolidated US trading volume and is positively correlated with 
stock price volatility, particularly during periods of market instability (Zhang 2010; Barton 2011; 
Generation 2012).  The combination of short-termism and stock price volatility encourages 
market instability, especially in the presence of HFT (Generation 2012).  In effect, HFT prevents 
the market from efficiently incorporating financial fundamentals into asset prices (Zhang 2010). 
Short-termism, and the market distortion it creates, causes inefficient capital allocation 
for long-term investments (Generation 2012).  However, firms with better CSR performance and 
disclosure appear to have significantly lower capital constraints.  Greater access to capital 
appears to be the result of reduced agency costs and increased revenue opportunities resulting 
from increased stakeholder engagement and the reduced information asymmetry costs resulting 
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from increased transparency (Cheng, Ioannou, and Serafeim 2010).  Eccles, Ioannou, and 
Serafeim (2011) hypothesize that CSR disclosing companies are perceived as less risky by the 
markets because the greater transparency decreases uncertainty about ability (and thus, 
expectations for future performance).  CSR, especially environmental performance and policies, 
affects exposure to legal, reputational, and regulatory risk, influencing corporate solvency, and 
credit, risk, and quality ratings (Bauer and Hann 2010). 
 
Conclusion 
 
CSR performance and reporting function on several levels to enhance organizational 
economic value.  The linkage operates through intervening constructs which affect both cost 
structures and revenues.  CSR demonstrates incorporation of extra-legal societal values, hence 
legitimacy, and engages across multiple stakeholder groups.  Credibility and transparency 
increase trustworthiness/reputation effects and decrease risk and uncertainty, significantly 
decreasing contracting and agency costs.  Recent surveys of managers, investors, professional 
investment managers, consumers, and citizens have confirmed that CSR is perceived as a critical 
component in the corporate business model and as contributing to superior performance – the 
uncertainty remaining concerns tradeoffs, priorities, reporting mechanisms, and intervening 
mechanisms.  The stream of research within this dissertation seeks to explore the tradeoffs and 
disclosure processes that link non-financial to financial performance. 
Study one, Exploring the Interface, responds to Wood and Jones’ (1995) assertion that 
CSR variables need to be appropriately matched with economic outcome measures, and that 
those measures will differ across stakeholder groups and CSR areas covered.  I find support for 
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their argument, with a much clearer link between CSR and financial performance and non-
market based measures, which also supports Zhang’s (2010) contention that the contemporary 
stock market is “broken”, with short-termism and HFT leading to distortions in the incorporation 
of information into accurate valuation.  I find that measurement levels do vary across outcome 
measures based on the degree of aggregation and the degree to which the outcome can be 
associated with a predominant stakeholder group (Wood and Jones 1995; Cheng, Ioannou, and 
Serafeim 2010).  I also find confirmation that different stakeholder groups require different CSR 
performance evaluations (IFAC 2012) and that, while environmental and social factors are fairly 
direct in their association with economic outcomes, governance items are either non-significant 
or contradictory (Cheng, Ioannou, and Serafeim 2010; Eccles, Ioannou, and Serafeim 2011). 
Study two, The Benefit of the Doubt, specifically explores the role of information 
characteristics contributing to high-quality disclosures (accuracy and completeness) in producing 
perceived legitimacy as operationalized by information credibility and organizational 
trustworthiness.  Perceived legitimacy then contributes to resilience in the face of unexpected 
poor performance following an industry crisis.  I find that accuracy is the primary driver in non-
professional judgments of legitimacy, which seems to support the need for quantifiable measures 
(with associated materiality and thresholds) that are consistent and comparable (IIGCC et al. 
2010; IFAC 2012).  I also find evidence for the role of perceived legitimacy as the link between 
social responsibility and corporate image as displayed in voluntary CSR reporting and market 
performance (BCCCC 2007; Accenture 2010). 
Finally, study three, In Bad Company, examines the alteration of organizational 
disclosure behavior in the presence of an exogenous threat to legitimacy.  When the institutional 
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framework supporting the economic environment and capital markets suffers from a credibility 
crisis, organizations try to demonstrate their own legitimacy by increasing disclosure.  More, the 
majority of disclosing organizations also seek to specifically increase the credibility of their 
disclosures via the use of independent third-party frameworks incorporating both accuracy and 
completeness.  Surprisingly, I find that the use of third-party assurance was extremely low 
overall, and did not significantly increase over the crisis period, supporting findings by Eccles, 
Ioannou, and Serafeim (2011).  The corporate response to the Enron/Andersen scandal in 2001 – 
2002, demonstrating an increase in CSR reporting, was repeated again during the economic 
downturn in 2008, and thus confirms that organizations accelerate the introduction of CSR 
disclosure during financial crises (Accenture 2010; Eccles, Ioannou, and Serafeim 2011). 
Taken together, these three studies forward our understanding of CSR reporting by 
targeting three critical factors in organizational performance and disclosure.  First, the CSP-CFP 
relationship is not simple, is usually not direct, and operates at many levels.  The more a CFP 
outcome measure captures a single stakeholder group and the less it aggregates multiple 
performance items, the more direct the relationship appears, often operating at the level of 
stakeholder reactions to individual issues.  In order to monitor and asses CSP performance and 
outcomes, then, organizations should carefully select the appropriate economic measures.  Stock 
market performance, and stakeholder assessments based on stock performance, is very 
insensitive to the influence of CSP on overall financial outcomes.  Second, different stakeholder 
groups emphasize different aspects of non-financial performance, which implies that an 
organization’s ability to identify and engage with key stakeholder groups will produce superior 
operational efficiencies and strategic direction.  Third, the effect of CSP on corporate economic 
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outcomes appears to work by enhancing legitimacy with stakeholders.  The increased legitimacy 
appears to be driven by perceived credibility of disclosure (linked to transparency), and the 
accompanying effect on perceived trustworthiness of management.  Credibility specifically 
appears to be enhanced by information characteristics leading to high-quality disclosure 
(accuracy and completeness) and by an independent, external source of credibility enhancement 
such as a reporting framework.  This implies that organizations can produce increased, long-term 
value creation the more that they align corporate values with societal norms.  It also implies that 
organizations which are able to achieve this distinction will outperform their competitors who 
are not able to do so, or be insulated from external crises or uncertainty to a greater degree.  The 
key, overall implications for management are three fold: (1) identify key stakeholders and 
engage with them to identify their concerns, (2) use appropriate measures to monitor 
performance in these areas so that the effect of CSR programs and policies is not lost in 
surrounding “noise”, and (3) increase transparency in reporting this performance through 
voluntary disclosure and credibility through the use of an independent, comprehensive reporting 
framework.   
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